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EIGHT LETTERS
ON
THE PEACE;
AND ON
THE COMMERCE
AND
MANUFACTURES
OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

BY
SIR FREDERICK MORTON EDEN, BART.

His ego nec metas rerum, nec tempora, pono—VIRG.

THE SECOND EDITION,
WITH CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONS.

LONDON:


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
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ERRATA.

Page 49, Note, line 2, for " See p. 43, 50, 52." read " See p. 50, 51, 53."

— 120, last line, for "10,122,452" read "10,323,452."

182, for "8,854" r. "8,857."

LETTERS

ON

THE PEACE.

LETTER I.

ON THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE.

Few political events can occur that will please all parties. On none can a greater diversity of opinion be expected than on the Peace recently concluded with France, Spain, and the Batavian Republic. The interests of commerce, the thirst of military glory, the pursuits of ambition, nay even the unalloyed feelings of loyalty and patriotism, will, each in their way, give a peculiar tinge to our opinions. It cannot therefore be a subject of surprize, that, though the greatest part of the nation express their unequivocal approbation of the Peace, as pregnant with the most beneficial consequences to the country, some persons (even among those who are distinguished for splendid abilities and upright intentions) should be found who think that

better terms might and ought to have been obtained, and that the honor and security of Great Britain would have been best promoted by a continuance of the war. In their estimation we have lost the “grand and swelling sentiments” of independence which characterized our forefathers; we have fought to preserve our wealth by debasing our character; and sold our birthrights for a mess of pottage. They say we have sanctioned those principles, and recognized as lawful governments those usurpations of power, which we lately deemed to be destructive of the balance of Europe, and inimical to the dearest interests of civilized society. They say, in short, that degenerate Britons,

“ Whose armour conscience buckled on,
 “ Whom zeal and charity brought to the field,
 “ That smooth-faced gentleman, tickling commodity,
 “ Commodity, the bias of the world,
 “ Hath drawn—
 “ From a resolv’d and honourable war,
 “ To a most base and vile-concluded peace.” *

Such are the heavy charges, which have been urged against those members of His Majesty’s government who have advised, and negotiated, the treaty of Amiens. Yet these charges, I conceive, contain much miscellaneous matter which is wholly foreign to the question of peace, and ought to be separately considered. It must be admitted that many circumstances attending our present situation

* Shakspeare.

are

are of momentous importance, but it should be recollected that they did not originate in the treaty. Many circumstances are of the most satisfactory nature, although they are not the result of diplomatic skill ; and some are to be lamented, although they furnish no proofs of ministerial incapacity. Among the former I might enumerate the return of plenty ; the internal tranquillity of Great Britain ; her industry, and opulence ; her increasing population ; her improvements in agriculture, manufactures and commerce ; her firm adherence to her civil and religious establishments. These are not the consequences of peace. I might likewise mention the fortunate changes, which even before France had sheathed the sword, had taken place in her interior organization ; the seeds of amendment which are observable in her defective institutions ; her abjuration of some revolutionary doctrines and excesses ; (*est quoddam prodire tenus ;*) her toleration of religious worship ; and her acknowledgment that monarchies are legitimate governments. Among the circumstances which are to be lamented, I might notice the mistaken policy of the Northern Powers of Europe ; the enteebled state of Turkey ; the reverses of Austria ; and the general corruption of Germany and Italy in morals, politics, and religion. These are evils which our interference did not create ;

and evils which our interference cannot cure. Nor, if the light of reason, still darkened by the fleeting clouds of vain philosophy,

“ In dim eclipse disastrous twilight sheds

“ On half the nations, and with fear of change

“ Perplexes monarchs,”*

can it be said that we, who have resisted, and have urged others to resist, the democratic storm, are the authors of those woes which threaten to disfigure the fairest portion of the globe. The convulsions, which now agitate Europe, are not imputable to us. Nor, on the other hand, is it essentially requisite for our security, that the ancient forms of government, the ancient divisions of territory, and the ancient system of treaties, should be revived and perpetuated. It is not such ties that connect us with the nations around us. They are bound to us by their wants; they are rendered tributary by our industry. Calamitous events, indeed, which we must deplore, may afflict them, and, by affecting the sources and contracting the channels of commerce, in some degree prove injurious to us. In the following pages, however, I shall endeavour to shew that the preservation of this country does not depend on the preservation of the balance of power on the Continent; that we still possess means of resistance, which will secure our independence and

* Milton.

promote our prosperity ; and that the terms of the definitive treaty, whilst they display our equity and moderation, have been selected with a due regard to those essential interests, the security of which constitutes the chief value of peace.

Many of the objections which have been, and are likely to be, urged against the Peace, may be included in this short though comprehensive proposition—that by sheathing the sword we have ratified the subversion of the balance of power in Europe, on the preservation of which our existence as a nation essentially depends.

The Peace, indeed, may be considered in other points of view ; but, for the present, I shall limit my attention to enquire what alterations this Balance has experienced, since its preservation has been deemed important to our interests ; and how far these alterations are likely to affect the future safety of Great Britain. To pursue such an enquiry to any useful purpose, we must have recourse to that guide, from whose instructive lessons Statesmen acquire political prudence. We must recur to History ; for the experience which the Statesman derives from the times in which he lives, is necessarily imperfect. It may, sometimes, shew him the causes of events ; but it can rarely enable him to trace them much beyond their immediate effects. History in some degree supplies the defects of experi-

ence, by furnishing us with complete examples of the beginning, progress, and completion of various systems of policy; and by connecting every cause with its consequence, it instructs us, if similar causes should occur, to divine what consequences will follow.

Thus, from unfolding the records of past events, we may confidently determine that laws tempered by freedom, and favourable to industry, will render a people prosperous and happy; that distracted and corrupt administrations must produce misery at home, and weakness abroad; that military governments, after some time, fall into impotence and languor; and that pure democracies usually end in anarchy or despotism. These and similar truths we recognize as axioms of state, and (though sometimes disappointed) we make them the rules of our public conduct: they are either buoys to point out our danger, or beacons to direct us to safety.

If we apply political experience to the consideration of our present circumstances, and, from an investigation of the past, attempt to anticipate the future, we may possibly discover, that in times less prosperous Britain had no reason to despair; and that confidence becomes her now. We may find precedents to shew that an advantageous peace has created dissatisfaction, but we shall find none to prove that a peace, signed in the full career of victory,

victory, has been the forerunner of ruin. Ill-omened birds, vain foretellers of tempests, may perch on our masts; but the vessel of the state will hold on her course, and bear her gallant crew unhurt amidst all the dangers of climates, storms, rocks, and quicksands.

It is generally agreed that the origin and foundation of the balance of Europe are to be sought for in the treaty which in 1648 terminated a thirty years war, and defined the rights, privileges, and authorities of the different members of the Germanic body. It is, however, remarkable, that the treaty of Munster, the corner stone of modern diplomacy, in some degree, countenanced those schemes of spoliation and aggrandizement, which we are apt to suppose to be peculiar to our own times. Secularizations and indemnities, the system which now threatens to annihilate the Empire, then originated. Crafty negotiators, whether Catholic or Protestant, carved eagerly for themselves. "Some asked for manors, others for acres, that lay convenient for them*." France, in particular, was a considerable gainer. Brisac, with its dependencies, the landgraviats of Alsace, Metz, Toul, Verdun, and Pignerol, (not to mention inferior acquisitions,) were surrendered to her. At this period Great Britain was too much occupied with domes-

* Swift and Arbuthnot's History of John Bull.

tic calamities to interfere in the general politics of Europe. Her only possession on the Continent was Dunkirk. The other principal powers were the house of Austria, (of which one branch held Spain and the Netherlands, and the other the fairest portion of Germany,) and the republic of Holland, a state, small, indeed, in extent, but wealthy, brave, and free; active in negotiation, and formidable in war. Prussia was then, and long after, a petty electorate. Russia had not emerged from barbarism.

The ambition of Louis the Fourteenth, within a short period after the peace of Westphalia, by conquest or by treaty, added new frontiers to France. By the Pyrenean treaty, concluded in 1659, after a short war with Spain, he not only acquired several places in Flanders and Luxemburg, the greatest part of Artois, Landrecy and Quesnoy in Hainault, the duchy of Bar, and other places in Lorraine, and Roussillon, Conflans, and Cerdagna, on the borders of Spain, but laid the foundations of uniting the French and Spanish monarchies under the house of Bourbon. From this time to the year 1700 (a period of 40 years) he never lost sight of this great object. In 1662, he purchased Dunkirk from our profuse and venal monarch, Charles the Second. By the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which in 1663 terminated another contest with Spain, Tournay, Lisle, Courtray, Oudenard, Aeth, Charleroy,

Charleroy, and Douay, very important points in what has been since denominated the iron frontier of France, were ceded to him. His northern and eastern frontiers were still further improved at the peace of Nimeguen in 1678, by which Spain received back Charleroy, Binch, Aeth, Oudenard, and Courtray, but ceded to France, Befançon, Valenciennes, Bouchain, Condé, Cambray, the remainder of Artois, several other places on the northern frontiers, and the whole of the country of Burgundy or Franche-Comté.

It is worthy of remark that, during the progress which Louis was making towards what has been termed Universal Monarchy, this country either viewed with indifference, or promoted with zeal, the attempts of her ambitious neighbour to subjugate the Continent. The Prince of Orange, however, profiting by the Revolution, which by placing him on the throne of James extended his influence to Great Britain, called forth our energies; and in 1689 we joined the continental confederacy, consisting of Spain, a debilitated monarchy, Holland, a still vigorous republic, and the Emperor, much weakened by the distracted state of his hereditary dominions, and a war with the Turks. This grand alliance proposed to reduce Louis to the terms of the Pyrenean treaty, (which stated the capitulation of marriage, by which Maria Theresa, the Queen of France, renounced

nounced her pretensions to the crown of Spain, as the chief part of the treaty, and the most worthy, as well as the greatest and most precious, earnest of the surety of its duration,) and to secure the succession of the Spanish crown to the house of Austria. Neither object, however, was accomplished. The French monarch's conquests from the Allies on the right bank of the Rhine, and Mons, Courtray, and Aeth, on the Flemish frontier, were restored to Spain at the peace of Ryfwick in 1697* ; but Strasburgh, a most important fortress on the side of Germany, was definitively ceded to him.

Of the state and sentiments of Great Britain, at the close of this war, Lord Bolingbroke appears to have given a faithful picture. As a Tory, and a strenuous opponent of King William and Queen Anne's Whig Ministers, he is to be perused with caution when he describes events in which they were concerned; yet, in the following remarks,

* The 4th article of this Treaty is somewhat similar to one introduced into the Treaty between Bonaparte and Russia. Louis XIV. engages his honour, upon the faith and word of a King, that he " will in no manner whatsoever favour the conspiracies or plots which
" any Rebels or ill-disposed persons may, in any place, excite against
" the King of Great Britain," who enters into a similar stipulation on his part. Notwithstanding this precedent, I should have lamented if a similar clause had been introduced into the Treaty of Amiens. The internal tranquillity of Great Britain will not, I trust, depend on the guarantee of the First Consul.

if

if compared with impartial historians, he will be found not to have deviated from truth. Those who doubt the veracity of this narration, will at least admit that modern times have shewn that it is not to be rejected on account of its improbability.

“ Our people” (he says) “ *believed, and were*
 “ *encouraged to believe, the war could not be*
 “ *long, if the King was vigorously supported:*
 “ and there is a humdrum speech of a Speaker of
 “ the House of Commons, I think, who humbly
 “ desired his Majesty to take this opportunity of
 “ reconquering his ancient duchy of Aquitain.
 “ We were soon awakened from these gaudy
 “ dreams. *In seven or eight years no impression*
 “ *had been made on France, that was besieged*
 “ *as it were on every side ;* and, after repeated de-
 “ feats in the Low Countries, where King William
 “ laid the principal stress of the war, his sole
 “ triumph was the retaking Namur, which had
 “ been taken by the French a few years before.
 “ Unsustained by success abroad, we are not to
 “ wonder that the spirit flagged at home; nor
 “ that the discontents of those, who were averse to
 “ the established Government, uniting with the
 “ far greater number of those who disliked the
 “ Administration, inflamed the general discon-
 “ tents of the nation, oppressed with taxes, pil-
 “ laged

“ laged by usurers, plundered at sea, and dis-
 “ appointed by land. As we run into extremes
 “ always, *some would have continued this war at*
 “ *any rate*, even at the same rate; but it was not
 “ possible they should prevail in such a situation
 “ of affairs, and such a disposition of minds. The
 “ generality of people grew as fond of getting out
 “ of the war, as they had been of entering into
 “ it; and thus far, perhaps, considering how it
 “ had been conducted, they were not much to be
 “ blamed. But this was not all; *for when King*
 “ *William had made the peace, our martial spirit*
 “ *became at once so pacific, that we seemed resolved to*
 “ *meddle no more in the affairs of the Continent; at*
 “ *least to employ our arms no more in the quarrels*
 “ *that might arise there:* and accordingly we
 “ reduced our troops in England to seven thou-
 “ sand men *.”

The King, however, persevered in his plan to
 reduce the power of France, and exerted himself
 during peace, to negotiate a new grand alliance
 with Holland and the Emperor. In the midst of
 these preparations he died: but, “ though the
 “ man was dead, the grand alliance survived†;”
 hostilities commenced against France and Spain

* Sketch of the History and State of Europe, Letter viii.

† Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution, p. 88.

in May 1702, and did not terminate till April 1713*.

Mr. Burke mentions this war as a proof of the energy of our ancestors: but here he stops; for it proves no more. Glorious as it was to our arms, and unequivocally demonstrative of our national resources, it added little to our power; but more than tripled the national debt, which in 1702 amounted to 16,000,000*l.*; but in 1714 exceeded 54,000,000*l.* The acquisition of Gibraltar, Minorca, half of St. Christopher's, and the Asiento trade, were no equivalent for such of the conquests of Louis, on the side of Germany and Flanders, as the peace of Utrecht allowed him to retain, and the establishment of the Bourbon family in Spain.

After the lapse of a century, in which the feuds of Whigs and Tories have given way to other controversies, unambitious and dispassionate politicians may doubt whether, on the whole, the war of Queen Anne was advantageous to the country. A writer, who has examined the most authentic documents respecting this period of our history, observe that “there were certainly many strong arguments for restraining that precipitancy of determination with which England rushed into

* Mr. Burke, somewhat inaccurately, asserts that this war continued for nearly *thirteen* years. Two Letters on Peace, p. 91.

“ the war, and which ought to have suggested
 “ such reserve and precautions as might, with-
 “ out violating the honour of King William,
 “ have prevented the extravagance with which it
 “ was carried on, and perhaps have brought it to
 “ a more speedy conclusion. But the general
 “ desire of the nation, the state of parties, and the
 “ private influence of a family, which the Sove-
 “ reign, at this time, was incapable of resisting, not
 “ only diverted her attention from pacific counsels,
 “ but induced the Administration to prepare for
 “ hostilities with an ardour, out of all proportion
 “ to any provocation received, and with exagge-
 “ rated expectations of the benefits likely to result
 “ from a successful war *.”

It may be said, on the other hand, that if we
 had not entered into the grand alliance, our Laws,
 our Liberties, and our Government would have
 been subverted; and that to the war of Anne we
 owe our subsequent existence as an independent
 nation. I cannot believe this; for the very cir-
 cumstance we so much dreaded, the acquisition of
 Spain by a Prince of the house of Bourbon, ac-
 tually took place without producing any calami-
 tous consequence to Britain. Still less shall I feel
 inclined to admit, that our thirty years peace,

* Somerville's Reign of Queen Anne, p. 3.

which

which succeeded the Treaty of Utrecht, was owing to the decrepit state of France: her public bankruptcy was expected in 1708; yet in four subsequent campaigns she continued the war with vigour, and in some instances with success. Our long repose was not owing to the decrepit state of France; for France, in 1730, was able to undertake, and actually did undertake, a new war with Germany; and reaped the solid fruits of conquest, in 1736, by annexing the valuable province of Lorraine to her wide-extended territories. The uninterrupted peace which we enjoyed during the whole of George the First's reign, and thirteen years after, may, with more probability, be ascribed to the long minority of Louis the Fifteenth, the internal dissensions of France respecting the Bull *Unigenitus*, the intrigues of the Spanish Minister Alberoni, which forced France and Great Britain for a time to unite, and, above all, to the pacific dispositions of Fleury and Walpole.

Let us now advert to the balance of European power as it appeared at the French Revolution in 1789. In the course of the eighteenth century Holland had gradually declined. Unable to stand singly against either England or France (in her prouder days she has held them both at defiance) she has, in all modern wars, been obliged to act the humble part of a feeble confederate. Verging
towards

towards the insignificance of Venice, she may expect to experience a similar fate, and to become the prey of some formidable neighbour. After a single gleam of national spirit, the sun of Spain had long before 1789 set for ever. The proud Castilians had long ceased to think for themselves. Of late years a war with Spain has rather been courted than dreaded. Mr. Burke truly describes her. “She is not a substantive power.” But, if neither the Monarchy of Charles the Fifth, nor the Republic of De Witt, can now regulate the fate of Europe, two formidable States have arisen, whose voices are heard in the Council of Nations. Russia, which at the peace of Westphalia was as dust in the balance, is now a great commercial and military Power. Prussia, from being the feudatory, is become the rival, of the Cæsars: the rescripts of her envoys are received with deference at Ratisbon. The mandates of Prussia in 1787 opened the gates of Amsterdam; the mandates of Russia may soon open the gates of Constantinople.

Such are the principal alterations which have taken place within the last one hundred and fifty years in the territorial division of Europe; and still more important changes appear to be in contemplation. It has been seen that various acquisitions, during this period, have rounded and consolidated the French Monarchy. In point of extent, the British dominions in Europe are now (with the
loss

loss of Dunkirk, and the addition only of Gibraltar) precisely what they were at the Treaty of Munster. Nature has fixed the boundaries of the United Kingdom. An ambitious continental power may add a contiguous province to her frontier: an insular one can only enlarge the bounds of empire, by acquiring detached provinces. But whilst our neighbours have extended their limits, Britain,

“Hedg’d in with the Main,

“That water-walled bulwark, still secure

“And confident from foreign purposes,”*

has increased her power (the power I mean of defence, for all other is precarious and illusory) by improvements in internal organization, by doubling her population, by colonization, by agriculture, by manufactures, and by commerce, the parent of naval power.

With these means, and these motives, to preserve her independence, she has five times, during the last century, been opposed to France. Some wars she has carried on alone; in others she has acted with confederates; in all she has shewn that her station in the scale of Europe depends not on a fanciful equilibrium which a congress of nations can adjust, but on resources which can be created, and energies which can be exerted, by herself.

* Shakspeare.

Diplomatic interference, negotiation, and treaty, may sometimes preserve a feeble state from immediate dissolution; but when did they inspire a timid people with manly sentiment and vigour; or make those powerful who had no confidence in themselves? Of all nations in Europe, Britain has the least occasion to dread the interposition, or to court the mediation, of neutral states. Her insular situation renders her inaccessible to all, except the maritime, powers. Her unfitness for Continental conquest secures her from jealousy. She can only affect Europe by alliances and subsidies. Nor are these means of war, now, of much consequence to her; for, as Germany is divided between two great monarchies, Austria and Prussia, whose mutual antipathies are not softened even by a common interest, we cannot court the one without displeasing the other. Austria was our ally in the war of 1742, and Prussia was against us; in that of 1756, Prussia joined, and Austria opposed, us; and in the last, though, from being both interested to resist the revolutionary system, they had joined against France, Prussia soon withdrew from the contest in which Austria persevered.

In mentioning these Powers, let me remark, that they are singular instances that, notwithstanding the supposed balance of power, systems of aggrandizement will still prevail. By two treaties of partition, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have parcelled
out

out to themselves the extensive republic of Poland; Russia, too, in the early part of the last century, stript Sweden of her most valuable province, and, towards the latter end of it, not content with a territory stretching from the Baltic to China, she advanced to the Crimea, and now, perhaps, extends her views to the mouldering provinces of Turkey. Yet Russia might whisper in our ears, that we, too, have taken our share in the division of empires: the northern powers might set off our two treaties for the partition of the Myfore against the two treaties for the partition of Poland. In one point, I trust, they would own the treaties materially differed. The northern confederacy dethroned a lawful prince because his territories were convenient for them: the Indian confederacy overthrew an usurper, and an implacable foe; and, in carving out an indemnity for themselves, they restored a lawful prince to his subjects.

Notwithstanding these various changes in the states on the Continent, Britain has long flourished “great and free, the dread and envy of them all.” History shews that the rise of one nation is not necessarily accompanied with the destruction of its neighbour. The French Republic may possess the Rhine, and yet not annihilate the commerce of the Thames. England may be free, though Holland is in chains. Whether the terms of peace are such as we are entitled to, or whether it would have

been more advantageous to us to have continued the war, are considerations very distinct from the question, whether our preservation depends on the balance of Europe being preserved. To this subject I have confined my present remarks; and shall conclude my letter with a translation of a paragraph in a periodical work, published at Hamburgh, which, I think, furnishes an answer to one reason, at least, for continuing the war.

“ The restoration of the balance of power,” it is said, “ is as chimerical as the dreams of conquest
 “ with which the coalition against France have
 “ been flattered.—It is the philosopher’s stone in
 “ politics. The negotiators at Munster thought
 “ they had obtained it; but what has it produced?
 “ Wars have succeeded wars: some states, which
 “ were then powerful, have been reduced to insigni-
 “ ficance; others have been annihilated; others
 “ from mere existence have risen into consequence:
 “ empires have been erected; kingdoms have
 “ been destroyed; the weak have been oppressed;
 “ the strong have abused their power: these are
 “ the consequences of this memorable system.
 “ What new scheme of policy can we devise that
 “ shall be safe? The birth of a great man, the licentiousness of a mob, may set human wisdom
 “ at defiance. We think that when we have
 “ placed equal (or nearly equal) portions of territory, population, commerce, revenue, and mili-
 “ tary

" tary force, in each scale, we have secured the
 " balance. But these are the mere elements of
 " chaos; how shall we duly appreciate human
 " wisdom which must combine them for use?
 " From a sight of the materials we estimate what the
 " fabric will be without consulting those who are
 " to be the architects. We determine what tools
 " will produce without knowing what hands will
 " use them. Calculate as we may, the future will
 " frequently elude our grasp, and our conjectures
 " be frustrated by the appearance of a Peter, a
 " Frederick, or a Bonaparte.

" Yet, as alchemy has led to some useful dis-
 " coveries, the attempt, however visionary, to set-
 " tle the balance of power in Europe may, possibly,
 " prove beneficial to mankind*."

* Le Spectateur du Nord, Juillet, 1801, p. 142.

L E T T E R II.

ON THE PEACE.

THE question of peace is not to be considered, as some would consider it, merely as a *question of territorial acquisition*: but, in order fairly to appreciate our present situation, and to decide whether we have acted wisely in terminating the war, on those conditions to which we have assented, we should recollect what was the chief object that induced France to attack us, and how far she has accomplished it. It was *to revolutionize us*. That the war, on our part, was purely defensive, that we had no views of conquest or aggrandizement, that we armed only to succour our antient allies, to vindicate our independence, and to protect our invaluable constitution from foes, both foreign and domestic, no one, who has studied Mr. Marsh's collection of authenticated facts, respecting the politics of Great Britain and France, can entertain a doubt*. If we failed in the first object, our failure was not ascribable to want of zeal, exertion, or perseverance. We fought and negotiated for the

* See Marsh's History of the Politicks of Great Britain and France.

powers of Europe long after they had ceased to fight or to negotiate for themselves. But, if we could not save others, we saved ourselves. We have exhibited a spectacle which will be fought for in vain among the humbled nations around us; we have successfully resisted the force of France; we have set the insidious arts of democracy at defiance; we have shewn the value we set on our liberties by our pertinacity in defending them; and we have been rewarded for our constancy; for, whilst war has desolated the continent, the peaceful shores of Great Britain have been exempt from its ravages. Nor did we shrink from the contest, when, after eight campaigns,

“ Deserted in” our “utmost need

“ By those” our “former bounty fed,”

we were attacked by a new and formidable confederacy. Grateful posterity will remember that our negotiations at Petersburg, which confirmed our maritime rights, were preceded by our naval victory at Copenhagen, and that our gallant army had vanquished the victorious legions of Bonaparte in Egypt before we signed the preliminaries with France.

It is well observed that “to improve the golden moment of opportunity, and catch the good that is within our reach, is the great art of life.”* This is precisely what our Ministers have done. When

* By Dr. Johnson.

they entered into office, they found the current of public opinion setting very fast against the continuance of the war. The nation was persuaded (not indeed that they were unable to contend with the French Republic, for every gazette proclaimed the valour and the victories of Britons, but) that the result of a further prolongation of hostilities would be an useless expenditure of blood and treasure. They were persuaded that no new continental alliances could be formed with advantage; that subsidies to foreign powers had drained the country of its specie; and that external force would consolidate the new-raised fabric of the consular government. Their wants influenced their opinions. Arguments were presented to them in the increased price of the necessaries of life. They were taught to believe that war had created a scarcity, and that peace would remove it. Peace is arrived; and plenty accompanies her: they will, therefore, I fear, continue to reason, mistakingly, as they have done;—*post hoc; ergo propter hoc*. Yet they ought to be informed that, during the last thirty years, the cheapest years were the seven years of the American war.

The nation, too, was satisfied that the great object of the contest had been attained. The popular notions of revolution and reform, which in 1793 agitated Great Britain, had given way to the rational conviction that no graft from the French tree
of

of liberty could improve the British constitution. The fate of France had left an awful warning to Great Britain. The experiment had been made, and had proved that the subversion of antient institutions, is not calculated to improve the sum of human bliss; that the proscription of the rich does not benefit the poor; that modern ethics offer no good substitute for religion; and foreign conquest no compensation for the loss of public order, and domestic comfort. The pack-horse may be ill-advised who kicks off his burthens in order to assume the trappings of the charger.

Let it also be recollected that, when the present Ministers entered into office, a new confederacy, designed to invade our maritime rights, had ripened into open hostility. They acted as became the guardians of the honor of a great nation whose dispositions were pacific; they contended with the Northern Powers, till our violated rights were recognized; but they contended no longer. They persevered in the war with France, till they had rescued from her gripe (not indeed a British colony, for Britain had lost no territory whatever, but) a country that had long been deemed (I conceive erroneously) the direct road to Indian conquest; but, having liberated Egypt, they improved the golden moment by concluding a peace, which secures some of the fruits of victory, and all the praise and advantage of successful resistance. This
resistance

resistance is a strong assurance of "security for the future;" for the experience of the last nine years has proved that the greatest military power in Europe, which has overrun Holland, Italy and Germany, can make no impression on this "sea-girt isle." We have indeed ceded to the original possessors more colonies than we have retained. So did France in 1783; but no rational politician was led from this circumstance to contend that she deemed the peace of Versailles either inglorious or unprofitable. She had succeeded in her object; and torn away a limb from the mother country. In the *last war* (may it long bear this designation!) she has failed most completely in a similar attempt; and the blow by which she hoped to dismember, has consolidated, the British Empire.

Peace, I admit, has been the result of necessity; but it is a necessity forcibly felt by both parties. France, by a continuance of hostilities, must have prolonged her internal distresses; and have protracted the long-wished-for period, in which renovated commerce may, possibly, repair the excesses of revolution; excesses which she must deplore, and from which war alone has preserved us: our coasts, our colonies, were inaccessible. Britain, by another year of war, must have made a great addition to a debt, which, though not intolerable, should not be wantonly increased. The blockade of Brest, or the bombardment of Boulogne, (and
such

such only, I apprehend, would have been the operations of another campaign) might have injured France, but would have yielded us no equivalent.

Some visionary politicians have supposed that vast projects were in contemplation; and that, if the war had continued, we should have attacked the Spanish settlements in America. I cannot, however, convince myself that the balance of Europe might be settled in Mexico, although the conquest of Canada is said to have been effected in Germany. Still less can I suppose that the invasion of Peru would have furnished a mighty lever for overturning the French Republic. Eldorado conquests would have attracted the gallant Knights of Britain two centuries ago; but I should have deemed myself a libeller of Ministers if I had supposed that they meant to consign our brave seamen and soldiers to the useless enterprizes and dishonourable graves of Drake, Cavendish, and Hawkins. Had we continued the war for such projects, well might Mr. Fox have exclaimed—"O calumniated
 "crusaders, how rational and moderate were your
 "objects! O much injured Louis the Fourteenth,
 "upon what flight grounds you have been accused
 "of restless and immoderate ambition! O tame
 "and feeble Cervantes, with what a timid pencil
 "and faint colours have you painted the portrait
 "of a disordered imagination!"*

* Letter to the Electors of Westminster 1793, p. 40.

In the parliamentary debates on the preliminary articles, though they have been defended nearly on the same grounds on which I thought them defensible,* Ministers have denied that the termination of the war was the result of necessity: yet, I trust, I shall not be deemed to have been guilty of a solecism, if, whilst I bow to such great authority, I persist in my opinion, that a peace may be the result of a necessity forcibly felt by both parties, and yet be honorable and safe. It appears to me to be a very possible case that two belligerent powers may be so circumstanced, that a continuance of hostilities, like a long protracted law-suit, may be ruinous to both. If such was the situation of France and this country, though I may deny that such a situation placed us at the feet of the First Consul, I must contend that the late necessary war has been concluded by a no less necessary peace. Nor shall I, as an Englishman, feel any humiliation if this plea, among others, should be brought forward to justify the treaty with M. Otto.

If, however, Peace is to be considered as a question of policy, and to be appreciated from the terms on which it has been concluded, it may be said, that some of our greatest statesmen have decided on its merits; that some of the principal members of the late administration (an administration which

* By the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords, and by Lord Hawkesbury in the Commons.

strenuously

strenuously supported the war) have censured the peace, either as bad in terms, or as objectionable altogether; and that the other members of that administration, who defend the Preliminaries, are glaringly inconsistent, because they thought it impolitic to enter into a negotiation with Bonaparte, in 1800. These points have been discussed, very fully, in Parliament; and I shall not investigate them further than to observe that at the beginning of that year our circumstances were very different from what they were in 1801. Russia had, then, not wholly withdrawn from the Continental Confederacy; Austria was preparing to act with vigour; the Royalists, though not stimulated by us, were assembling in the Western Departments of France. Those, therefore, who, two years ago, thought, with Mr. Windham, that the chances of war were preferable to the chances of peace, may now, without any dereliction of principle, think the experiment of another campaign inadvisable. Let me add too, that, however grateful we must feel to Mr. Pitt for having impressed us with a just sense of our danger, for having developed our resources, and for having conducted us, I will not say *through*, but *nearly through*, a long and expensive contest with foes both foreign and domestic, however readily we must acknowledge his great abilities as a war minister, and his still greater abilities as a minister of finance, it does
not

not follow that peace ought to be rejected, because he may be (though I do not think it has been proved that he is) inconsistent. Neither his impassioned and eloquent speech delivered in 1800, *flagrante bello*, nor Lord Grenville's official communications in 1797, will furnish us with a diplomatic code, by which the present peace can be tried. It is not to be vindicated merely by resorting to the *argumentum ad hominem*. If the peace is a bad one, it is no consolation to learn that "*fecerunt idem multi alii et boni*;" if it is safe and honorable it will bear the test of examination without reference to the negotiations at Lisle. If it places us in a state of insecurity it is no justification of Lord Hawkesbury, that Trinidad, Ceylon, Cochin, and the Cape, possessions which his predecessor attempted to secure to us by treaty in 1797, are less valuable acquisitions than Trinidad, Ceylon, and the Myfore, which are actually secured to us: it is no justification, that Lord Grenville's peace existed only in a *projet*, which, if it had been listened to by the Directory, might, very possibly, have been cut down to terms much below Lord Hawkesbury's *ultimatum*: it is no justification that our future security was as much affected by the treaty proposed in 1797, which allowed the French to retain all their colonies, as it is by the treaty concluded in 1801, which restores them all their colonies which we have conquered during the war.

In

In truth, “the form and pressure” of the two periods cannot, in any respect, be deemed to be the same. In 1797 we negotiated with a faction; we now treat with a state. I am assured by persons who lately visited France, and who were well acquainted with the character of Frenchmen during the monarchy, that they are now as averse as can be imagined to the original ideas and principles of the revolutionary system; that they sigh for the blessings of repose; and not only tolerate, but approve, those acts of government, which, twelve years ago, would have been deemed oppressive and despotic. They are no longer clamorous for universal suffrage; or even for the freedom of the press. Their 6000 justices of the peace have not taught them the value of an *Habeas Corpus* act. Royalists and republicans at length coalesce, like travellers, who, having gone round the world in different directions, meet at the same point. The Catholic worship (I will not say the Catholic religion) is re-established. A vast force has been sent to St. Domingo, to correct the ideas of negroes respecting civil liberty. Who, three years ago, could have supposed that the French would become such instructors? No part of this picture is such as an Englishman, whether he be a genuine Whig or a zealous Tory, can approve: but, with reference to the possibility and the propriety of negotiation,

it

it is satisfactory to know that France is at length sensible of the blessings of order; that, whatever the view of her rulers may be, the disposition of her inhabitants to remain at peace with us is warm and unequivocal: and that her government has not only renewed, but is capable of maintaining, the relations of amity with Great Britain.

The people of France, I apprehend, have satisfied themselves that the substitution of a Consul, or of Consuls, for an Executive Directory, is a change for the better: I doubt, however, whether their speculations on this subject are as refined as those of an ephemeral writer who informs us that the First Consul “has it in his power, perhaps, to
“lead his countrymen to solid liberty. They
“require a preparation for that state. They must
“be taught that liberty without order does not de-
“serve the name. Bonaparte, we trust, is now
“teaching them the wholesome lesson of obe-
“dience; that sort of obedience, however,
“which in nations, as well as individuals,
“qualifies men to govern themselves—an obedi-
“ence which does not corrupt and degrade, but
“which elevates and improves. Undoubtedly the
“French nation has much need of this lesson*.”

Whether the First Consul will perform all that is here set down for him, and “lead his country-

* Morning Chronicle, 21st October, 1801.

"men to solid liberty," I will not attempt to prognosticate. It is not a difficult task to make a strong government; but to make a free one, suited to the temper and genius of the French nation, to combine liberty with subordination, and to provide means for reform without opening a door to revolution, cannot be the work of one man, however great, or of one age, however enlightened. In the composition of political institutions time must be the principal agent. Bonaparte, however, has one road to glory opened to his view; but, to reach her temple, he must not attempt to mount higher, (as allegory would instruct him,) but be content to descend from the eminence. Sylla, Christina, and Washington, have done so before him. Public men, under certain circumstances, may find that "the post of honour is a private station." To Bonaparte it would also be the post of safety. He may confer happiness on France, if, availing himself of the power which military success has placed in his hands, he models his future conduct from examples which may be found in our history, not indeed in the Protectorate of Cromwell, but in the period which immediately succeeded it. I cannot believe that France is for ever destined to experience an elective government. The chances of peace may place the fabric of the state in that country on firm foundations:—but we must wait with patience, *dum defluat annis*.

The tide of revolution is ebbing away very fast : may the returning flood “ lead on to fortune !”

In estimating the probability of future security, we do not appear to have attached sufficient importance to the events of the last campaign. The force of nations depends as much on their moral character, as on their territorial and financial resources. A people who think themselves inferior to their adversaries in military skill and martial prowess are already half conquered. Doubt is the beginning of despair. Most of the successes of the French are ascribable to energy and confidence. *Possunt quia posse videntur.* The charm, however, which led them on from victory to victory, is at length, I trust for ever, dissolved. They now must know that, even with superior numbers, they are not more formidable to us in the field than on the ocean. That a French army of equal force ever successfully withstood the British bayonet, no fair instance, I believe, can be adduced. From the nature, however, of a continental war, few opportunities have occurred for large bodies of our troops to act unconnected with foreigners. But the expedition to Egypt has proved that in discipline, valour, endurance of fatigue, patient persevering exertion, the veterans of France may be excelled by the youth of Britain. Our army has added a never-fading wreath to the laurels won at Blenheim, Minden, and Quebec. Posterity will
read

read with astonishment, that less than 14,000 * of our troops, many of whom had been nearly a twelvemonth at sea, landed in a country, above three thousand miles distant from their own; a country, too, strongly fortified by nature, and garrisoned by 28,000 French †, the flower of those victorious

* The returns from the army under General Abercromby in Marmorissa Bay, on the 1st of January, 1800, amounted to 16,061 rank and file, fit for duty, including 469 Marines. At this period the sick list exceeded 2000. About 17,000 troops arrived in the bay of Aboukir, in March, and the effective rank and file landed in Egypt did not much exceed 13,000 men. In the months of July and August, a reinforcement of about 4500 men arrived from Great Britain and the Mediterranean garrisons; and about the middle of July, the Indian army of 5000 men, half British and half Sepoys, reached Cairo, but too late to be employed in the siege of Alexandria. The arrival, however, of this army in the Red Sea in the end of April, probably contributed towards the evacuation of Upper Egypt, and much assisted the operations against Cairo. The assistance derived from the cooperation of the Turks, resulted from their appearance and position more than from their personal exertions.

† The Gazette accounts of the operations of the British army enable us to ascertain, with sufficient precision, the number of the French forces in Egypt in March, 1801.

Taken Prisoners and capitulated

	MEN.
18th March, at Aboukir	150
21st March	200
19th April, at Rosetta	368
9th May, at Rhamanie	110
Cavalry taken on their way from Alexandria	53
14th, in vessels on the Nile	150
17th, the garrisons of fort Lesbé and Burlos	700
	Taken

victorious legions, who had spread terror through Italy, and vanquished the best troops of Austria. By three battles, and two sieges, we re-conquered

Taken with 550 Camels	-	600
25th June, at Cairo (including 500 Greeks)	-	10,000
21st August, in Marabout Castle	-	180
25th, surprised by 1st battalion of the 20th	-	57
2d Sept. garrison of Alexandria (including 1300 Sailors)		9400

Killed

15th May, in the battle near Cairo	-	50
The killed, in the different actions with the British, those who died of their wounds, of the plague in Cairo, or were destroyed by the natives, after the 8th of March, cannot, reasonably, be estimated at less than		5000

Total, exclusive of the followers of the army, of various descriptions. Of these there were taken 3500 at Cairo; and more, probably, at other places. 27,018

The number of French sea and land forces employed in Egypt, appears from various documents, found among the intercepted letters published two years ago, to have been above 60,000 men. Some addition may be made to this number for the crews and troops carried out in vessels which have entered Alexandria since August, 1798, and for the host of speculators, (*"faisseurs de fortune,"* as they were called,) who accompanied the army to Egypt.

Of the naval force of the Republic employed in this expedition, all the French line of battle ships, amounting to 13, were either taken or destroyed; and of 14 frigates, which attended them, very few escaped a similar fate. The General, indeed, destined to be First Consul, eluded the vigilance of our cruisers; and returned to France:

"Sed qualis rediit, nempe unâ nave"——

The loss of the British, in Egypt, it is supposed, did not altogether exceed 2000 men.

Egypt in less than six months *, and sent home 23,000 Frenchmen, disgusted with schemes of Indian conquest, and humbled by defeat. They will record our triumphs in every department of the Republic, and teach their countrymen to remember, for many years to come, that the last events of the war were disastrous to France, and glorious to Great Britain. Our exploits at Aboukir, Alexandria, and Cairo, by impressing the French with correct notions of our means of defence, will add security to peace. The *Invincibles*, who fled before us in Africa, will not intimidate us in Europe.

If a Northern Confederacy should again be formed to invade our maritime rights, which have been formally recognised by the Convention of Peterburgh, the Sound will form no barrier to our fleets, the harbours of the Baltic will furnish no protection to an armed neutrality. In 1780 we were insulted with impunity: in 1800, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, again attempted to insult us; but the lesson they received from the battle of Copenhagen will prevent the attempt from being

* The army landed on the 8th of March, in tempestuous weather, in the face of a numerous enemy who were defeated with great loss. On the 13th the French made an unsuccessful attack, and were again repulsed with loss; and on the 21st a general action took place, in which they were completely routed. Aboukir Castle surrendered on the 18th of March; Rosetta on the 19th of April; Cairo on the 25th of June; and Alexandria on the 2d of September.

repeated, as long as the exploits of a Nelson are remembered in the Baltic *.

I consider the islands which have been ceded to us by the Treaty of Peace to be most valuable acquisitions. Ceylon, whether we regard its situation at the southern extremity of the Peninsula of India, its excellent port of Trincomalé, (the only good one near our settlements,) or its rare productions, will increase the security, and extend the commerce, of our Indian empire. Nor should it be forgotten that Tippoo, the antient ally of France, (who aimed through him to subvert our power in Asia,) has been destroyed; that our provinces in the Carnatic have been strengthened on their most vulnerable side, by the annihilation of so powerful and implacable a foe; and that the partition of his territories has enabled us to narrow our frontiers, to form very beneficial alliances, and to bid

* Our victory over the Danes, and our naval preeminence at the conclusion of the war, were concisely and elegantly described in a Prologue to the Westminster play in last December. I regret that my memory does not enable me to quote more than four lines; and they, possibly, are not correctly stated.

—————“ fama ———
 “ Concinet ut Galli cessarunt æquore toto,
 “ Ut Batavæ Rheno delituere rates :
 “ Concinet et Danos uno discrimine fractos,
 “ Fœderaque Arctoo firmitus icta polo.”

Fiction is usually considered as the province of Poetry : but in this instance Poetry is allied with Truth.

defiance

defiance to the jealousy of Indians, and the ambition of Europeans. If the annexation of Belgium to France is a valuable conquest, let us be allowed to compute our gains in the Mysore. They are held by the best possible tenure—good government. Nor will any reasonable mind feel alarmed because the French are to receive back Pondicherry, and the Dutch are to re-occupy their *Comptoirs* in the East. Mere places of trade, circumscribed by our settlements, may excite our vigilance, but can never prove formidable to our power. In India we are the lords paramount ; and, though we permit the huckster and the chapman to erect their booths in our market, we do not fear that the grant will enable them to strip us of our demesnes, or to besiege us in our castles.

In the West-Indies we retain an island, more extensive than all the islands we restore : more advantageously situated, both for commerce and defence, than Jamaica ; less exhausted by cultivation, less exposed to Jacobinism. Trinidad, improved by British capital, and defended by British power, will, probably, in a very few years rival our most flourishing West-India colonies.

Ministers must comply with some of the prejudices of commerce. The possession of the French Windward islands, as military posts, was indispensable to us in war. They were the *point d'appui* of our sugar colonies. But I do not regret

the cession of Martinico and St. Lucia to France, or of Demerara and Surinam to Holland. When we contemplate the fate of St. Domingo, we should not wish to fatten more victims for sacrifice. The noxiousness of a climate more fatal to Britons than the sword, the proximity of the States of America, and the spirit of insubordination (a spirit, I fear, that will not cease, even with the abolition of the Slave Trade) have much lessened the value of Transatlantic property.

Of the acquisitions of France I entertain very different sentiments from those expressed by the advocates for war; but the limits of a pamphlet will not allow me to compare her gains of population and of territory with her losses, both moral and political. The account would be a long one. In less distracted times, France herself may probably strike a fair balance, set down her losses with correctness, and compute her gains without exaggeration.

It is no objection to peace, that by it much must be hazarded; for more would be hazarded by a prolongation of the contest. All great political measures, war and peace more especially, are experiments. Our statesmen well know that more than mere parchment is required to cement the amity of nations: that time, the most powerful of agents, the chief improver of human institutions, must cooperate with political wisdom to render
 peace

peace a blessing ; that self-interest will soften antient animosities ; and that commerce, “ the golden girdle of the globe *,” will bind us together, when our fiercer passions would disunite us.

It is a narrow policy to suppose, that our prosperity must be advanced by the ruin of France. A commercial nation will be benefited by an increase of her best customers. The more industrious France becomes, the more sensible she will be of the blessings of peace, and the more anxious to preserve them. Nor will her advances in social arts, though they may add to her strength, diminish our security. It seems to have been wisely ordained by Providence that the wealth of nations should not dispose them to aggression, though it may furnish them with defence. The poorest and most uncivilized tribes have ever been the greatest conquerors.

The advocates for war apprehend that what the Republic cannot effect by force, she may accomplish by craft, and that we may fall, like the Trojans,

“ —Captique dolis, lacrymisque coacti,
 “ Quos neque Tydides, nec Larissæus Achilles,
 “ Non anni domuere decem, non mille carinæ.”

I entertain no such apprehensions : I consider our undisputed sovereignty in the East, and our

* Cowper.

union

union with Ireland, (another beneficial consequence of the war,) as some “indemnity for the past, and “security for the future.” To these most valuable acquisitions, but above all, to the activity of British industry, and the energy of British spirit, which (under the blessing of Providence) have conducted us through war with honour, I look with confidence for resources, that may preserve us in peace without humiliation.

L E T T E R III.

ON THE COMMERCE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

EVERY war, in which Great Britain has been engaged since the reign of Queen Anne, except that which has just terminated, has so much affected the relations and connexions of this country with other parts of the civilized world, that, if the extent of our commerce be estimated by the tonnage of the vessels employed, (which upon the whole appears to be a fairer criterion of the magnitude of our trade than the Custom-house valuations of imports and exports, though they ought not to be wholly disregarded,) it will be found to have progressively declined during each period of hostility to a point much below its amount in the preceding period of peace. In the war, which originated from our disputes with Spain in 1739, the tonnage of vessels cleared outwards from the ports of England and Wales fell from 503,568 tons, the tonnage before the war, to 446,666 tons in 1744, and did not reach its former height till 1748, which, as Preliminaries were signed early in April, may be considered as a year of peace: in that of 1756, from 661,184 tons,

tons, the average of the years 1749, 1750, 1751, (I have not the accounts of the three subsequent years before me,) the tonnage sunk to 524,710 tons, its lowest depression during the war; and though it afterwards rose, it did not wholly recover itself till the return of peace: and in the American war a still more remarkable diminution took place. The following extracts from Mr. Chalmers's Estimate will exhibit at one view the various fluctuations in our commerce during each of these periods.

Tonnage of Vessels, English and Foreign, cleared outwards from the Ports of England and Wales.

	Years.	English Tons.	Foreign Tons.	Total Tonnage.	
Peace	{ 1736 1737 1738 }	476,941	26,627	503,568	} Aver. of 3 years.
War	{ 1739 1740 1741 1744 1747 1748 }	384,191	87,260	471,451	
		373,817	72,849	446,666	ditto.
		394,571	101,671	496,242	
		479,236	75,477	554,713	
Peace	{ 1749 1750 1751 }	609,798	51,386	661,184	ditto.
War	{ 1755 1756 1757 1760 1761 1762 }	451,254	73,456	524,710	ditto.
		471,241	102,737	573,978	
		508,220	117,335	626,055	
		480,444	120,126	600,570	
					Peace

	Years.	English Tons.	Foreign Tons.	Total Tonnage.
Peace	1770	703,495	57,476	760,971
	1771	773,390	63,532	836,922
	1772	818,108	72,603	890,711
	1773	771,483	54,820	826,303
	1774	798,240	65,273	863,513
War	1775	783,226	64,860	848,086
	1776	778,878	72,188	851,066
	1777	736,234	83,468	819,702
	1778	657,238	98,113	755,351
	1779	590,911	139,124	730,035
	1780	619,462	134,515	753,977
	1781	547,953	163,410	711,363
	1782	552,851	208,511	761,362

Of the causes of this depression in our commerce, the principal seem to be, that in war we are usually opposed to those states which in peace are our best customers; that during hostilities the risk of capture so much enhances the expence of freight, which constitutes a part of the price of every article exported, and the charges of seamen's wages and insurance are so much increased, that neutral nations not only become the carriers of our goods, but are enabled to undersell our manufacturers in foreign markets; and that a considerable part of the national capital being required during war, for supplying the exigencies of the state, less labour can be set in motion for the purposes of commerce. During the last nine years, however, peculiar circumstances have prevented these causes from producing

ducing their usual effect ; or rather have counter-balanced them. Since the commencement of the war our commerce has so much increased, that the tonnage of vessels, cleared outwards from British ports, has arisen from 1,639,300 tons, its amount in 1792, the most flourishing year of peace this country ever experienced, to 2,130,322 tons. The following table exhibits this increase, and the progress of our navigation since the year 1788.

An Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels which entered inwards, and cleared outwards, in the several Ports of Great Britain, from, or to, all Parts of the World, in 1789, and the eleven following Years.

Vessels entered Inwards.

Years.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons..	Total Tons.
1789	1,398,333	190,676	1,589,009
1790	1,428,376	277,599	1,705,975
1791	1,452,498	321,364	1,773,862
1792	1,587,645	304,074	1,891,719
1793	1,342,952	332,375	1,675,327
1794	1,452,786	334,205	1,786,991
1795	1,242,785	390,030	1,632,815
1796	1,474,949	520,069	1,995,018
1797	1,150,222	455,678	1,605,900
1798	1,289,144	420,028	1,709,172
1799	1,375,169	476,596	1,851,765
1800	1,379,807	763,236	2,143,043

Vessels

Vessels cleared Outwards.

Years.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.	Total Tons.
1789	1,507,636	103,697	1,611,333
1790	1,399,233	148,974	1,548,207
1791	1,511,294	184,729	1,696,023
1792	1,563,744	75,550	1,639,300
1793	1,240,202	187,032	1,427,234
1794	1,382,250	218,567	1,600,817
1795	1,145,450	332,567	1,528,017
1796	1,254,626	478,358	1,732,984
1797	1,103,781	396,271	1,500,052
1798	1,319,151	365,719	1,684,870
1799	1,302,551	414,774	1,717,325
1800	1,445,271	685,051	2,130,322

The increase in the imports and exports is still more extraordinary than the increase in the tonnage, exhibited in the preceding table. It appears from the following official statements of the Inspector General of the Imports and Exports of Great Britain, that the Exports of 1799 and 1800 amount to more than the Exports of 1777 and the five following years, and that the Exports of 1800 are nearly quadruple the amount of the Exports twenty years ago. During the American war the Exports seldom exceeded the Imports: in one year (1781) they were less. The Exports of the first eight years of the last war exceeded the Imports by more than £ 50,000,000 official value; and including the ninth year, 1801, it is probable, that the excess of Exports during the war above the Imports

Imports was more than £60,000,000 official value*. Since the prosperous year 1792 our Imports have received an increase of one-half, and our Exports of two-thirds, of their amount at that period; our Imports in 1800, compared with those of 1785, were as two to one, and our Exports as five to two. It also appears that the British manufactures exported in 1800 were valued at more than those exported in the two years 1785 and 1786; that they very nearly equal those exported in the two years 1785 and 1793; and that the British manufactures exported in 1799 and 1800 exceed by ten millions official value (which are equal to about seventeen millions real value) the amount of British manufactures exported in any other two years that can be selected. It is true, that in some articles of export, an increase may be ascribed to the war; but when it is considered that provisions, and naval and military stores, shipped in the King's transports, are not entered on the books of the Custom-house, a very ample allowance may be made for the extraordinary demand created by the war; and yet a considerable surplus will remain, which must be placed to the account of extended markets and improving commerce.

VALUE

* It cannot, however, be supposed, that the *real value* of the balance of Exports and Imports amounts to this sum. The *real value* of the Exports in 1799 exceeded the *official value*, about 40 per cent.; and the

VALUE OF IMPORTS *.

Years.	From East Indies & China.	All other Parts.	Total Imports.
	£.	£.	£.
1777	1,834,221	10,809,612	12,643,834
1778	1,526,130	9,449,402	10,975,533
1779	716,323	10,718,940	11,435,263
1780	970,726	9,841,513	10,812,246

VALUE

real value of the Imports that year exceeded the *official value*, about 82 per cent. (See p. 43, 50, 52,) and the Imports and Exports that year, in *real value*, nearly balanced each other; the *real value* of foreign merchandize exported was somewhat less than the *official value*. (See p. 53,) The *real value* of British manufactures exported may be taken in round numbers at 70 per cent. more than the *official value*. (See p. 53.) If these data were applicable to every period of the war, the *real value* of the Imports and Exports, in round numbers, might be adjusted thus :

	Official value.	Real value.
	£.	£.
Imports in 8 first years of the war	193,000,000 + 82 p. ct. =	360,000,000
Exports—British manufactures	150,000,000 + 70 p. ct. =	255,000,000
Foreign merchandize	95,000,000	95,000,000
	Total Exports	350,000,000
Balance of Imports	- Total value	10,000,000

It must be recollected that a considerable part of our Imports is a *Remittance Trade* to proprietors of East and West India property, resident in Great Britain.

* The totals, in some instances, in this and the following table, amount to £.1 more than the two first columns added together; this arises from the shillings belonging to the first and second columns,

VALUE OF IMPORTS*.

Years.	From East Indies & China.	All other Parts.	Total Imports.
	£.	£.	£.
1781	2,526,339	10,197,274	12,723,613
1782	626,319	9,715,509	10,341,828
1783	1,301,495	11,820,739	13,122,235
1784	2,996,652	12,276,224	15,272,877
1785	2,703,940	13,575,478	16,279,419
1786	3,156,687	12,629,385	15,786,072
1787	3,430,868	14,373,146	17,804,014
1788	3,453,897	14,573,272	18,027,170
1789	3,362,545	14,458,557	17,821,102
1790	3,149,870	15,981,015	19,130,886
1791	3,698,713	15,971,069	19,669,782
1792	2,701,547	16,957,810	19,659,358
1793	3,499,023	15,757,693	19,256,717
1794	4,458,475	17,830,418	22,288,894
1795	5,760,810	16,976,079	22,736,889
1796	3,372,689	19,814,630	23,187,319
1797	3,942,384	17,071,572	21,013,956
1798	7,626,390	20,230,959	27,857,889
1799	4,284,805	22,552,626	26,837,432
1800	4,942,275	25,628,330	30,570,605

when they amounted to a pound, having been added together for the total. This remark applies to the subsequent tables. The eight first years in these tables of imports and exports were taken from the Report of the Lords' Committee of Secrecy, 1797, Appendix No. 40; and the remaining years were derived from the Trade and Navigation Account, laid before Parliament in June last; that account, however, varies in a small degree from the accounts of 1799 and 1800. The year 1801 was supplied from the Custom-house.

VALUE OF EXPORTS.

Years.	British Produce and Manufac- tures.	Foreign Mer- chandize.	Total Exports.
	£.	£.	£.
1777	9,300,266	4,190,763	13,491,029
1778	8,207,503	4,046,392	12,253,895
1779	7,648,286	5,890,289	13,538,575
1780	8,813,690	3,834,925	12,648,616
1781	7,633,332	3,708,963	11,342,296
1782	9,109,561	3,907,829	13,017,390
1783	10,409,713	5,058,574	15,468,287
1784	11,887,628	3,846,434	15,734,062
1785	11,081,810	5,035,357	16,117,168
1786	11,830,372	4,475,493	16,305,866
1787	12,053,900	4,815,889	16,869,789
1788	12,724,719	4,747,518	17,472,238
1789	13,779,506	5,551,042	19,340,548
1790	14,921,084	5,199,037	20,120,121
1791	16,810,018	5,921,976	22,731,995
1792	18,336,851	6,568,348	24,905,200
1793	13,892,268	6,497,911	20,390,180
1794	16,725,402	10,022,680	26,748,083
1795	16,338,213	10,785,125	27,123,338
1796	19,102,220	11,416,693	30,518,913
1797	16,903,103	12,013,907	28,917,010
1798	19,672,503	13,919,274	33,591,777
1799	24,084,213	11,907,116	35,991,329
1800	24,304,283	18,847,735	43,152,019

It is hardly necessary to remark that these values are not the real values of merchandize imported or exported. The rates of value settled in 1697 have been continued at the Custom house; and according to those rates the value of all merchandize imported or exported is entered in the books

of the Inspector General ; but since that period the price of almost every article of commerce has so much increased that its official value falls very much short of its real value : in some few instances, however, this is not the case ; in an account of the rated value, and of the value agreeably to the prices current, of the foreign merchandize exported from Great Britain to Ireland, (laid before Parliament in 1799,) it appears that the rated value of liquorice, mahogany, coffee, rice, saltpetre, linseed seeds, Bengal Italian and thrown silks, rum, and tar, is more than their real value : coffee is rated at nearly thrice its current price. The Convoy Act, passed in 1798, required the merchant to declare the real value of British merchandize exported, in order that the export duty might be ascertained ; but the exports to Ireland, certain articles used in the fisheries, and cotton manufactures of all descriptions, being exempted from the payment of this duty, the information which it furnished was necessarily imperfect. By assuming, however, that articles exported to Ireland, or used in the fisheries, may be estimated at the same rate of value with articles of a similar value exported to other countries, and by forming an estimate of the true value of cotton manufactures exported, the Inspector General has been enabled to state to Parliament the real value of merchandize exported. From the first half year's operation

operation of the Convoy Duty, it appeared that the *declared value*, on which a duty was paid, exceeded the rate of *value in the Inspector General's books* about 71 per cent. on the whole of the British manufactures exported. The *real* value probably exceeds the *declared* value. In some years, owing to the great quantity of coffee, and other high-rated articles being re-exported, the *official* value of *foreign merchandize* exported exceeds the *real* value*. The Inspector General has laid before Parliament the following statements of the real value of our imports and exports.

IMPORTS.

Years.	From East Indies and China.	All other Parts.	Total.
	£.	£.	£.
1799	8,918,248	40,083,922	49,002,170
1800		45,573,138	

EXPORTS.

Years.	British Manu- factures.	Foreign Merchandize.	Total.
	£.	£.	£.
1798	33,148,682		
1799	38,942,498	11,347,692	50,290,190
1800	39,471,203	16,359,640	55,810,843
Total actual value of imports and exports in 1799			99,292,360

It appears from the resolutions on Finance, moved by Mr. Addington, and adopted by the House of Commons, last Summer, that the total

*This, it appears, was the case in 1799 and 1800.

actual value of imports and exports in 1800, supposing the imports from the East Indies and China to be the same in the preceding year*, may be estimated at £.110,000,000.

Three of these resolutions exhibit the progress of our commerce during the last twenty years in so satisfactory a point of view, that I cannot deny myself the pleasure of subjoining them.

RESOLUTION XIV.—That the official value of all imports into Great Britain, in the year ending the 5th of January, 1784, was 13,122,235*l.*; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th of January, 1784, was 11,690,829*l.*: That the official value of all imports into Great Britain, in the year ending the 5th of January, 1793, was 19,659,358*l.*; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th of January, 1793, was 18,685,390*l.*: That the official value of all imports into Great Britain, in the year ending the 5th of January, 1801, (supposing the imports from the East Indies, of which no account has yet been made up, to be the same as in the preceding year) was 29,925,858*l.*† making an increase, as compared with 1783, of 16,803,623*l.* and with 1792, of 10,366,500*l.*; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th of January, 1801, was 25,259,890*l.* making an increase, as compared with the average to 5th of Ja-

* That is £.4,284,805. This estimate was very moderate; for the imports from the East Indies and China in 1799 were less than the average of the preceding six years by £.491,913; less than the average of the preceding three years by £.695,862; and less than the imports of the preceding year 1798, by £.3,342,125. It now appears that the imports from the East Indies and China in 1800 exceeded this estimate by £.657,470. See p. 50.

† Their actual amount was £.30,570,605. See p. 50.

January, 1784, of 13,569,061*l.* and with the average to 5th of January, 1793, of 6,574,500*l.*; and that the real value of imports in the year ended the 5th of January, 1801, supposing the imports from the East Indies to be the same as in the preceding year, may be estimated at about 54,500,000*l.*

RESOLUTION XV.—That the official value of British manufactures exported from Great Britain, in the year ending the 5th of January, 1784, was 10,409,713*l.* and on an average of six years, ending 5th January, 1784, was 8,616,660*l.*; that the official value of British manufactures exported from Great Britain, in the year ending 5th January, 1793, was 18,336,851*l.*; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th January, 1793, was 14,771,049*l.*: That the official value of British manufactures exported from Great Britain in the year ending 5th January, 1801, was 24,411,067*l.* *; making an increase, as compared with 1783, of 14,001,354*l.* and with 1792, of 6,074,216*l.*; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th of January, 1801, was 20,085,199*l.* making an increase, as compared with the average to 5th January, 1784, of 11,468,539*l.* and with the average to 5th January, 1793, of 5,314,150*l.*; and that the real value of British manufactures exported, in the year 1800, may be estimated at about 39,500,000*l.*

RESOLUTION XVI.—That the total amount of foreign merchandize exported from Great Britain, in the year ended the 5th of January, 1784, was 4,332,909*l.*; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th January, 1784, was 4,263,930*l.*: That the total value of foreign merchandize exported from Great Britain, in the year ending the 5th January, 1793, was 6,568,000*l.*; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th of January 1793, was 5,468,014*l.*: That the total value of foreign merchandize exported from Great Britain, in the year ending the 5th of January, 1801, was 17,166,145*l.* †; making

* The exact sum was £.24,304,283. See p. 51.

† The exact sum was £.18,847,735. See p. 51.

an increase, as compared with 1783, of 12,833,236*l.*; and with 1792, of 10,598,145*l.*; and on an average of six years, ending the 5th of January, 1801, was 12,867,958*l.*; making an increase, as compared with the average to January 5th, 1784, of 8,604,028*l.*; and with the average to January the 5th, 1793, of 7,399,994*l.*; and that the real value of foreign merchandize exported in the year ended the 5th of January, 1801, may be estimated at about 16,300,000*l.*

The increase of British navigation is no less extraordinary than the increase of British commerce. It will appear from the following accounts, that, notwithstanding the encouragements held out to foreign traders by the war, ship-building has thriven more than ever; and that our commerce has required every year, not only additional shipping, but larger vessels than were built before 1793.

An Account of the Number of Vessels, with the Amount of their Tonnage, which have been annually built and registered in the several Ports of the British Empire, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

Years.	Vessels.	Tons.	Average Tonnage.
1789	827	71,090	86
1790	725	68,695	94
1791	766	68,940	90
1792	821	78,120	95
1793	800	75,085	93
1794	714	66,021	92
1795	719	72,181	100
1796	823	94,972	115
1797	756	86,242	114
1798	833	89,319	107
1799	858	98,044	114
1800	965	126,268	130

An Account of the Number of Vessels belonging to the several Ports of the British Empire, and the Amount of their Tonnage, and the Number of Men and Boys employed in navigating them, in the Year 1783, and the Seventeen following Years *.

	Years.	Vessels.	Tons.	Men.
On 5th Jan.	1783	8,342	669,212	59,004
	1784	9,111	793,147	65,880
	1785	9,753	859,606	71,372
	1786	10,192	920,926	74,835
	1787	10,411	1,087,874	81,745
On the 30th September.	1788	13,827	1,363,488	107,925
	1789	14,310	1,395,172	108,962
	1790	15,015	1,460,823	112,556
	1791	15,645	1,511,411	117,044
	1792 †	16,079	1,540,145	118,286
	1793	16,329	1,564,520	118,952
	1794	16,806	1,589,758	119,629
	1795	16,728	1,574,451	116,467
	1796	17,067	1,519,298	120,979
	1797	16,903	1,614,996	124,394
	1798	17,295	1,666,481	129,546
	1799	17,879	1,752,815	135,237
	1800	18,877	1,905,438	143,661

In the above account, the first five years only comprehend the shipping belonging to England

* Accounts, and Supplementary Accounts respecting the Trade and Navigation of the British Empire, June, 1801.

† The late Inspector General was of opinion, that, immediately preceding the war, the Merchants shipping of *this kingdom*, (by which expression I presume he meant *Great Britain* only,) amounted to much more than £. 12,000,000. See Commons' Third Report on the Bank, 1797, p. 113.

and

and Holland. The accounts of the vessels belonging to Ireland, Guernsey, Jersey, Man, and the British Colonies in the West Indies and America, were not returned to the Register General of Shipping previously to the year 1788, when the Act of the 26th of the King, called the Register Act, had taken full effect. From the following comparison of the shipping belonging to different parts of the British Empire in 1788 and 1800 it appears that the number of vessels belonging to Ireland has decreased, and that the greatest increase has been in the shipping belonging to England and the Colonies.

On the 30th September, 1788.

	Vessels.	Tons.	Men.
England	9,358	1,055,299	79,859
Scotland	1,864	149,185	13,236
Ireland	1,016	60,777	6,055
Guernsey, Jersey, and Man,	221	13,801	1,333
Colonies	1,368	84,426	7,442
	13,827	1,363,488	107,925

On the 30th September, 1800.

	Vessels.	Tons.	Men.
England	12,189	1,463,398	104,926
Scotland	2,286	168,485	14,453
Ireland	1,003	54,262	5,057
Guernsey, Jersey, and Man,	390	17,110	2,749
Colonies	3,009	202,183	16,476
	18,877	1,905,438	143,661

Various causes have co-operated to raise our trade and navigation to this unexampled height of prosperity. The calamitous effects of revolution have long dried up the sources of mercantile opulence in France. The destruction of Lyons, the annihilation of the manufacture of woollens in the Southern, and the temporary suspension (in consequence of the operations of war) of that of cambrics and linens in the Northern Departments, will, probably, long prevent our neighbours from entering into competition with us in foreign markets. The general insecurity of property on the Continent has thrown a vast capital into Great Britain, and thus supported public credit, with which the credit of our counting-houses is intimately connected. The formidable state of our navy, the vigilance of our cruizers *, and the salutary provisions of the Convoy Act, have given confidence and security to our merchants and manufacturers. Almost every port from the Baltic to the Adriatic has been shut against us by the

		Ships of the Line.		Frigates.
* The British Navy	} in Feb. 1793 consisted of	{	135	133
The French Navy			80	66
The British Navy	} in Oct. 1801	{	202	277
The French Navy			39	35

See Lord Hawkesbury's Speech on the Peace.

During the war, 90 French, Dutch, Spanish, or Danish, ships of the line, 4 fifties, 190 frigates, and 250 sloops (besides about 940 privateers, and about 5,500 merchantmen) have been lost, taken, or destroyed.

compulsion of open, or the machinations of secret, enemies; but our commerce has forced her way even into countries unwilling to receive her:—

——“ *Per obstantes catervas
Explicuit sua victor arma.*”

Those who apprehend that peace must, necessarily, lessen the export of our manufactures, seem to have been led to form this conclusion from observing that our trade has been increased, in some branches, by the extraordinary demand for naval and military stores, and other supplies necessary for our foreign possessions, and by the conquest of many valuable colonies; but they ought also to consider, that, though the war has furnished us with some new markets which we must lose at the peace, it closed several old ones, which we must recover, and that our business in those which have not been affected by the contest has increased and is increasing. That many valuable branches of trade, which the sovereignty of the sea during the last nine years has enabled us to share with neutral nations, or to appropriate exclusively to ourselves, will, in consequence of the cession of conquered settlements, which we have agreed to make, be either wholly or partially lost to this country, is indisputable. I am ready to admit that peace will eventually deprive us of a great part of the trade which we now carry on with the French and Dutch settlements in the West Indies and America, of the whole

whole or greatest part of our trade with the Cape, Cochin, Malacca, and the Dutch spice islands, and of some part of our trade with the northern states of Europe, and with Portugal. But if our probable losses are to be charged against us, we should be allowed credit for our probable gains; if the cessation of hostilities will deprive us of many new customers, it will restore to us many old ones. Our trade with the conquered colonies, which we propose to restore, and our trade with the northern states of Europe, may experience some diminution; but our trade with the United States of America and with our foreign possessions in the East and West Indies will, probably, be augmented; and our trade with the belligerent powers, which has been suspended during the war, may be expected to return to its ancient channel. I shall consider each of these four heads separately; and endeavour to shew, from a short review of the tonnage of the vessels which we employed both before, and during, the war, in different parts of the world, that, whatever evils we may dread from the peace, we cannot reasonably apprehend that our manufactures will languish, or our commerce decrease.

LETTER IV.

ON THE TRADE WITH THE WEST INDIES.

FROM the following account of the tonnage of vessels entered inwards at the different ports in Great Britain, from the West Indies, since the year 1788, it will appear that our trade with the conquered islands during the last four years, has amounted to a third of the trade which we carry on with our own West India colonies; and that our trade with the foreign islands has been tripled since the commencement of the war in 1793.

Tonnage of Vessels entered inwards in the several Ports in Great Britain, from the West Indies, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

Years.	British West Indies.	Foreign West Indies.	Conquered Islands.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
1789	- 142,288	- - 125	—
1790	- 140,069	- - 548	—
1791	- 144,233	- - 3,124	—
1792	- 148,360	- - 2,791	—
1793	- 154,310	- - 2,344	—
1794	- 172,408	- - 2,519	—
1795	- 154,306	- - 4,809	—
1796	- 145,195	- - 4,996	- - 34,622
1797	- 112,345	- - 3,366	- - 51,822
1798	- 138,841	- - 3,585	- - 47,412
1799	- 178,782	- - 12,666	- - 57,509
1800	- 162,425	- - 6,057	- - 59,755

The official value of British manufactures exported to our old West India islands, and of the imports

imports from them, was stated by Lord Hawkesbury* to be—

	British Manufactures exported.	Imports.
On an Average of the Three last Years of Peace —	£. 2,185,000	£. 3,877,000
On an Average of the Three Years of War, 1798, 1799, and 1800 — —	3,561,000	5,101,000

The following official account of imports and exports, for eleven years, ending with 1800, distinguishes the value of British manufactures exported during the years 1797, 1798, 1799, and 1800, to the British West Indies, the conquered islands, and the foreign West Indies. It appears from this account that our imports from the conquered islands are above a third, and our exports to those islands not quite a third, of the amount of the corresponding branches of trade with our own West India colonies.

The late Inspector General estimated the direct exports from Great Britain to the West Indies, to have amounted annually in the four years preceding 1796, agreeably to the prices current during that period, to about £.3,900,000, and including the value of those negroes exported from Africa, who were retained in the British West Indies, to £.4,670,000. He valued the imports, estimated in the same manner, to have amounted annually in the same period, to £.68,00,000, a considerable part of which is remittances to West India proprietors †.

* Speech on the Peace, 3d Nov. 1801.

† Commons' Third Report on the Bank, 1797, p. 110.

An Account of the official Value of Imports from the British and Foreign West Indies and Florida, and of Exports to them, in 1790 and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize. In the Years 1797, 1798, 1799, and 1800, the British West Indies are distinguished from the conquered Islands, the foreign West Indies, and Florida.

Years.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	4,083,305	1,731,105	185,064	1,916,170
1791	3,849,494	2,359,577	226,895	4,586,472
1792	4,408,532	2,646,370	244,563	2,890,934
1793	4,647,980	2,314,709	253,134	2,567,844
1794	5,566,645	3,257,877	540,312	3,798,189
1795	4,929,519	2,399,101	442,653	2,761,755
1796	4,897,698	3,433,417	597,257	4,030,674

British West Indies, including Trinidad.

	£.	£.	£.	£.
1797	3,540,431	2,427,067	228,347	2,655,415
1798	4,594,023	4,666,636	394,958	4,561,595
1799	5,284,306	4,355,352	628,178	4,983,530
1800	5,820,223	2,827,113	339,866	3,166,980

Conquered Islands.

1797	1,632,637	794,244	129,457	923,701
1798	1,796,635	1,294,767	245,446	1,540,214
1799	1,469,280	1,047,224	206,442	1,311,167
1800	2,543,534	704,988	142,314	847,232

Foreign West Indies.

Years.	Value of Imports.	British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	Total Exports.
1797	104,955	23,609	3,92	26,801
1798	84,326	43,926	6,20	50,047
1799	602,609	137,943	23,519	161,462
1800	310,96	15,03	7,818	22,921

Florida.

1797	422	—	—	—
1798	—	—	—	—
1799	20,115	—	—	—
1800	10,116	24,792	4,153	28,946

The following account of the Exports from Surinam, and the other conquered colonies, during the last three years, has been recently laid before the House of Commons *.

An Account of the Quantity of Sugar, Rum, Coffee, and Cotton, imported into Great Britain, from the Colonies of Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, as far as the same can be made, up in the Years 1799, 1800, and 1801.

	Surinam.	Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo.
1799 {	Sugar 1000 cwt.	35,189 cwt.
	Rum —	14,456 gallons
	Coffee 4800 cwt.	39,089 cwt.
	Cotton 245,809 lbs.	3,593,053 lbs.
1800 {	Sugar 35,258 cwt.	51,199 cwt.
	Rum 220 gallons	93,070 gallons
	Coffee 63,579 cwt.	114,692 cwt.
	Cotton 1,067,910 lbs.	7,057,665 lbs.
1801 {	Sugar 204,774 cwt. †	95,031 cwt. †
	Rum 100,177 gals. ‡	139,781 gals. ‡
	Coffee 162,131 cwt.	142,819 cwt.
	Cotton 1,803,262 lbs. §	7,622,942 lbs. §

* Ordered to be printed, 13th April, 1802.

† The sugars exported from these colonies to Great Britain, last year, are equal in amount to a seventh or eighth of the sugars produced by the old British colonies.

‡ Together about the thirtieth of the annual produce of the old British colonies.

§ Together about one third of the whole quantity annually imported into Great Britain.

An Account of the Quantity of Sugar, Rum, Coffee, and Cotton, imported into Great Britain, from the Islands of Martinico, St. Lucia, and Tobago, as far as the same can be made up, in the Years 1799, 1800, and 1801.

		Martinico.	St. Lucia.	Tobago.
1799	{ Sugar	287,172 cwt	2993cwt.	164,212 cwt
	{ Rum	3,916 gals	—	257,592 gals
	{ Coffee	34,906 cwt	—	80 cwt
	{ Cotton	725,602 lbs.	55,331 lbs	7,214 lbs.
1800	{ Sugar	192,249 cwt	12,164 cwt	119,656cwt
	{ Rum	5,392 gals	114 gals	194,071gals
	{ Coffee	45,405 cwt	3,945 cwt	124 cwt
	{ Cotton	1,468,112 lbs.	275,549 lbs	7,397 lbs.
1801	{ Sugar	285,817 cwt	18,903 cwt	79,292 cwt
	{ Rum	17,410 gals	—	169,736gals
	{ Coffee	47,927 cwt	3,513 cwt	42 cwt
	{ Cotton	796,727 lbs.	422,119 lbs	24,989 lbs.

Such is the want of commercial capital, both in France and Holland, that, although we may ultimately lose 50,000 tons of our present West India trade by restoring Martinico, St. Lucia, and Tobago, to the French, and St. Eustatia, Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, to the Dutch, it is probable that, for some time after the peace, a part of the trade of these settlements will, directly or indirectly, find its way to Great Britain. In 1763, after we had restored the Havannah to Spain, and Guadaloupe and

and Martinico to France, these places continued to trade with this country, and our imports, that year, were*

From Guadaloupe	-	-	£.412,303
Martinico	-	-	344,162
Havannah	-	{ Goods	- 249,387
		{ Bullion	- 389,450
			£.1,395,302

By an *arrêt* in August 1784, in the ministry of the Maréchal de Castries, after a spirited controversy in print respecting the colonial commerce, foreigners were permitted, under certain regulations, to trade with the French West India islands. Our trade to them in 1786, in consequence of this *arrêt*, became very considerable, both in manufactures and in lumber and provisions †.

Of 20,880,000 *livres*, the value of the merchandize imported into the French islands by foreigners, the British imported merchandize of the value of 4,550,000 *livres*, in 189 vess ls.

And of 14,133,000 *livres*, the exports from the French islands to foreign countries, our exports amounted to 1,259,000 *livres*, in 153 vessels.

If, however, in consequence of the peace, the trade with the conquered colonies should be lost to

* Burke's "Observations on a late State of the Nation," 1st ed. p. 10. I have corrected his figures from Sir C. Whitworth's Tables. See 8th Article of the Treaty of Paris.

† Young's Travels in France, 4to edit. vol. i. p. 491.

Great Britain, the peculiar circumstances of the western hemisphere are such, that a very favourable opportunity is presented not only of acquiring those commercial advantages which might have been expected from retaining the French and Dutch settlements, but of promoting the national interest by means which they were very ill calculated to afford.

The antient policy of Great Britain, with regard to her West India colonies, has been directed to favour her manufactures and navigation, by securing to herself the monopoly both of importing colonial produce and of exporting European commodities.

It is unnecessary to examine whether the restrictions of the Navigation Act *, to which the mother country subjected her colonial trade, were proper at the time they were imposed. Circumstances have induced her, on several occasions during the last century to depart from them: and the present state of commerce will, probably, lead to a further revision of a system which has already been modified by the establishment of free ports in several of the islands, and by the provisions of the 12th article of the treaty of commerce, concluded, in 1794, with the United States of America †.

To consider our connexion with the West Indies as a channel, only, for exporting British manufactures in British ships to British colonies, and

* 12th Ch. II. c. 18.

† P. 71.

for importing their produce in British ships, is to take a very limited view of the benefits which this country may derive from her intercourse with the western world. The interests of our navy, of our merchants, and our manufacturers, require that our attention should be directed not only to the British sugar colonies, but to the settlements belonging to foreign powers.

The three great points, on which the commerce of the West Indies must turn, are

I. Their import of provisions, lumber *, and naval stores.

II. Their import of manufactures.

III. Their export of colonial produce.

I. All the advantages, derivable to Europe from the West Indies, must depend on their improvement, which will be much accelerated by a regular supply of the essential articles of food and lumber. The cheaper these articles can be procured the less capital will be wanted for the cultivation of the colonies. The proprietors of West India estates reside chiefly in the mother country: a saving therefore of capital to them is a saving to Great Britain. In the French islands, where the plantations in general belong to resident proprietors, a saving of capital is not an immediate gain, though

* By lumber, I mean boards, shingles, staves, hoops, mill timber, and wood of every denomination.

it may ultimately produce a benefit, to the mother country.

The propriety of allowing the British colonies to purchase provisions and lumber at the best market, was recognized by the late Minister, who, in 1783, brought in a Bill, known by the name of the American Intercourse Bill. In consequence, however, of great opposition from the merchants this Bill was laid aside ; and an Act passed, authorising the Crown, for a limited time *, to regulate the trade with America in such manner as his Majesty in council should deem expedient †. By the proclamation issued in consequence of this Act, the importation into the British West Indies of any kind of naval stores, lumber, live stock, flour, and grain, the growth of the American States, was confined to British ships navigated according to law ; and the export to those states of West India produce was made subject to the same restrictions ; whilst the necessary articles of salted beef, pork, fish, and train-oil, formerly supplied by America, were prohibited altogether. It is always a wise conduct in Government, however enlightened they may be on subjects of commerce, to regulate re-

* One year.

† See 23 Geo. III. c. 39. The time limited for the operation of this Act was extended by several subsequent Acts to the 5th of April, 1798. On the 19th of November, 1794, a Treaty of Commerce was concluded between Great Britain and the United States ; and an Act was passed in 1797 for carrying this Treaty into execution. See 37 Geo. III. c. 97.

form by the anterior habits and sentiments of those who must be affected by it. A good hound will not instruct his followers, if he runs too far before his pack. A strong prejudice against permitting the United States to supply the West Indies, as they had formerly done, with provisions and lumber, existed in 1783. It had subsided before 1794, when the American States were allowed, under certain restrictions, to trade with the British West Indies*.

II. The

* The 12th Article of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, provides, " That it shall be lawful during the time therein limited, for the citizens of the United States to carry to any of his Majesty's islands and ports in the West Indies from the United States, in their own vessels, not being above the burthen of seventy tons, any goods or merchandizes of the growth, manufacture, or produce of the said States, which it is or may be lawful to carry to the said islands or ports from the said States in British vessels; and that the said American vessels shall be subject there to no other or higher tonnage duties or charges than shall be payable by British vessels in the ports of the United States; and that the cargoes of the said American vessels shall be subject there to no other or higher duties or charges than shall be payable on the like articles, if imported there from the said States in British vessels.

" And his Majesty also consents that it shall be lawful for the said American citizens to purchase, load, and carry away in their said vessels, to the United States, from the said islands and ports, all such articles, being of the growth, manufacture, or produce of the said islands, as may now by law be carried from thence to the said States in British vessels, and subject only to the same duties and charges on exportation to which British vessels and their cargoes are or shall be subject in similar circumstances.

" Provided always that the said American vessels do carry and land their cargoes in the United States only, it being expressly agreed and declared,

II. The export of manufactures to the British sugar islands is as great as their present consumption requires ; and it is only from their future improvement that an increased demand can be created in these colonies : if their improvement is promoted by the free import of food and lumber, thir means of consumption will be augmented, and a larger market opened for the vent of our manufactures. But a favourable opportunity is now presented for esta-

declared, that, during the continuance of this article, the United States will prohibit and restrain the carrying any melasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton, in American vessels, either from his Majesty's islands or from the United States, to any part of the world, except the United States, reasonable sea stores excepted.

“ Provided also, that it shall and may be lawful, during the same period, for British vessels to import from the said islands into the United States, and to export from the United States to the said islands, all articles whatever, being of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the said islands, or of the United States respectively, which now may by the laws of the said States be so imported and exported. And that the cargoes of the said British vessels shall be subject to no other or higher duties or charges than shall be payable on the same articles, if so imported or exported in American vessels.

“ It is agreed that this article, and every matter and thing therein contained, shall continue to be in force during the continuance of the war in which his Majesty is now engaged ; and also for two years, from and after the day of the signature of the preliminary or other articles of peace by which the same may be terminated.

“ And it is further agreed, that at the expiration of the said term, the two contracting parties will endeavour further to regulate their commerce in this respect, according to the situation in which his Majesty may then find himself with respect to the West Indies, and with a view to such arrangements as may best conduce to the mutual advantage and extension of commerce.”

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blishing an intercourse with the foreign West India islands. The manufactures of Great Britain are in a flourishing state: capital and confidence have introduced them into every quarter of the world. The manufactures of France are annihilated. In all the conquered colonies we have established connexions, of which the spirit and enterprize of our merchants will probably avail themselves, if they are not restricted from entering into competition with the French, the Dutch, or the Danish trader, in the West India market.

III. The cultivation and improvement of the islands, and the consequent export of colonial produce, must depend on the extent of the demand of those countries which consume it. The demand for sugar, I apprehend, will increase. It will increase in France, which during the last ten years was too much impoverished by revolutionary warfare to consume her ordinary quantity of superfluities. It will increase in Great Britain, in consequence of the progress of wealth, population, and improvement. The reduction of price, arising from the reduction of freight, (one very obvious effect of peace,) will increase the consumption in other parts of Europe. Our continental settlements in North America, as they advance in prosperity, will take off more West India produce than they do at present. The cultivation of our sugar islands will also be encouraged, by an extension

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sion of the fur trade, and of the fisheries. But it will be chiefly promoted by the increasing demand of the United States*, which are now become a considerable market for the vent not only of rum, but of sugar and of coffee. If the West Indies cannot thrive without a supply of American produce, America has wants which can only be gratified by the sugar colonies. A mutual demand is thus created, which is not only beneficial to both those countries, but to Great Britain: for the remittances from the West Indies, to discharge their balances to Americans, contribute to enable Americans to discharge their balances to British merchants. A commerce with America is not only conducive to the prosperity, but essential for the subsistence, of the West Indies. They are supplied from the United States (for their imports from Canada and Nova Scotia are inconsiderable) with fish, flour, grain, and live stock, with materials for their habitations, mills, and warehouses, and with packages for their rum and sugar. In peace time the annual amount of these imports cannot be expected to amount to much less than a million sterling. Twenty years ago they exceeded 700,000*l*.

* In 1790 the population of the United States was 3,929,326 persons.

According to a census taken in 1800 it was 5,214,801

It probably now exceeds five millions and a half, the population of England and Wales at the Revolution.

official value*. In return for these indispensable commodities, the West India islands furnish the United States with sugar, melasses, rum, and coffee. It is probable that more than one half of the rum made in the islands, is exported, either legally in British, or clandestinely in foreign, vessels, to the continent of America.

These considerations, it may be hoped, will induce his Majesty's Government to adopt an enlarged and liberal system of West Indian commerce, and to avail themselves of the favourable opportunity, which the present situation of the new world (whether considered with reference to the conquests which we keep, or the conquests which we restore, the state of our sugar islands or that of the French and Spanish settlements) presents to us :

- I. To strengthen the defence of the old colonies;
- II. To provide for the increasing demand for West India produce ;—and
- III. By opening new and extensive markets for the vent of our manufactures to promote the prosperity of Great Britain.

The two first objects I conceive will be attained by the settlement of Trinidad. Its position to windward of all our sugar colonies, except Barbadoes, will enable it, if it should become the head quarters

* Edwards's Hist. of the West Indies, vol. ii. p. 398.

of the West Indies, to succour the windward and leeward islands in any future war, and even to protect Jamaica. As a naval station it is of very great importance. As it is placed midway between the French settlements in Guiana and the Spanish main, all communication between them by sea may be obstructed. Armaments, if armaments should be attempted at Surinam, Demerara, or Essequibo, will be easily watched. The conquest of the Dutch settlements, if again necessary, will be much facilitated. As to any danger which the vicinage of the French, or the extension of their Southern boundaries to the Arowary, may create to the British West Indies, I consider them as extremely visionary. Under a vertical sun* they will not rival us in industry: in the pestilential marshes and woods of Guiana they will not increase and multiply. The conquest of the Nile did not enable them to march to the Ganges: the possession of the river of the Amazons, the Orinoko, or the Mississippi, will not enable them to annihilate the commerce of the Thames.

The quantity of land, that is fit for cultivation in Trinidad, exceeds 800,000 acres. If cleared, it would in a very few years afford employment to as many inhabitants as Jamaica; and produce 100,000 hogheads of sugar, besides rum, cotton,

* The river Arowary is only one degree north from the equator.

and other articles. I conceive no solid objections can be urged against the settlement and improvement of Trinidad, because the annual consumption of Great Britain does not exceed 120,000 hogsheads, which the old islands are able to supply. Some intelligent persons, indeed, have doubted whether “the extension of the cultivation of the West India islands beyond that degree that is requisite for supplying Great Britain and her dependencies with the principal articles of their produce is likely to promote the interests of the empire *:” but, in general, political economists have supposed (and our commercial regulations have, in a great measure, countenanced the supposition) that by the re-exportation of surplus colonial produce, not wanted for home consumption, the national wealth is increased. The proprietors of West India estates mostly reside in the mother country; and if they are benefited by the re-exportation of the produce of their estates, Great Britain must participate. In every part of civilized Europe, there is a permanent demand for sugar, the chief production of the West Indies. Any increase in the quantity, which we can re-export in British ships, must not only augment the national wealth, but strengthen our naval power.

One of the advantages attending the acquisition

* Edwards's History of the West Indies, vol. ii. p. 464.

of Trinidad is, that if, from the consideration of the peculiar circumstances of the French West India islands, and the general spirit of insubordination which revolutionary doctrines are calculated to produce among the negroes, the British Government should be led to entertain doubts whether the system adopted in the old islands is applicable to a new colony, persons desirous of acquiring land in the ceded settlement may be subjected to regulations which, whilst they do not interfere with the rights and interests of others, may appear to be best calculated for preventing dangers which might otherwise arise from a great inequality in the number of slaves and of free inhabitants. In most of the islands there are seven or eight blacks for one white: in many of them corps of slaves have been trained to the use of fire-arms: two of our colonies (St. Vincents and Grenada) have scarcely recovered from the calamitous effects of insurrection; a small band of Maroons proved formidable in the heart of Jamaica; and in the largest French island, the negroes, who, during the last ten years, made their will their law, have not yet become peaceful cultivators and obedient slaves.

I do not enter into the discussion whether slavery is compatible with religion, morality, or sound politics. The question now is, whether a new and extensive colony, contiguous to the Spanish, Dutch and French settlements in South America, should be

be allowed to be peopled with an indefinite number of Africans. The question is not whether the system of slavery in the old islands, all things considered, is not the best both for them and the mother country.

The disturbed state of the French colonies has occasioned a great deficiency in the produce of sugar, which the possession of Trinidad may enable us to fill up. If St. Domingo for some years to come should not raise one third, or even not more than two thirds, of her antient produce, the deficiency would not be supplied by the Dutch colonies, even on the supposition that, when British capitals, and the protection of a British government, are withdrawn from them, their produce will equal the amount of last year.. Mons. de Charmilly, who has corrected some errors of Edwards, informs us that the sugar annually produced in St. Domingo before the revolution was 2,035,201 cwt. English weight*. The sugar exported from Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo to Great Britain, last year, was 299,805 cwt.; and the average of the last three years was 140,812 cwt. †

III. The third object (the vent of British manufactures) will be best appreciated, if we direct our consideration to the present state of the export trade to

* Answer to Edwards, p. 63.

† See p. 65.

the West Indies. The demand, for British goods and for assortments of every species of European manufactures, is not confined to the British West Indies. A lucrative and extensive trade in these articles has been carried on, by neutral states, not only with the Danish islands, and Porto Rico, but also with St. Domingo and the Spanish main. The returns for these goods are specie, or raw materials fit for the British market, indigo, coffee, cotton, cocoa, tobacco, hides, tallow, mahogany, fustic, and a variety of dye-woods and other non-enumerated articles*, the produce of those countries. This commerce has been hitherto carried on from those free ports which the wise policy of several European nations has established in the West Indies. St. Eustatia, without a harbour, without any produce of its own, in consequence of the freedom of its port, and the facility with which business was transacted there, in a few years became the centre of commerce, and (for its size) the most opulent of the West India islands. It is well known that, during the last peace, Curaçoa was converted by the Dutch into a vast warehouse, in which assortments of every kind of European commodities might be procured. Thither

* Commodities, in the export of which the colonies were confined, by the Navigation Act, to the market of the mother country, having been enumerated in that act, and in other navigation acts, are called *enumerated* commodities: the rest are called *non-enumerated*.

the Spaniards resorted, both from their islands and the main, to exchange their gold, silver, cocoa, cochineal, bark, staves, and mules, for negroes, linens, cottons, silks, laces, ribbands, India goods, spices, quicksilver, steel, and iron. What Dutch policy effected at Curaçoa, British wisdom will, probably, accomplish at Trinidad. The establishment of free ports in proper situations in the western hemisphere will contribute very materially towards the extension of our West India trade. The articles which the Spaniards are desirous of purchasing with the produce of America consist chiefly of manufactures in which we peculiarly excel. Some years ago, the Spanish settlements were principally supplied with linens and cottons from Germany; and in the first of these articles that country will continue to rival us: but our artists can now so well imitate the German linens and cottons in texture, colour, sizes, assortment, and manner of packing, that we have been enabled to carry on a considerable trade, in these articles, with Spanish America; and there can be little doubt but that, with proper attention, it may be preserved during the peace. In the manufacture of steel we are unrivalled; in that of iron and other metals, we are rapidly approaching to perfection. India goods, it is probable, might be (I do not believe they are) conveyed to the West Indies, at as small an expence by

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British,

British, as by American, shipping. The slave trade (I speak of it only in a commercial view) promises to open new sources of mercantile profit. The demand for negroes must, for some years to come, be very great; St. Lucia, Martinico, and Trinidad, may still be supplied, although the, not “happier, island in the stormy waste,” St. Domingo, should continue to be deemed too pure a soil for slaves to dwell in.

During the last war, the Danish island of St. Thomas, though its soil is steril, and its harbour ill protected from storms and hurricanes, acquired great importance. This settlement, which, 20 years ago, did not possess a population of 4000 souls, in the short space of ten years increased it to ten times that number. In the year 1799 its exports to Great Britain, and imports from that country altogether amounted to upwards of £800,000.*

Sensible of the value of free ports, the British legislature, at different periods, have passed acts for allowing the free import and export of certain merchandizes to four ports in Jamaica, to two in

* Viz. Exports from St. Thomas	£593,971
Imports—British manufactures	£.228,788
Foreign merchandize	22,189
	————— 250,977

Total (real value) 844,948

Dominica,

Dominica, to one in Grenada, and to one in the Bahama islands*. By an act passed in 1796 the port of Scarborough in the island of Tobago, and by an act passed in 1797 the port of San Josef in the island of Trinidad, were declared free ports†.

From an inspection of the map of the West Indies, it will be seen, that none of the present free ports are advantageously situated for carrying on an intercourse with Porto Rico, the Danish islands

* By the 6th Geo. III. c. 49. live cattle and all other commodities, (tobacco excepted,) the produce of any foreign American colony, were allowed to be imported into the British free ports in Dominica, in foreign vessels not having more than one deck; and all foreign produce (except sugars, coffee, pimento, ginger, melasses, and tobacco,) was allowed to be imported into the free ports of Jamaica, in vessels of one deck: the export, however, of the produce of the British islands from free ports was prohibited. The export of negroes (imported in British ships) was permitted in vessels of one deck. No goods were allowed to be exported from the free ports to any port of Europe north of Cape Finisterre; nor to Great Britain, except in British ships, navigated according to law. The free ports in Dominica were permitted to export foreign sugars in British ships to foreign parts of Europe, south of Cape Finisterre. Vessels from Dominica laden with West India produce (live cattle excepted) were prohibited from touching at any other island. This act contains other regulations respecting the free ports in Jamaica and Dominica. It continued in force seven years, and was extended by the 13th Geo. III. c. 73, and the 14th Geo. III. c. 41, to the 1st of November 1780; and by the 21st Geo. III. c. 29, the above acts were repealed, and so much of the 6th Geo. III. c. 49, as related to free ports in Jamaica was continued to the 1st of November 1787. By the 27th Geo. III. c. 27, all the former acts were repealed; and free ports, on a less extensive scale, established in Jamaica, Dominica, Grenada, and New Providence, one of the Bahama islands.

† 36th Geo. III. c. 55.—37th Geo. III. c. 77.

of St. Thomas and St. Croix, and the western coast of St. Domingo. The definitive treaty will deprive Great Britain of Tobago and Curaçoa; the island of St. Thomas has been recently restored to the King of Denmark. It is therefore to be apprehended that, unless a new policy is adopted, the trade with the foreign islands will revert to Dutch or Danish free ports, that British capital will again be transferred to Curaçoa or St. Thomas, and that the produce of the foreign West India islands, destined for those parts of Europe which possess no colonies, instead of passing through London will be consigned to Amsterdam, to Hamburg, or to Copenhagen. The period, however, is auspicious for the establishment of a British free port in the neighbourhood of the leeward islands, Porto Rico, and St. Domingo. The trade of St. Thomas is suspended, for a time; and the capital which carried it on has been lodged in America, and will there remain till a free port, with equal privileges, is re-established. The last war has proved that Denmark, though eager to injure our commerce, could not protect her own. Commercial capital, vested in a British free port, would not only be protected from foreign hostility, but be exempted from those severe exactions* which the Danish laws impose on the profits of industry.

* Known in St. Thomas's, under the title of *tenths* and *sixths*. They amount to a tax of 25 *per cent.* on the property which a trader acquires during his residence in the island.

Of the various national benefits which would result from the establishment of a free port, on an extensive scale, the following appear to be the principal.

I. A *depôt*, or *emporium*, would be formed, where not only British manufactures, but every assortment of European commodities, wanted by the inhabitants of foreign states, could be purchased.

II. The 27th Geo. III. c. 27. only allows the importation of *non-enumerated* produce* ; but if sugars and coffee were permitted to be imported into a free port, conveniently situated, even under the restriction that these articles should not be re-exported to Europe except in British bottoms, navigated according to law, a considerable increase of maritime power might be expected. To allow the Danish island of St. Thomas to reap the benefit of the import of foreign sugars, and not to grant it to British subjects in a British island, is a policy unworthy of an enlightened legislature. If the planters in the foreign islands can send their sugars to a neighbouring market, they will increase their purchase of manufactures. The Americans, when-

* Viz. Wool, cotton, indigo, cochineal, drugs of all sorts, cocoa, logwood, fustick, dye-woods, hides, skins, tallow, beaver, all sorts of furs, tortoiseshell, hard wood or mill timber, mahogany and all other woods for cabinet ware, horses, asses, mules, and cattle, the production of any American colony belonging to any European power, coin and bullion, diamonds and precious stones.

ever their treaty of commerce with Great Britain is revised, will aim at being permitted to export provisions and lumber to our islands in vessels of more than 70 tons burthen; and if this privilege is granted them, whatever restrictions are imposed on British subjects, it will not be easy to prevent vessels belonging to the United States from carrying sugars, from the British colonies in the West, as they now do from those in the East*, to Europe. Whatever embarrassments the demands of independent states may produce, it is pleasing to reflect that the most thriving branches of our commerce have been created by competition, and not by monopoly.

III. The establishment of a free port, near the leeward and windward islands, will, in any future contest with France, provide specie for the payment of the army, and provisions for their subsistence. If the import and export of grain and cattle are permitted, a considerable trade would be carried on not only with North America, but with the Spanish main; and the free port be rendered a *depôt*, to which the inhabitants of the different islands would resort for supplying themselves with live stock: but unless such a permission is granted, as a glut of provisions may often take place, it is

* See Letter V. § III.

not to be expected that great speculations will be attempted in this branch of commerce.

IV. The establishment of a free port would, by the vivifying influence of its trade, attract free settlers from all parts of the West Indies; and thus, in some degree, form a counterpoise to the great number of slaves in the old islands, and prevent those evils which are apprehended from the insubordination of negroes.

V. The beneficial effects of a free port would be experienced by the leeward islands, which might thence be supplied with mules, horses, asses, cattle, and mill timber, upon terms much more moderate than they can now be by carrying on a forced trade with Porto Rico or the Spanish main.

VI. By a legalized export of foreign sugars from a British free port the smuggling, which exists in many of our islands, would be prevented, and the revenue effectually guarded. The facility of disposing of every kind of produce in the Danish free ports attracted the Spaniards thither in preference to British ports, where only particular produce could be disposed of. The same inducements led British traders to invest their capitals in foreign islands, and have prevented our West India free ports from thriving.

Jamaica, from its situation, opposite to the Spanish main, would, probably, soon annihilate the commerce of Curaçoa if it possessed equal privileges:

Trinidad, from its vicinity to the Dutch and French continental settlements, may be rendered a good substitute for Tobago: but it does not appear to be as well calculated to become a free port for the reception of sugars and coffee as a small island. Were these articles admitted at Trinidad they might, possibly, interfere with the staple articles of produce which will be cultivated in that fertile and extensive colony*. Nor is the loss of the free port of St. Thomas irreparable. We possess Tortola, an island more advantageously situated in every respect, better secured from storms, containing a harbour capable of receiving 3 or 400 vessels, and not large enough to interfere with the interests of sugar or coffee planters. It raises no coffee; and its produce of sugar has seldom exceeded 3500 hogsheads in any one year, unless increased by sugars clandestinely landed from the foreign islands. Tortola, from being steep and mountainous, may be easily

* From the following statement, it appears, that the export of sugar from Trinidad has doubled in two years; and that its present produce of cotton is not inconsiderable.

An Account of the Quantity of Sugar, Rum, Coffee, and Cotton, imported into Great Britain from Trinidad in 1799, 1800, and 1801.

	Sugar. cwt.	Rum. gallons.	Coffee. cwt.	Cotton. lbs.
1799	26,728	104	1,898	1,403,290
1800	54,515	3,018	4,357	863,987
1801	69,551	19,537	3,327	1,289,573

Account ordered to be printed 13th April, 1802.

defended;

defended ; and its vicinity to the Danish and leeward islands, Porto Rico, and St. Domingo, is such that its intercourse with them might be carried on in very small vessels.

If, among the consequences of peace, the system of commercial intercourse between North America and the sugar colonies, proposed by Mr. Pitt in 1783, should be established, if markets should be opened in the West Indies, upon an extensive scale, for the admission of European and Asiatic commodities imported in British ships, and of American and West India produce in vessels of every description, and the export from British free ports should be rendered equally free with the export from the island of St. Thomas, it may be expected not only that the ties of interest which now connect this country with the United States will be drawn still closer, but that the trade which has enriched our rivals and enemies will cease, and that the progress of every part of the West Indies, in wealth, population, and improvement, will contribute to promote the progress of the wealth, population, and improvement, of Great Britain.

The state of the French colonies is such that it is probable a very advantageous intercourse may be carried on with them. The proprietors of Martinico and St. Lucia, who, during the last seven years, have sold us their sugars and bought our manufactures, will not easily be induced to abandon all connexion with our traders. Guadaloupe cannot recover its former

former consequence without the fostering assistance of foreign capitals and foreign commerce. The calamities, which the once-flourishing colony of St. Domingo has experienced, will oblige her to relax that system of restrictions to which European powers have subjected their colonies. America will not supply her with food, nor will Great Britain furnish her with those commodities which France, at present, is unable to manufacture, unless they receive either specie, or the staple produce of the island, in return.

St. Domingo still exhibits an awful example of the destructive effects of revolutionary excess, and civil warfare. In population, and in produce, this colony, I apprehend, now ranks below Jamaica.

A French Minister of France informs us that St. Domingo contained,

In 1779	-	32,650 whites	
		7,055 people of colour	
		249,098 slaves	
Total population		288,803	*
There were in 1790		30,831 whites, exclusive of	
		European troops and	
		seafaring people.	
		434,429 negro slaves	
Exclusive of	-	46,000 domestic slaves and	
		negro mechanics.	
And about	-	24,000 free people of colour.	
		535,260	†

* Necker, sur les Finances, tom. i. c. 13.

† Edwards's History of the West Indies, vol. iii. p. 164.

The French colony, thus, appears to have contained, eleven years ago, above 530,000 inhabitants. Charmilly estimated them at 600,000*. It was, however, computed, in the year 1793, that the class of negroes alone had sustained a diminution of more than 100,000. Mr. Edwards says, that “since that time the mortality has been still “more rapid; and, including the loss of whites by “sickness and emigration,” he reduces the population of St. Domingo, in June 1796, to “two-fifths “of the whole number of inhabitants (white and “black) which it possessed in the beginning of “1791†.” According to this calculation upwards of 300,000 human beings have either been killed or driven out of this devoted country within the short period of six years. It is said that many thousands took refuge in America, and that many have returned to St. Domingo. Civil war, however, again rages with exterminating fury. The victories, and the defeats, of Le Clerc, will still further diminish the resources of the colony. Towns and plantations are burnt by the negroes, when they are successful; and when they are vanquished a stock more valuable than houses, or mills, is destroyed.

The benefit which the mother country derived from this colony during the last twelve years was

* Answer to Edwards, p. 158.

† Edwards's History of the West Indies, vol. iii. p. 257.

very inconsiderable. The chief part of the produce which St. Domingo was able to export was consigned to America and other neutral states: the most authentic accounts from the island justify me in thinking that its whole exportable produce last season was not one third of what it was in 1789. The average exports from the French part of St. Domingo, previously to the revolution, were rather more than 5,000,000l.* In 1791, they were upwards of 5,500,000l.† In 1800, (according to an official report of the Minister of the Interior, made in May 1801,)

	Livres.	Sterling.
The imports into France from all the French colonies in the East and West Indies were	1,483,800	or £61,825
The exports from France to all the French colonies in the East and West Indies were	282,300	or 11,762
The imports into France, last year, (the 9th year of the Republic;) from all the French colonies were	2,077,000	or 84,000
The exports from France to all the French colonies	208,000	or 8,400

* Edwards's History of the West Indies, vol. iii. p. 165. † Ibid. p. 231.
In

In 1788, St. Domingo imported French goods to the amount of more than 3,500,000*l.* in 580 vessels belonging to France, carrying 189,679 tons, exclusive of 98 vessels engaged in the African trade*. In 1800, I believe, (though I will not state this as a positive fact,) not a single French vessel cleared out from France for this island.

Produce cannot be raised without cultivators. The loss of 300,000, or even of 200,000, negroes, and of other agricultural stock, cannot be replaced for 10,000,000*l.* sterling. Such advantages would result to our colonies and our commerce from the revival of agriculture, and its concomitant blessings, that every humane and reflecting mind must wish that tranquillity were restored to St. Domingo. But the decrees of governors, black or white, will not, I fear, fill up the gaps in her population. The negroes who remain, many of whom have retired into the natural fastnesses which the country affords, will not be disposed to work double tides; the soldier will not, without coercion, once more become the villein regardant; the Maroon will not, till his instructors from Old France use stronger arguments than words, lay down his musquet and take up his hoe. The island will long exhibit marks of depopulation, unless the tutelary genius of the republic can furnish her with a Deucalion who may turn her pebbles into people, and an Amphion whose *sa ira*s may rear the prostrate walls of the ravaged *Cap Français*.

* Ibid, p. 233.

L E T T E R V.

O N THE TRADE WITH NORTH AMERICA, AFRICA, AND ASIA.

I. *On the Trade with North America.*

OUR commercial connexions with the United States of America are fixed on such solid foundations, that we have no reason to apprehend that the future political dissensions of Europe will affect them. For many years to come, the Americans, although an extensive sea-coast, good harbours, and a spirit of enterprise inherited from their forefathers, suggest to them the employment of a part of their capital in commerce, must continue to direct the largest portion of it to agricultural improvements. While we can supply them with better and cheaper goods than other nations can manufacture for them, or than they can manufacture for themselves, they will, from the strongest tie, that of interest, continue to be connected with us. Their intercourse with Great Britain will be promoted by other circumstances : the consanguinity of the two people, the similarity of religion, language, manners, and taste in the two countries, will dispose them to form mutual attachments. The opinion, therefore, of a German writer seems to be well founded, that “ the consumption of the manufactures of Europe will necessarily keep pace with the progress of cultivation

tion in America, until, at some period yet extremely remote, the surplus hands not wanted for agriculture or commerce must seek employment in manufactures." He adds, "that as the commerce of the United States must necessarily be possessed by Britain, it will be that country which, in the end, instead of losing, will have gained, every thing by a revolution, from which we fondly predicted her ruin. If we were to form our opinion from that which personal animosities, and the recollection of civil discord, have generated in the minds of a few individuals of both nations, we might fancy that Britain and America would never be sincerely united. But such feelings are transitory: nations may be considered as combatants for hire, whose animosity never survives the event that occasions it*."

Our trade to North America is of the greatest importance, as it principally consists in the export of our home productions and manufactures. Its increase has been very rapid: and, whether it be measured by the tonnage of the shipping employed, or by the value of the merchandize sent out, by years of war, or by years of peace, it will justify this conclusion, that our future intercourse with the United States will enlarge those sources of employment and of wealth, which that country has opened to British manufacturers and merchants.

* Wimpffen's Voyage to St. Domingo, Letter xxxix.

An Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels cleared outwards from England and Scotland, to the United States of America, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total Tonnage. Tons.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	58,717	26,917	13,961	2,030	101,625
1790	40,718	36,918	10,209	2,523	90,418
1791	43,508	52,603	11,820	3,203	111,134
1792	41,451	56,160	9,512	3,254	110,377
1793	7,054	56,000	1,510	4,747	69,311
1794	9,672	64,093	1,154	2,899	77,818
1795	2,113	90,327	—	3,015	95,455
1796	1,522	99,774	547	5,583	107,426
1797	3,640	73,513	641	5,362	83,156
1798	6,439	68,999	1,478	5,169	82,085
1799	11,401	74,186	2,865	4,497	92,950
1800	9,309	105,476	5,072	7,120	126,977

An Account of the official Value of Imports into Great Britain, from the United States of America, and of the Exports from Great Britain to the United States; distinguishing British from Foreign Merchandize; in the following Years:

Years.	Value of Imports. £.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports. £.
		British Manufactures. £.	Foreign Merchandize. £.	
1790	1,191,072	3,178,594	253,183	3,431,778
1791	1,194,232	3,909,771	295,676	4,225,418
1792	1,038,707	3,974,827	296,591	4,271,418
1793	904,040	3,272,725	141,956	3,414,681
1794	625,733	3,588,889	270,981	3,859,861
1795	1,352,136	4,892,572	361,546	5,254,118
1796	2,080,960	5,835,640	218,651	6,054,291
1797	1,175,512	4,871,416	185,106	5,056,822
1798	1,702,720	5,313,668	267,301	5,580,370
1799	1,818,911	6,696,221	360,337	7,056,558
1800	2,357,923	6,689,467	196,140	6,885,508

The export of British manufactures to the United States in the year 1800 amounted to more than a fourth of the export to all parts of the world.

It appears, from the following comparison, that the export to the United States, during the war, has exceeded the exports of British manufactures; during the same period, to all Foreign Europe.

An Account of the official Value of British Manufactures exported to Foreign Europe, and to the States of America, in 1793, and the Seven following Years.

Years.	Foreign Europe. £.	States of America. £.
1793	3,531,046	3,272,725
1794	4,458,383	3,588,889
1795	4,222,782	4,892,572
1796	4,497,683	5,835,640
1797	3,732,830	4,871,316
1798	3,981,650	5,313,068
1799	4,543,608	6,696,221
1800	7,516,123	6,689,467
	£.36,484,105	£.41,159,898

Of the British manufactures exported to the United States more than two fifths consist of woollens. That country now stands first in the list of foreign consumers of this production of British industry.

Of £.6,875,939 the official value of woollens exported in 1799, the export to

	£.
The States of America, was -	2,803,490
Ireland - - - - -	916,190
East Indies and China - -	668,161
Portugal and Madeira - -	568,788
British and Foreign West Indies	552,726
Germany - - - - -	427,053
British Continental Colonies in America	324,739
Russia - - - - -	149,789

The proportion exported to the United States, in preceding years, will appear from the following account :

An Account of the Total official Value of Woollen Manufactures exported from Great Britain in 1790, and the Nine following Years, to the United States of America, and to all Parts of the World*.

Years.	United States. £.	All Parts of the World. £.
1790	1,481,378	5,190,637
1791	1,621,796	5,505,034
1792	1,361,753	5,510,668
1793	1,032,954	3,806,536
1794	1,391,877	4,390,920
1795	1,982,318	5,172,884
1796	2,294,942	6,011,133
1797	1,901,986	4,936,355
1798	2,399,935	6,499,339†
1799	2,803,490	6,876,939

* From an account laid before the House of Commons on the 30th April, 1800.

† In the accounts respecting the commercial intercourse between Great Britain and Ireland, laid before the House of Lords in February, 1799, (No. 2.) the official value of woollens exported to all parts of the world, in 1798, is stated at £.6,836,603.

The true value, agreeably to the prices current in 1791 and 1792, and agreeably to the declarations of the merchants exporters in 1798 and 1799, of woollen manufactures exported from Great Britain, in those years, was

1791.	1792.	1798.	1799.
£.	£.	£.	£.
7,376,745	7,384,295	8,458,567	8,529,229

The value of all the woollens manufactured in Great Britain was stated to exceed £.19,000,000, by several intelligent manufacturers, examined before a Committee of the House of Commons in 1800. No register, however, is kept of the quantity manufactured in any part of this island, except the West Riding of York; but the following extracts from the Returns annually made to the Pontefract Easter Sessions afford the most unequivocal proof of the prosperous state of this manufacture in the North of England. A great part of the increased consumption is owing to America, who thus, in some degree, repays the mother-country for having reared her to maturity.

An Account of the Number of Broad and Narrow Cloths milled in the West Riding of the County of York, and of the Number of Yards made in the following Years.

Years.	BROADS.		NARROWS.	
	Pieces.	Yards.	Pieces.	Yards.
1763	48,038	—	72,096	—
1773	120,245	3,635,612	89,874	2,206,235
1783	131,092	4,563,376	108,641	3,292,002
1793	190,331	6,054,946	150,666	4,783,722
1794	190,988	6,067,208	130,403	4,634,258
1795	250,993	7,759,907	155,087	5,172,511
1796	246,770	7,830,536	151,594	5,245,704
1797	229,292	7,235,038	156,709	5,503,648
1798	224,159	7,134,114	148,566	5,180,313
1799	272,755	8,806,688	180,168	6,377,277
1800	285,851	9,263,966	169,262	6,014,420
1801	264,082	8,699,242	137,231	4,833,534

If we compare the import of the raw material of cottons, another manufacture which forms a considerable part of our exports to America, with the import of the wool used in our finest broad cloths, it will appear, that, though the latter is the most flourishing, the former has not been materially affected by the war.

An Account of the Quantities of Cotton and Spanish Wool, imported into Great Britain, on an Annual Medium of Four Periods of Five Years each.

Average of Five Years, ending on the	Cotton. lbs.	Spanish Wool. lbs.
5th Jan. 1776	4,414,757	1,578,605
5th Jan. 1787	16,081,983	1,975,327
5th Jan. 1792	28,852,038	3,174,429
5th Jan. 1799	26,433,730	3,800,583

I am

I am not enabled to state the amount, either of the quantity or value, of the cotton manufactures, exported to America. It however appears from the Parliamentary Accounts, respecting the Commerce of Ireland, that the total official value of cotton manufactures exported from Great Britain to all parts of the world in the year 1799 was £.3,497,197 *; and that the value, agreeably to the prices current, or to the declared value of the merchants exporters of cotton manufactures, exported from Great Britain on an average of three years ending the 5th January, 1799, was £.4,175,236.†

Our commerce with that part of North America which bears allegiance to his Majesty is of considerable importance. Canada and Nova Scotia, in the year 1792, which I select as a fairer period of comparison than any subsequent year, imported a greater amount of British manufactures than any one country in Europe. Like the United States, they promise, from their increasing population, to furnish us with new customers; nor am I singular in supposing that the vast extent of country, reaching from the Atlantic to the Hyperborean and the Pacific Oceans, which has lately been added to

* Accounts respecting the commercial Intercourse between Great Britain and Ireland, ordered (by the Lords) to be printed, 22d of February, 1799. (No. 18.)

† Address and Resolutions of the two Houses of Parliament in Ireland, and Accounts ordered to be printed, 2d April, 1800. (No. 1.)

the British dominions by the discoveries of enterprizing traders, may, with proper encouragement, ultimately ensure us the entire command of the fur trade in North America *.

From the following statement of imports and exports, which extends to the year 1800, and account of woollens exported, which extends as far as the year 1799, we may reasonably infer that our commerce with these colonies will continue to improve. Whilst the spirit of emigration exists in Europe, (and the state of France and Germany is still such that it cannot be expected to cease in those countries,) it is not only the turbulent and factious, but the peaceable and industrious, who may be led to seek their fortunes across the Atlantic. If French Guiana, according to the First Consul's recommendation, be a good refuge for the former class, British America is a better asylum for persons of the latter description. Though the climate of Canada and Nova Scotia is not so mild as that of the United States, it is more healthy. The difficulty of obtaining unexceptionable titles to land, we are assured, is the only obstacle that prevents this part of North America from experiencing a more rapid improvement than it does †. Every year, however, many persons emigrate from the United States into

* See Mackenzie's Voyages through North America, just published.

† Weld's Travels through the States of North America, Letter xxvii.

Canada; and there can be little doubt but that, with proper encouragement, those who leave Great Britain and Ireland to settle in America, might be induced to seek a colony, where they would still live under the protection of that country in which they first drew breath.

An Account of the official Value of Imports from the British Colonies * in North America, and of the Exports to them, in 1790, and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

Years.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	239,040	623,770	216,908	840,679
1791	253,833	688,658	205,958	894,617
1792	255,798	908,105	211,886	1,119,981
1793	210,345	717,075	187,446	904,529
1794	241,026	735,496	235,754	971,251
1795	314,761	826,440	173,345	999,786
1796	268,777	851,349	169,703	1,021,053
1797	283,431	896,325	151,828	1,048,153
1798	315,792	1,166,730	200,168	1,356,898
1799	333,326	1,309,792	319,039	1,528,831
1800	558,037	1,190,365	240,081	1,436,446

* Not including Nootka Sound, which forms an article in the Custom-house books of the year 1800. See Letter VII.

An Account of the official Value of Woollens exported to the British Colonies in North America in 1790, and the Nine following Years.

Years.		£.
1790	-	156,192
1791	-	132,997
1792	-	183,681
1793	-	147,631
1794	-	186,787
1795	-	196,876
1796	-	224,649
1797	-	232,329
1798	-	232,869
1799	-	324,739

It appears from the following account of the tonnage of vessels cleared outwards from Great Britain to these settlements, that a considerable diminution has taken place during the war.

Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels cleared Outwards from England and Scotland to the British Settlements in North America, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total Tonnage.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign Tons.	
1789	52,046	90	5,089	—	57,225
1790	44,155	—	4,854	—	49,009
1791	49,319	—	6,449	—	55,768
1792	48,087	—	7,280	—	55,367
1793	34,528	—	6,766	—	41,294
1794	33,303	176	5,421	—	38,900
1795	30,783	—	5,528	—	36,311
1796	29,881	—	5,524	—	35,405
1797	29,642	—	4,005	—	33,647
1798	27,286	—	7,762	—	35,048
1799	29,203	—	9,568	—	38,771
1800	33,262	—	8,759	—	42,021

The decrease in our export trade to our North American colonies is principally ascribable to the check which our Newfoundland Fisheries have experienced in consequence of the unsettled state of the markets in the South of Europe. The tonnage of the ships employed in these fisheries, which, on the average of the three years before the war, amounted to 31,112 tons annually, on the average of the last three years was only 15,840 tons. It may, therefore, be presumed that in this branch of commerce some increase will result from a free communication being opened with Spain, and the countries in the Mediterranean.

An Account of the Number of Vessels (with the Amount of their Tonnage, and the Number of their Men) which cleared out from the different Ports in Great Britain for the Newfoundland, Greenland, and Southern, Fisheries, in the Years 1790, 1791, 1792, 1798, 1799, and 1800*.

Newfoundland	} 1790 {	298	31,614	2,608
Greenland		116	33,232	—
Southern Fisheries		33	7,262	—
		447	72,108	2,608
Newfoundland	} 1791 {	308	34,166	2,639
Greenland		116	33,906	—
Southern Fisheries		75	16,927	1,478
		499	84,999	4,117
Newfoundland	} 1792 {	263	27,528	2,412
Greenland		93	26,983	3,667
Southern Fisheries		42	9,544	816
		398	64,055	68,95
Newfoundland	} 1798 {	162	15,838	1,268
Greenland		66	18,754	2,633
Southern Fisheries		34	9,143	772
		262	43,735	4,673
Newfoundland	} 1799 {	128	14,322	1,145
Greenland		67	19,360	—
Southern Fisheries		26	7,485	673
		221	41,167	4,501
Newfoundland	} 1800 {	143	17,360	1,380
Greenland		61	17,729	2,459
Southern Fisheries		24	6,382	612
		228	41,471	4,451

* Accounts respecting Navigation and Trade, ordered to be printed, 10th and 23d of June, 1801.—Accounts respecting the Newfoundland Fishery, ordered to be printed, 15th of June, 1801.

The

The Newfoundland Exports and Imports are included in the Trade of our American Continental Colonies. The following Statement exhibits the values of our Greenland and Southern Fishery Trade in 1797 and the Three following Years. In Peace the Imports will probably be doubled.

GREENLAND.

Value of Exports.

Years.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1797	130,909	95	458	554
1798	129,161	92	691	784
1799	134,909	—	503	503
1800	125,805	—	761	761

SOUTHERN FISHERY.

	£.	£.	£.	£.
1797	140,143	6	33	40
1798	95,883	—	150	150
1799	84,007	33	191	224
1800	89,198	—	259	259

An Account of the Quantities of Fish and Oil exported from Newfoundland to the South of Europe, in the Years 1790, 1791, 1792; 1798, 1799, and 1800*.

	Fish.		Oil.		
	Dry. Quintals.	Wet. Barrels.	Tons.	H.	G.
1790	581,824	3,667	78	1	9
1791	623,083	4,338	44	0	37
1792	490,514	—	27	2	20
	1,695,421	8,005	149	3	66
1798	209,995	—	4	0	0
1799	238,953	990	—	—	—
1800	366,379	—	2	0	4
	815,327	990	6	0	4

* Accounts respecting the Newfoundland Fishery, ordered to be printed, 15th of June, 1801.

The other countries to which oil and fish are exported from Newfoundland, are the isles of Guernsey and Jersey, North America, the West Indies, Ireland, and Great Britain. Exclusive of wet fish and oil, the consumption of the three last countries has been

	GREAT BRITAIN.	IRELAND.	WEST INDIES.
	Quintals of Dry Fish.	Quintals of Dry Fish.	Quintals of Dry Fish.
1790	29,750	13,089	58,904
1791	53,483	23,796	11,935
1792	19,716	13,209	42,118
1798	45,137	3,000	75,415
1799	13,734	1,531	53,882
1800	7,526	1,537	97,295

The Total Export of Fish and Oil from Newfoundland during the above Years, was

Years.	Fish.		Tons.	Oil.	
	Dry. Quintals.	Wet. Barrels.		H.	G.
1790	684,421	6,221	1,939	1	57
1791	720,147	7,011	839	3	42
1792	565,833	5,596	2,896	1	50
1798	353,363	6,026	2,177	0	30
1799	313,756	3,548	1,851	2	60
1800	481,524	96	2,367	2	39

The British Fisheries, during the last three years, in consequence of the high price of corn, have received great encouragement at home, but the export of fish to Italy has necessarily declined.—

In peace, the trade in herrings and pilchards to the South of Europe is very considerable*.

II. *On the Trade with Africa.*

A considerable increase may be expected in the trade with the British settlements in Africa, in consequence of the peace. A very large supply of negroes will be wanted in many of the West India islands, and the extension of the slave trade must necessarily create a greater demand for British manufactures in Africa than would otherwise take place. The following account of tonnage and imports does not comprehend our commerce with the Cape of Good Hope. Our trade with Egypt is comprehended in that with Turkey†.

* Mr. Burke, in his "Observations on a late State of the Nation," published in 1769, makes the following judicious observations on the importance of the Newfoundland trade. "The Custom House entries furnish a most defective, and indeed ridiculous idea, of the most valuable branch of trade we have in the world, that with Newfoundland—Observe what you export thither; a little spirits, provision, fishing lines, and fishing hooks—Is this Export the true idea of the Newfoundland trade in the light of a beneficial branch of commerce? Nothing less. Examine our Import from thence; it seems, upon this vulgar idea of Exports and Imports, to turn the balance against you. But your Exports to Newfoundland are your own goods—your Import is your own food; as much your own, as that you raise with your ploughs out of your own soil; and not your loss, but your gain; your riches, not your poverty.—But so fallacious is this way of judging, that neither the Export nor Import, nor both together, supply any idea approaching to adequate of that branch of business.—The Vessels in that trade go straight from Newfoundland to the foreign market; and the Sale there, not the Import here, is the measure of its value—That trade, which is one of your greatest and best, is hardly so much as seen in the Custom House entries; and it is not of less annual value to this nation than £.400,000." p. 32.

† See Letter VI.

An Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels
cleared Outwards from England to Africa* in 1789,
and the Eleven following Years.

Years.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.	Total Tonnage.
1789	19,493	—	19,493
1790	26,921	—	26,921
1791	32,590	—	32,590
1792	40,479	—	40,479
1793	16,484	45	16,529
1794	29,034	224	29,258
1795	18,234	370	18,604
1796	23,251	1,000	24,251
1797	25,477	1,531	27,008
1798	39,310	755	40,065
1799	41,778	—	41,778
1800	38,966	431	39,397

No vessel cleared out from Scotland to Africa in the
above years.

* This entry in the Custom House Navigation Account does not com-
prehend the tonnage cleared outwards to Barbary, which is here sub-
joined.

BARBARY.

	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.
1789	1,384		
1790	1,379		
1791	868		
1792	4,419		
1793	80		
1794	215		
1795	839		
1796	994	780	
1797	283	654	145
1798	508	340	
1799	492	50	
1800	150	270	

An Account of the official Value of Imports from Africa, and of the Exports to that Country, in 1790, and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

Years.	Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total. Exports.
		British Ma- nufactures.	Foreign Mer- chandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	71,800	609,820	319,382	929,203
1791	79,784	534,731	321,350	856,082
1792	82,912	882,074	485,845	1,367,919
1793	120,378	256,458	128,128	384,587
1794	48,880	438,577	311,245	749,822
1795	65,097	214,953	213,778	428,731
1796	106,734	298,162	310,803	608,965
1797	54,357	523,367	364,478	887,846
1798	69,761	777,226	514,482	1,291,708
1799	112,789	1,036,261	590,362	1,626,624
1800	96,563	589,496	510,161	1,099,657

It appears from the following statement that the Cape of Good Hope has not yet been rendered a great commercial establishment.

An Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels which entered Inwards, and cleared Outwards, in the several Ports of Great Britain, from or to the Cape of Good Hope in 1796 and the Four following Years.

	Entered Inwards.		Cleared Outwards.			
	British.		British.		Foreign.	
	Ships.	Tons.	Ships.	Tons.	Ships.	Tons.
1796	6	2,194	14	7,020	-	—
1797	6	2,809	7	2,073	1	440
1798	2	305	8	2,268	1	564
1799	5	852	10	3,332	-	—
1800	3	620	10	2,290	-	—

From

From this account it appears that the total tonnage of vessels cleared outwards for the Cape, since we took possession of it, amounts only to 17,987 tons.

I cannot regret that this colony is to be restored to the Batavian Republic. The possession of it might have gratified a national vanity, if that be deemed a proper principle to encourage by the peace, and have enabled us to mortify the pride of one antagonist by displaying our flag at the southern extremity of Africa, as we wound the feelings of another, by retaining a barren rock at the southern extremity of Europe*. I cannot assent to the opinions of those who consider the Cape, “ either
 “ with regard to its situation, as favorable for carrying on a speedy intercourse with every part of
 “ the civilized world; or to its intrinsic value, as
 “ capable of supplying many articles of general
 “ consumption to the mother country; or as a port
 “ solely for the numerous and valuable fleets of the
 “ East India Company to refresh at; to assemble in

* Mr. Barrow observes, that “ by the capture of the Cape of Good Hope and of Ceylon, the British language is now heard at the southern extremities of the four great continents or quarters of the globe. Three of these have submitted to the power of Britain; and the spirit of commerce and adventurous industry has directed the attention of its enterprising subjects to the fourth on the small island of Staaten, at the extreme point of South America, where a kind of settlement has been formed for carrying on the Southern Whale Fishery.” Barrow’s Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa, p. 1.

“ time

“ time of war for convoy ; to reestablish the health of
 “ their sickly troops, worn down by the debilitating
 “ effects of exposure to a warm climate ; and to
 “ season, in the mild and moderate temperature of
 “ southern Africa, such of those from Europe as
 “ may be destined for service in the warmer cli-
 “ mate of their Indian settlements *.”

It is not wanted as a naval station for the defence of India ; we possess a better in the excellent ports of Ceylon. It is not wanted as a place where our fleets may be victualled and refitted. We may procure provisions at St. Helena, and in the Brazils. By the improvements which have taken place in navigation, the voyage to India has been shortened, if not in distance, certainly in the time required for performing it. If we possessed the Cape, our East Indiamen would seldom touch at it. It is not wanted as a depôt where troops may be hardened before they proceed to Asia. The very healthy condition of those regiments which were sent from Gibraltar to Egypt has proved, that in the south of Europe, as well as in Africa, soldiers may be seasoned for warmer climates. The Cape labours under the same inconvenience which has retarded the advancement of our colony at Port Jackson. The North American States, notwithstanding the hardships to which the first settlers were exposed, soon acquired consequence, from possessing a produce that was wanted in Europe. But in New South Wales no such advantage has occurred. Captain Cook, indeed, recom-

* Ibid.

mended the New Zealand hemp, as far superior to that imported from the North; but it does not appear that this article of produce has been much attended to. Like our convict-plantation in the southern hemisphere, the Cape possesses no staple commodity (except the very insignificant produce of the Constantia vineyards) which can be exchanged for the manufactures of Europe: and I hesitate not to assert, that the commercial advantages, which can be derived from the Cape, would neither repay us, nor even a more frugal nation, the Dutch, for the charge either of its military or its civil establishment.

III. *On the Trade with Asia.*

An Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels entered Inwards and cleared Outwards from the several Ports of Great Britain, in the Year 1789, and each of the Eleven following Years, to the East Indies and China.

Years.	Entered Inwards.		Cleared Outwards.	
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.
1789	27,695	—	22,223	
1790	27,122	—	26,408	
1791	25,539	—	24,109	
1792	21,560	—	27,645	
1793	25,900	—	39,529	
1794	34,375	—	30,452	
1795	46,299	—	34,719	
1796	31,262	—	59,457	
1797	34,365	1,032	42,876	294
1798	63,880	—	35,543	
1799	38,751	1,305	43,049	903
1800	49,635	1,018	49,284	1,990

It appears, from Steel's List of British vessels, employed in the Company's service, that their tonnage exceeds 85,000 tons *.

* No estimate of the amount of shipping employed in any branch of
The

The export of British manufactures to India and China, was greater in the year 1800 than in any preceding year, except 1794 ; it exceeds the export of 1790 by £.40,127 *official* value ; and when it is considered that, during the last ten years, there has been an advance in the price of various articles of export, there can be little doubt that the *real* value of our exports to that part of the world bears a greater proportion to the *official* value, than it did in 1790; and that the *real* value of the exports in 1800 exceeds the *real* value of the exports in 1794.

commerce can be formed merely from a reference to the Custom House accounts of tonnage, cleared outwards and entered inwards. It appears from those documents that the tonnage of vessels entered inwards from the East Indies and China in 1799 was 40,056 tons ; and that the tonnage of colliers entered inwards at the port of London the same year was 892,362 tons. (See Third Report on the Port of London, Appendix, A. 7.) From this statement, it might, at first sight, be supposed that the coal trade could furnish twenty times the quantity of East India shipping. The fact, however, is, that whilst the India shipping contains 85,000 tons, the colliers frequenting the port of London contain no more than 99,151 tons. It is the *length of the voyage* which determines the proportion between the *shipping and the tonnage entered inwards or cleared outwards in the course of a year*. The report of Mr. Jefferson on the commerce of the United States of America in December 1793, stated the tonnage of American vessels, entered inwards, in the year ending the 30th September 1790,

From France at	-	-	116,410 tons.
Great Britain at	-	-	43,580

But, as the American trade with the dominions of France was then carried on by short voyages to the West Indies, and that to the dominions of Great Britain chiefly by long ones to Europe, the entries of tonnage did not exhibit a correct view of the quantity of shipping employed between each country. The actual tonnage of American ships trading in the year ending the 30th September 1792.

With the Dominions of France was	82,510 tons.
With those of Great Britain	66,582.

Speeches of Mr. Smith of South Carolina, p. 38.

An Account of the official Value of Exports* to the East Indies and China, in 1790, and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

Years.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
	British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.
1790	2,298,152	88,167	2,386,320
1791	2,176,422	103,384	2,279,807
1792	2,341,360	96,527	2,437,887
1793	2,598,730	122,760	2,721,491
1794	2,832,234	92,595	2,924,829
1795	2,298,533	84,824	2,383,358
1796	2,219,689	157,287	2,376,977
1797	2,185,486	102,945	2,288,432
1798	1,094,004	51,963	1,145,968
1799	2,278,900	157,945	2,436,846
1800	2,718,279	142,141	2,860,421

It will be seen from the following account that our export of woollens alone to Asia now exceeds a million sterling.

An Account of the Prime Cost, or Value, of Woollens exported to India and China, in the Seasons 1798-9, 1799-1800, and 1800-1.

		Pieces.	Value.	
			£.	£.
1798 to 1799	Broad Cloth -	14,175	285,229	
	Long Ells - -	228,192	553,981	
	Camlets - -	6,563	39,174	
				878,384
1799 to 1800	Broad Cloth -	15,984	320,328	
	Long Ells - -	230,764	567,343	
	Camlets - -	12,972	75,671	
				963,342
1800 to 1801	Broad Cloth -	14,951	305,069	
	Long Ells - -	266,590	631,762	
	Camlets - -	43,755	90,452	
				1,027,283

* For the Imports from the East Indies and China, see p. 49.

Copper

Copper is another considerable article in our exports to Asia. From the accounts laid before the House of Commons, two years ago, respecting the copper trade, it appears that a very large proportion of wrought copper, and of brass, and plated goods, exported, is sent to Asia.

Official Value of Wrought Copper, and of Brass, and Plated Goods, exported to all Parts of the World, distinguishing Asia, in 1790, and the Nine following Years *.

Years.	Wrought Copper.		Brass and Plated Goods.	
	Asia.	All Parts of the World.	Asia.	All Parts of the World.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	43,210	324,943	31,469	171,338
1791	51,013	358,844	36,472	209,769
1792	74,730	437,043	64,822	282,469
1793	229,490	465,030	195,030	320,672
1794	235,063	482,188	169,920	279,766
1795	218,890	438,772	174,150	275,888
1796	202,894	462,431	173,344	286,562
1797	146,049	397,495	115,515	219,099
1798	116,543	413,840	76,500	211,093
1799	202,971	515,043†	155,254	346,652†

Tin, also, forms a considerable part of the exports of the East India Company. The prime cost of the quantity they purchased in 1795 amounted to £. 92,204.

* Report of a Committee of the House of Commons on the Copper Trade, 1799. App. 33, 34. Accounts of Wrought Copper, and of Brass and Plated Ware, exported; ordered to be printed 21st March, 1800.

† The value declared by the exporters was

Wrought copper	-	£. 626,459
Brass and plated goods	-	613,901

An Account of the Quantity and Price of Tin sold to the East India Company in 1792, and the Five following Years*.

Years.	Quantity. Tons.	Price, per Ton.			Total Amount. £.
		£.	s.	d.	
1792	793	76	0	0	60,268
1793	{ 800	75	0	0	90,960
	{ 430	72	0	0	
1794	{ 800	75	0	0	82,660
	{ 330	68	13	4	
1795	{ 800	75	0	0	92,204
	{ 469	68	13	4	
1796	{ 800	75	0	0	77,853
	{ 260	68	13	4	
1797	{ 800	75	0	0	89,320
	{ 427	68	13	4	

In return for British manufactures, India now furnishes us with many raw materials of great consequence to our manufacturers. Indigo, an article of which not a single pound was brought from India twenty years ago, is now an import of such consequence, that its sales in one year have amounted nearly to one million sterling. Cotton, too, it is probable, may be obtained from India, in any quantity required by our manufacturers. The average annual export of Malabar cotton, from Surat and Bombay to China, is 60,000 bales, occupying 20,000 tons of shipping, and producing about £.720,000, the greater part of which is paid into the Company's treasury at Canton, for bills of exchange on the Court of Directors, or lent to foreign agents for the purpose of buying

* Report of a Committee of the House of Commons on the Copper Trade, 99, p. 5.

teas for the market of Europe *. In the year 1799-1800, upwards of 34,000 bales † (each containing 392 lbs. weight) were imported in 11,500 tons of shipping, into Great Britain. Hemp is another production which, it is supposed, may be imported to advantage. If it should be thought expedient to encourage the importation of that article from Bengal, it will make a demand for a still greater supply of shipping than cotton ‡.

Respecting sugar, another natural production of Bengal, we are informed by Mr. HENCHMAN, in his interesting Observations on the Trade between India and Europe, that it “has, for ages, been “cultivated” there “in very large quantities. It “was formerly an article of export trade; and by “the activity of individuals, aided by the support “and assistance of the Company, it has been rendered so again; and will, if it is politically right “to allow it, be an article of great consideration “between the East Indies and the port of London, “to be again exported for foreign consumption. “One very important point, in deciding upon this

* HENCHMAN'S Observations on the Reports of the Directors of the East India Company, p. 25.

† Equal to 13,328,000 lb. The quantity of cotton imported from Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, Essequibo, Martinico, St. Lucia, and Trinidad, in each of the last three years, was

Years	lbs.
1799	6,030,299
1800	10,740,620
1801	11,959,612

‡ HENCHMAN'S Observations, p. 16.

“ subject, is to recollect the situation of all foreign
 “ Europeans and Americans in India: they are at
 “ liberty to bring any articles from the East Indies
 “ that may be beneficial. If, therefore, sugar
 “ should for any reasons be prohibited to be brought
 “ in British ships, they will bring it in Foreign
 “ ships, whenever they find an advantage in doing
 “ so, for the supply of any part of the world, Eng-
 “ land excepted*.”

The sales of the East India Company, which, in 1783, only produced £.3,363,800, now amount to more than £.10,000,000.

Amount of Goods sold at the East India Company's Sales, in the Three last Years of Peace, and the Three last Years of War.

Years.	Company's Goods. £.	Private Trade, and Privileged Goods. £.	Total. £.
1790	5,104,508	930,930	6,035,438
1791	5,141,532	709,455	5,850,987
1792	5,650,819	703,578	5,754,397

Years.	Company's Goods. £.	Private Trade. £.	Neutral Property. £.	Total. £.
1st Mar. 1798 } to ditto 1799 }	8,337,066	1,629,959	348,231	10,315,256
1799 } 1800 }	7,367,727	2,336,980	455,903	10,160,610
1800 } 1801 }	7,662,041	2,382,092	339,310	10,122,452

* Henschman's Observations, p. 27.

How different is this state of our Indian trade from its amount at the end of the American war, in the year 1783! Yet, extensive as our commerce with Asia now is, it is highly probable that it will experience a great increase.

The trade carried on with the Dutch spice-islands, and settlements at Malacca and Cochin, is too inconsiderable for us to regret its loss. One East India-man would bring to Europe all the exportable produce of Amboyna, Banda, Ternate, and Malacca.

There can be little doubt but that in the hands of Britons, Ceylon (enriched, perhaps, by the introduction of the spices of these islands,) will be rendered a very flourishing colony; but I cannot avoid repeating the prayer of the learned author of "the Periplus of the Erythrean Sea," that the commerce of this rich and valuable island, now in the complete possession of the English, may be conducted on more liberal principles, and the natives treated more generously by them than they have been by their predecessors*. The restoration of the port of Cochin to its former possessors is more than compensated by the acquisition of all the maritime frontier of the Mysore. The possession of the ports of Mangalore and Onore will open a new vent for our manufactures (more particularly our woollens) in that populous empire. Colonel

* Dr. Vincent's Periplus, App. p. 22.

Beatson, in his account of the war with Tippoo, says, that “ formerly all traffic between the subjects and dependants of the Company, and those of the late Sultan, was nearly prohibited by the restraints to which his hatred to the British nation, or his ignorance and prejudice, had subjected the communication with his possessions. Those restraints being removed, and every proper encouragement to commercial intercourse being substituted, it may reasonably be expected that the neighbouring and now united countries of the Carnatic and Myfore will mutually consume a considerable portion of their respective products and manufactures, and that even a proportion of British commodities will soon find a market in Myfore. Our information with regard to the articles produced, manufactured, or consumed, in the countries acquired by the Company, and by the Rajah of Myfore, is at present too imperfect to form any accurate calculation of the possible increase of the imports from the coast of Malabar to Europe; but it appears probable, that the Company’s investment in the article of pepper, may soon be augmented to any extent which may be deemed adviseable*.”

Our undisputed sovereignty in Bengal and the Carnatic promises us similar advantages on the coast of

* View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo, p. 257.

Coromandel; the reduction of freight, in consequence of the peace, will be highly beneficial to the Company; and the spirit of investigation, which will probably lead to a full inquiry into the best means of promoting the interests of the nation respecting India, consistently with the chartered rights of the Company, will, we may hope, ultimately afford such encouragement to private traders in Asia and Britain, that the competition of foreign adventurers may be effectually checked, and London rendered the emporium of Indian commerce.

LETTER VI.

ON THE TRADE WITH EUROPE.

OUR European commerce may be divided into two parts; that carried on with those countries which during the last war were neutral, and that carried on with those which were belligerent powers. I shall consider each separately: and endeavour to shew that the balance of increase in those branches of trade, in which increase may be expected, will, probably, exceed the balance of loss in those in which a defalcation may be apprehended.

I. *On the Trade with the Neutral Powers.*

Russia occupies a chief place among the European neutral powers. Our trade with her, during the last ten years, has very considerably increased. The increase may be partly attributed to the war; but is also in some degree owing to causes which are likely to be permanent. If our imports from the countries on the Baltic have risen in consequence of our late extraordinary consumption of naval stores, they have also risen in consequence of an increased demand among our manufacturers for raw materials; and our export of British manufactures to the North of Europe has risen in consequence of the improved state of this part of the civilized world. Russia is advancing in population and civilization. From Asiatic Tartars, the Russians are (if I may be allowed the expression) becoming Europeans:
and

and their connexions with Britain have, probably, not a little contributed towards their improvement. Our factory at St. Petersburg, I am persuaded, has, in many points of view, proved a good national institute: “*artes intulit agreſſi Latio.*”

Our commerce with Ruſſia has been regularly progreſſive, ſince the commencement of his preſent Maſteſty's reign. Our exports, which on an average of five years, ending with 1765, amounted to £.66,402, roſe to £.196,229 in 1773, the laſt year noticed in Sir Charles Whitworth's tables of imports and exports; in the year 1792 they were valued at £.800,762; and in 1800 at £.1,025,335, of which £.557,374 were Britiſh manufactures.

The trade with Denmark and Sweden increaſed during the war; and principally in conſequence of the war. That part of it, however, which reſpects the export of Britiſh manufactures has not increaſed: the export of them to Denmark on the average of 1790, 1791, and 1792, was valued at £.179,333, and the exports to Sweden at £.41,058; and on the average of the years 1798, 1799, and 1800, the export of them to Denmark was valued at £.191,288, and the exports to Sweden at £.26,896*. It will be ſeen from the following documents that the export of Britiſh manufactures to theſe two countries does not equal half the export of Britiſh manufactures to Ruſſia.

* See Table of Exports to Denmark and Sweden in page 128. I need hardly remark that the values ſtated in this page are the *official* values of the Cuſtom Houſe Ledger.

Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels which cleared Outwards from the several Ports of England and Scotland, to Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

RUSSIA.*

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total Tonnage.
	British Tonnage.	Foreign Tonnage.	British Tonnage.	Foreign Tonnage.	
1789	47,096	855	7,134	—	55,085
1790	55,911	2,343	4,995	—	63,249
1791	60,668	1,505	5,450	—	67,623
1792	62,877	380	7,226	—	70,483
1793	35,101	1,038	5,498	—	41,637
1794	73,278	1,432	10,592	2000†	87,302
1795	104,407	3,502	10,041	—	117,950
1796	96,780	9,395	11,874	—	118,049
1797	58,217	1,287	9,128	—	68,632
1798	102,740	1,536	16,272	470	121,018
1799	71,860	29,698	12,194	191	113,943
1800	132,037	24,848	11,871	—	168,756

* This entry in the Custom-house navigation account does not comprehend Livonia. I have, therefore, here subjoined a statement of the tonnage of vessels cleared outwards to that country in 1789, and the eleven following years.

LIVONIA.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.
	Brit. Ton.	For. Ton.	Brit. Ton.
1789	3,883	—	106
1790	4,410	—	—
1791	included in Russia.		
1792	4,721	—	—
1793	3,067	30	—
1794	7,171	—	—
1795	14,957	490	—
1796	9,951	—	—
1797	6,734	—	—
1798	10,491	—	—
1799	9,919	52	—
1800	21,311	1,048	—

† This is stated as the tonnage of one ship; I presume erroneously.

DENMARK.

DENMARK.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total Tonnage.
	British Tonnage.	Foreign Tonnage.	British Tonnage.	Foreign Tonnage.	
1789	45,453	25,617	13,459	1,081	85,610
1790	47,222	34,261	9,177	1,526	92,186
1791	48,392	38,970	10,628	2,530	100,520
1792	42,262	35,874	9,921	1,710	89,767
1793	31,173	30,942	6,527	1,186	69,828
1794	46,478	45,401	7,196	2,781	101,856
1795	39,598	81,507	7,207	7,532	135,844
1796	46,816	91,549	12,847	12,378	163,590
1797	46,627	78,080	8,775	5,672	139,154
1798	53,433	77,773	10,843	12,202	154,251
1799	51,561	117,602	5,169	16,478	190,810
1800	45,850	145,995	9,275	14,218	215,338

S W E D E N.

1789	11,826	480	4,880	—	17,186
1790	10,808	351	6,889	—	18,048
1791	5,836	4,753	8,787	—	19,376
1792	7,015	6,703	7,973	682	22,373
1793	6,873	7,429	6,180	—	20,482
1794	15,473	9,803	9,835	447	35,558
1795	10,878	15,157	7,381	238	33,654
1796	16,020	17,216	11,304	180	44,720
1797	9,871	8,243	5,912	—	24,026
1798	12,884	18,347	4,634	—	35,865
1799	7,780	24,678	4,801	1,035	38,294
1800	5,774	27,980	2,314	1,075	37,143

An Account of the official Value of Imports into Great Britain from Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, and of Exports from Great Britain to each of those Countries, in 1790, and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

R U S S I A.

Value of Exports

Years.	Val. of Impts. £.	Brit. Man. £.	For. Mer. £.	Tot. Expts. £.
1790	1,710,374	265,920	188,369	454,289
1791	1,548,677	281,243	292,113	573,356
1792	1,708,671	428,774	371,987	800,762
1793	1,804,025	197,683	123,144	320,827
1794	1,789,448	240,520	255,386	495,907
1795	1,857,978	393,500	468,766	862,267
1796	2,510,083	393,932	372,965	766,897
1797	1,707,504	256,483	217,722	474,206
1798	2,416,829	380,068	311,711	691,780
1799	2,662,255	428,610	341,099	769,710
1800	2,382,098	557,374	467,960	1,025,335

D E N M A R K.

1790	149,860	140,418	121,726	262,144
1791	182,040	219,803	134,818	354,621
1792	186,649	177,779	134,941	312,720
1793	205,822	141,590	149,674	291,265
1794	209,885	195,202	293,982	489,184
1795	154,335	175,022	323,441	498,464
1796	243,928	189,672	320,110	509,783
1797	134,602	225,648	445,274	670,922
1798	176,208	193,122	356,428	549,550
1799	194,036	194,041	150,703	344,744
1800	241,562	186,703	353,994	540,698

S W E D E N.

1790	300,518	29,504	34,858	64,363
1791	267,770	36,259	38,483	74,743
1792	338,690	57,413	60,927	118,340
1793	307,395	28,437	47,987	76,424
1794	287,784	43,637	61,636	105,273
1795	294,612	47,304	80,073	127,377
1796	347,336	51,672	69,840	121,512
1797	192,033	74,934	78,961	153,895
1798	266,003	24,807	27,910	52,718
1799	347,882	26,120	24,460	50,580
1800	309,280	29,761	49,079	78,840

The same observation which I made respecting Russia, applies to the northern states of Germany : Prussia, Saxony, Hanover, and (I believe I might add) the hereditary dominions of Austria, though impoverished by the war, are improving markets. Various attempts have been made on the Continent, particularly in Saxony, to rival us in the cotton and woollen manufactures, by the introduction of machinery ; but these attempts have not lessened our exports. It is, however, not easy to determine what proportion of British manufactures exported to Germany during the war was destined for the consumption of Holland, Flanders, or France : but it is highly probable that a considerable part of the commerce lately carried on with the northern states of Germany will be diverted to other channels in consequence of the peace. In 1800, the exports to Germany were £.12,664,591. It is not to the internal demand of those countries, and the improving condition of their people, that we can attribute more than a part of the increased trade which has taken place with them in the course of the war. Whatever advantages Denmark may have derived from the neutrality which she observed till 1801, she will be much deceived if she flatters herself that in any year of peace, 215,338 tons, the amount of the tonnage of shipping from Great Britain last year, will enter her ports. She has acted only as an agent and carrier between the British merchant and other countries.

tries. Prussia, too, must consider the late extension of her trade as only temporary. Though she received 1849 vessels (containing 235,481 tons, or a ninth of the foreign trade of this country*) from our ports last year, she, probably, in profound peace, will not furnish employment to a fourth part of this number. In our trade with Hamburgh the tonnage has increased from 6,030 tons, in 1789, to 62,441 tons: the peculiar circumstances of the times may prevent its sinking to the level of the last peace; but our trade with most of the neutral powers except America, will decrease; and its diminution must be allowed against any increase which may be calculated to arise from the commercial intercourse being re-opened between Great Britain and the other belligerent Powers.

* Viz.

Cleared outwards from Great Britain in 1800,

	Number of Vessels.	Tonnage.
To Prussia	1976	223,859
Dantzic	53	11,622
Total	2029	235,481
To all parts of the world	16,761	2,130,322

An Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels which cleared Outwards from the several Ports in England and Scotland to Germany, Poland, Prussia, Bremen, Dantzic, and Hamburg, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

GERMANY.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total. Tonnage.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	39,099	7,000	7,459	186	53,744
1790	30,571	12,124	9,353	—	52,048
1791	46,973	17,665	9,095	—	73,733
1792	50,506	11,252	8,640	—	70,398
1793	39,095	14,135	5,091	453	58,774
1794	45,629	8,629	6,342	310	60,910
1795	25,830	24,634	2,431	652	53,547
1796	35,043	18,939	5,019	1,306	60,307
1797	26,381	12,989	5,092	635	45,097
1798	47,793	8,204	7,803	259	64,059
1799	28,609	13,988	5,843	108	48,548
1800	32,597	37,735	12,193	707	83,232

POLAND.*

1789	773	320	484	—	1,577
1790	577	320	200	118	1,215
1791	1,577	480	745	—	2,802
1792	2,224	1,615	260	—	4,099
1793	2,034	918	683	—	3,635
1794	2,934	620	373	135	4,062
1795	3,493	265	455	—	4,213
1796	5,059	80	2,643	—	7,782
1797	1,424	270	102	—	1,796
1798	3,646	170	970	—	4,786
1799	1,478	409	2,018	—	3,905
1800	5,522	1,644	3,235	—	10,401

* See note in next page.

PRUSSIA.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total. Tonnage.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	22,721	8,188	4,308	150	35,367
1790	27,924	14,975	7,026	100	50,025
1791	30,462	25,934	5,906	246	62,548
1792	24,509	16,469	3,958	—	44,936
1793	29,470	13,718	4,452	—	47,640
1794	42,872	11,998	3,700	135	58,705
1795	39,575	42,349	3,034	372	85,330
1796	51,335	82,197	4,154	3,118	140,804
1797	23,038	83,068	3,783	3,719	113,608
1798	43,238	98,145	4,546	2,487	148,416
1799	43,702	68,467	4,901	1,685	118,755
1800	41,838	166,242	10,755	5,024	223,859
BREMEN.					
1789	2,323	2,557	—	—	4,880
1790	1,912	2,572	—	—	4,484
1791	included in Germany				
1792	1,929	3,055	—	—	4,984
1793	2,782	2,760	—	—	5,542
1794	4,512	7,401	—	—	11,913
1795	3,005	10,330	—	—	13,335
1796	2,797	14,294	—	—	17,091
1797	3,210	7,021	—	—	10,231
1798	13,915	2,807	—	—	16,722
1799	5,742	2,652	—	—	8,394
1800	6,717	13,221	—	—	19,938

* The annexed account of the tonnage cleared outwards to Courland is not included under Poland in the Custom-house Navigation Account.

COURLAND.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.
1789	623	—	—
1790	827	—	—
1791	—	—	—
1792	1,809	216	—
1793	1,337	430	—
1794	2,017	—	—
1795	225	482	—
1796	1,579	—	—
1797	694	100	—
1798	629	—	—
1799	412	—	106
1800	1,064	80	767

DANTZIC.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total. Tonnage.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	1,029	—	669	350	2,048
1790	2,471	4,184	included in Poland		
1791	included in Poland		D°		
1792	1,634	3,909	78	—	5,621
1793	1,367	1,720	—	—	3,087
1794	1,224	3,125	147	—	4,496
1795	7,081	8,244	232	—	15,557
1796	4,877	7,044	included in Poland		
1797	1,745	7,539	—	—	9,284
1798	5,236	3,024	281	—	8,541
1799	8,155	5,605	95	—	13,855
1800	2,656	8,637	329	—	11,622

HAMBURGH.

1789	5,434	605	—	—	6,039
1790	included in Germany				
1791	D°				
1792	D°				
1793	D°				
1794	18,233	17,918	—	—	36,151
1795	12,195	41,308	—	—	53,503
1796	8,926	39,095	—	—	48,021
1797	14,527	37,667	539	—	52,733
1798	51,656	22,287	183	—	74,126
1799	31,363	13,364	—	—	44,727
1800	35,699	26,542	200	—	62,441

An Account of the official Value of Imports from Germany and Poland, and of Exports to those Countries, in 1790, and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

GERMANY.

Years.	Value of Imports. £.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports. £.
		British Ma- nufactures. £.	Foreign Mer- chandize. £.	
1790	603,208	791,601	902,920	1,694,522
1791	715,628	778,213	1,111,532	1,889,745
1792	650,437	811,140	1,327,970	2,139,111
1793	794,095	718,474	1,764,221	2,482,695
1794	796,138	1,634,530	4,308,695	5,943,225
1795	1,020,632	1,760,133	6,311,876	8,072,009
1796	2,082,275	1,591,740	6,582,179	8,173,920
1797	1,576,426	1,964,967	6,419,587	8,384,554
1798	2,091,832	2,042,774	8,646,691	10,689,466
1799	2,820,134	2,032,567	6,640,729	8,673,297
1800	2,352,197	4,364,120	8,300,470	12,664,591

POLAND.

	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	114,148	39,217	12,269	51,486
1791	175,043	39,833	22,812	62,645
1792	122,321	32,900	34,174	67,075
1793	275,497	20,533	47,911	68,444
1794	202,222	11,612	64,083	75,696
1795	137,507	15,212	74,217	89,429
1796	340,724	16,124	43,775	59,899
1797	168,662	11,394	19,066	30,460
1798	202,562	22,331	45,908	68,240
1799	270,687	32,247	18,816	51,063
1800	393,041	17,802	30,099	47,902

II. *On the Trade with the Belligerent Powers.*

Commerical enterprize, following the footsteps of conquest, has enabled Great Britain by the acquisition of permanent or temporary markets, in distant parts of the world, to indemnify herself for the deprivations which her trade with the Continent of Europe has experienced in consequence of the war. These deprivations, however, will, in a great measure, cease with the termination of the contest; and the renewal of a friendly intercourse with France and her allies will place us, if not on the footing of the most favoured nation, at least in a situation to carry on a direct trade, under certain regulations, with our neighbours. Very considerable advantages must result, both to our merchants and manufacturers, from this change; for, whatever relaxation may have taken place during the last year, before that time the use of British manufactures was prohibited both in France and Holland under the severest penalties*; and all communication interdicted with our merchants. British merchandize, though purchased of neutrals, was subjected to confiscation. Yet, though these checks, together with

* The effect of this prohibition may be estimated from the lowness of the export of British Manufactures and Foreign Merchandize to France and Flanders in 1798 and 1799. (See p. 143.) Since the establishment of the Consular government the exports to France and Flanders have in one year risen from £.23,139 to £.2,134,246.

the increased price of freight, and expence of a circuitous transit through neutral ports, have much reduced the consumption of British commodities in France; they have not altogether prevented it.

It cannot reasonably be supposed, that France and her allies, during the latter years of the war, received from us, through the intervention of neutral traders, the same quantity of goods that they would import from Great Britain in a period of profound peace. Some articles, which would readily be received by a direct channel, are too bulky to pay a war freight and circuitous navigation. It will be seen from the following extract from a Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, that the export of coal from the East coast of England to foreign countries has sunk one half in consequence of the war.

An Account of the Quantity of Coals exported from Newcastle and Sunderland to Foreign Countries in the Years 1791, 1792, 1798, and 1799*.

Exported.	1791.	1792.	1798.	1799.
	Chaldrons. Chaldrons. Chaldrons. Chaldrons.			
From Newcastle	45,702	42,993	44,722	43,366
Sunderland	54,150	53,313	55,111	4,039

The measure here used is the Newcastle chaldron, equal to two London chaldrons.

* Report on the Coal Trade, 1800, App. 42. 43.

From other English ports above 16,000 Newcastle chaldrons were annually exported before the war to France, Flanders, Holland, and Spain; but none in 1797, 1798, or 1799.

More than half a million bushels of salt were exported to Flanders annually, before 1793; none has been exported during the last six years*. If the wealth and energy of this country should enable Parliament to carry into execution the commutation of the salt duty, of which the gross amount is above a million†, (a measure which has been recommended by two Committees of the House of Commons, as more efficacious for promoting the prosperity of the fisheries than any possible system of bounties and encouragement,) salt would probably form a very considerable article of export. From an ac-

* An Account of the manufactured Salt exported from Great Britain to Flanders in the Years 1790, 1791, 1792, 1798, 1799, and 1800.

	Rock Salt.	White Salt.	
	Bushels.	Bushels.	
1790	582,446	16,880	} Report on British Fisheries, 1798, App. 9.
1791	532,894	6,800	
1792	572,888	25,200	
1798	None.	None.	
1799			
1800			

† Amount of the Salt Duty,	Gross Receipt.	
in 1800.	£.	
In England - - -	947,129	} for year ending 5th Jan. 1801.
Scotland - - -	59,399	
Ireland - - -	86,816	} for year ending 25th March 1801.
	£. 1,093,344	

count

count of woollens exported to the year 1799 inclusive, it appears that the increased export to Germany (the internal consumption of which country, I apprehend, is much greater than it was ten years ago) had not compensated for the loss of the French, Flemish, Dutch, and Spanish markets.

An Account of the official Value of Woollens exported from Great Britain to Germany, Holland, Flanders, France, and Spain, in the Years 1790, 1791, 1792, 1797, 1798, and 1799.

	1790.	1791.	1792.
Germany -	£.223,226	£.255,303	£.271,638
Holland -	306,414	313,845	367,583
Flanders -	117,779	124,239	117,151
France -	95,827	96,840	155,134
Spain -	407,464	346,367	472,221
Total -	<u>1,150,710</u>	<u>1,136,594</u>	<u>1,383,727</u>
	1797.	1798.	1799.
Germany -	£.641,098	£.463,019	£.427,053
Holland -	7,712	94	175
Flanders -			
France - -	631	—	—
Spain - -	26	—	—
Total -	<u>649,467</u>	<u>463,113</u>	<u>427,228</u>

The following account exhibits the tonnage of our trade with France, Flanders, Holland, and Spain, both during and previously to the war. It will be seen from this statement that the annual tonnage cleared outwards, on an average of the years of war, to France, Flanders, and Holland, has not amounted

amounted to a tenth of the tonnage employed during the preceding period of peace; and though a very large abatement will (as I have already remarked) take place in our peace exports to those neutral powers, who, during the war, have been the carriers of British merchandize, and colonial produce, to the belligerent states opposed to us*, it is probable, for many reasons, that our future trade with France, Holland, and Spain, will much exceed the amount of this abatement.

* It is, however, remarkable that, notwithstanding the great increase in the export of Foreign merchandize from Great Britain to France, Flanders, Holland, and Italy, in the year 1800, the export of Foreign merchandize to Germany rose from £. 6,640,729, its amount in 1799, to £. 8,300,470 in 1800.

An Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels cleared Outwards from the several Ports of Great Britain, in the Year 1789, and each of the Eleven following Years, to France, Flanders, Holland, and Spain.

FRANCE.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total Tonnage.	
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign Tons.		
1789	137,540	9,860	4,174	—	151,574	Peace.
1790	91,783	9,026	2,095	264	103,118	
1791	110,784	13,018	1,183	80	125,065	
1792	106,481	8,346	1,390	75	116,292	
1793	3,734	8,560	—	—	12,294	War.
1794	83	2,420	—	—	2,563	
1795	627	5,977	—	—	6,604	
1796	—	8,974	—	—	8,974	
1797	—	10,107	—	—	10,107	
1798	—	2,930	—	—	2,930	
1799	—	1,548	—	—	1,548	
1800	534	16,523	—	—	17,057	

FLANDERS.

1789	41,963	2,139	3,586	—	47,688	Peace.
1790	36,236	3,803	196	—	40,235	
1791	33,763	5,706	1,589	—	41,058	
1792	61,175	4,012	1,003	—	66,190	
1793	31,588	9,301	285	—	41,174	
1794	29,092	4,703	100	—	37,895	War.
1795	—	1,669	—	—	1,669	
1796	—	1,876	—	—	1,876	
1797	—	2,692	—	—	2,692	
1798	—	15	—	—	15	
1799	—	214	—	—	214	
1800	—	4,478	—	—	4,478	

HOLLAND.

HOLLAND.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total. Tons.	
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.		
1789	134,110	10,828	10,488	—	155,426	Peace.
1790	121,158	11,552	9,349	186	142,245	
1791	127,558	10,739	7,819	544	146,660	
1792	131,611	14,222	8,083	354	154,270	
1793	129,264	17,282	6,471	285	153,302	
1794	106,827	18,802	6,180	—	131,809	
1795	817	3,772	—	—	4,589	War.
1796	22	5,376	—	400	5,798	
1797	—	21,073	—	192	21,265	
1798	174	10,184	—	—	10,358	
1799	879	1,527	—	—	2,406	
1800	—	21,536	—	1,910	22,446	

SPAIN, including the Canaries.

1789	22,076	3,159	1,792	—	27,027	Peace.
1790	20,539	5,766	1,662	—	27,967	
1791	28,811	3,800	3,579	—	36,190	
1792	29,847	3,464	2,020	—	35,331	
1793	16,363	6,433	522	—	23,318	
1794	22,976	7,596	1,558	—	32,130	
1795	13,319	9,641	1,962	—	24,922	War.
1796	5,946	15,897	1,280	206	23,329	
1797	70	4,855	—	—	4,925	
1798	50	6,073	—	—	6,123	
1799	274	10,238	—	168	10,680	
1800	1,584	15,722	—	—	17,306	

Annual Average Tonnage of Vessels cleared Outwards to France,

Flanders, Holland, and Spain, before and during the War.

	Average of Peace.	Tons.	Average of War.	Tons.
France	{ four years ending with 1792. }	124,032	{ eight years ending with 1800. }	7,759
Flanders	{ six years ending with 1794. }	45,706	{ six years ending with 1800. }	1,824
Holland	{ six years ending with 1794. }	147,285	{ six years ending with 1800. }	11,143
	{ eight years ending with 1796. }	28,776	{ four years ending with 1800. }	9,753

It appears from the following account of imports and exports, that the value of British manufactures exported to France in the year before the war, amounted to 743,280*l.*; and that the value of those exported to Flanders, in each of the years 1790, 1791, and 1792, exceeded 300,000*l.* Whether our future trade to these, now consolidated, states will be equally valuable, must depend on the nature of our future intercourse with them. If the probability of the renewal of commerce with Great Britain has created murmurs in France, it must certainly be admitted that, in one branch of political economy, our neighbours have not been enlightened by the revolution. Their political economists might inform them that it is advantageous to them to buy their cloth, their linens, and their hardware, from those who sell those commodities at the lowest price. If the commercial regulations of France will enable us to serve her cheaper than the Dutch or Germans, or than her own manufacturers can do, she will consult her own interest in dealing with those whom she terms “a nation of shopkeepers.” The thinned population, reduced capital, low price of confiscated land, and languid state of agriculture, in the Republic ought to suggest to her, that the national prosperity will, for some years to come, be best promoted by encouraging improvements directly connected with cultivation. Mercantile jealousy, and national animosity, if they still influence

the councils of France, may point out a different course; and attempt, though they will attempt in vain, to injure Great Britain by forcing French industry, by means of bounties and prohibitions, into a direction which it is not naturally inclined to take.

Account of the official Value of Imports into Great Britain from France, Flanders, Holland, and Spain, and of Exports from Great Britain to each of those Countries, in 1790, and the Ten following Years, distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

FRANCE.

Years.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	605,371	535,284	337,040	872,324
1791	546,057	576,632	554,744	1,131,376
1792	717,634	743,280	484,885	1,228,165
1793	121,027	66,677	162,210	228,887
1794	167	2,680	31,862	34,543
1795	10,362	—	78,652	78,652
1796	14,655	30	7,945	7,975
1797	13,706	32,579	656,715	689,295
1798	20,885	26	4,455	4,481
1799	29,930	570	8,332	8,903
1800	110,415	130,685	1,194,734	1,325,419

FLANDERS.

F L A N D E R S.

Years.	Value of Exports.			
	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	145,950	303,537	597,195	900,733
1791	193,420	387,399	539,560	926,959
1792	132,289	381,287	649,806	1,031,093
1793	120,180	215,113	560,976	776,089
1794	76,820	187,577	484,305	671,888
1795	4,287	—	13,508	13,508
1796	7,067	2,045	63,008	65,054
1797	10,514	1,720	122,838	124,558
1798	14,643	—	16,684	16,684
1799	12,355	215	14,021	14,236
1800	34,656	40,485	768,410	808,826

H O L L A N D.

1790	714,707	727,646	695,698	1,423,345
1791	853,984	692,725	673,149	1,365,874
1792	801,535	785,207	731,242	1,516,449
1793	806,306	578,844	1,037,938	1,616,783
1794	1,013,351	449,179	1,141,736	1,640,916
1795	119,586	1,781	109,333	111,115
1796	309,933	2,792	513,475	516,268
1797	529,428	76,908	1,264,007	1,340,915
1798	594,104	6,297	931,805	938,102
1799	200,432	4,931	12,720	17,652
1800	972,600	20,414	3,188,198	3,208,613

SPAIN,

SPAIN, including the CANARIES.

Years.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Ma-	Foreign Mer-	
		nufactures.	chandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	738,485	586,498	80,724	667,222
1791	733,048	582,914	90,126	673,041
1792	908,063	720,984	90,394	811,379
1793	490,242	419,360	83,487	502,847
1794	759,950	487,281	165,238	652,520
1795	1,007,936	369,612	100,991	470,604
1796	825,632	441,434	121,395	562,830
1797	517,809	748	6,145	6,893
1798	353,897	397	—	397
1799	429,846	5	—	5
1800	704,189	—	3,382	3,382

It appears from the following account of the tonnage of vessels cleared outwards to the other belligerent states, that a diminution has taken place in our trade with all of them, except Portugal. The increased export, however, of British manufactures to that country has not compensated for the loss of the direct intercourse with Spain during the war. The official value of British manufactures exported in the years

	1790, 1791, 1792,	1798, 1799, 1800.
	£.	£.
To Spain - was -	1,890,396	402
To Portugal — -	1,911,226	2,902,758
	3,801,622	2,903,160

An Account of the Tonnage of Vessels cleared Outwards from the Ports of Great Britain to Portugal, Italy, and Sicily *, the Streights and Turkey, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

PORTUGAL, including MADEIRA.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total Tonnage. Tons.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	26,485	777	1,461	—	28,723
1790	28,952	1,935	2,024	70	32,981
1791	34,586	2,543	2,584	—	39,713
1792	38,750	2,650	2,267	179	43,846
1793	22,750	5,519	499	240	29,008
1794	30,110	4,625	1,474	150	36,359
1795	26,042	20,491	1,970	370	48,873
1796	29,028	25,280	2,619	340	57,267
1797	25,262	14,978	2,006	631	42,877
1798	31,846	15,576	2,756	—	50,178
1799	24,871	17,480	2,484	—	44,835
1800	30,029	23,464	754	—	54,247

ITALY and SICILY.

1789	16,642	190	862	—	17,694
1790	19,526	2,203	1,282	—	23,071
1791	29,888	199	1,117	—	31,204
1792	29,467	200	805	—	30,472
1793	17,406	2,200	729	—	20,335
1794	19,507	457	1,032	—	20,996
1795	13,469	5,958	502	—	19,929
1796	6,416	11,920	—	—	18,336
1797	—	10,082	—	—	10,082
1798	3,863	4,627	—	—	8,490
1799	6,475	3,342	946	—	10,763
1800	12,337	6,075	388	216	19,016

* Under "Italy and Sicily" I have included the following entries, which stand separate in the Custom-house Account of Trade and Navigation, "Italy, Naples, Venice, Leghorn, Genoa, and Sicily."

THE

THE STREIGHTS and GIBRALTAR.

Years.	ENGLAND.		SCOTLAND.		Total Tonnage. Tons.
	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	British. Tons.	Foreign. Tons.	
1789	7,445	—	450	—	7,895
1790	9,565	1,078	130	—	10,773
1791	7,840	136	464	—	8,440
1792	6,737	—	222	—	6,959
1793	4,197	403	375	—	4,975
1794	5,047	166	177	—	5,390
1795	3,345	—	110	—	3,455
1796	5,300	456	—	—	5,756
1797	3,644	852	223	—	4,719
1798	6,057	228	509	—	6,794
1799	8,328	1,188	370	—	9,886
1800	4,705	2,013	184	—	6,902

TURKEY.

1789	6,077	—	—	—	6,077
1790	4,150	371	—	—	4,521
1791	9,021	—	—	—	9,021
1792	11,186	—	—	—	11,186
1793	2,071	—	—	—	2,071
1794	2,396	—	—	—	2,396
1795	1,683	—	—	—	1,683
1796	1,048	380	—	—	1,420
1797	—	330	—	—	330
1798	1,511	524	—	—	2,035
1799	1,624	2,197	—	—	3,821
1800	2,456	—	—	—	2,456

Our export of British manufactures to Italy has been much reduced in consequence of the war: and, with the exception of the two last years, the annual average export of them to Turkey, during the war, has not amounted to half the average of the three preceding years of peace.

An Account of the official Value of Imports from Portugal, Italy, the Streights, and Turkey, and of the Exports to each of those Countries in 1790, and the Ten following Years ; distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

PORTUGAL including MADEIRA.

Value of Exports.

Years.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	746,907	536,887	29,417	566,304
1791	874,225	657,388	31,076	688,464
1792	977,820	714,951	39,671	754,622
1793	482,191	521,167	61,935	583,102
1794	714,388	512,479	78,215	590,694
1795	848,550	643,860	64,876	708,737
1796	677,773	783,046	92,955	876,001
1797	525,319	633,484	77,715	711,199
1798	704,720	782,290	142,453	924,743
1799	1,061,967	1,045,950	138,643	1,184,594
1800	927,258	1,074,518	124,506	1,199,024

ITALY and SICILY.

1790	972,847	803,884	87,518	891,403
1791	1,020,298	932,148	115,014	1,047,163
1792	1,069,620	778,195	185,037	963,233
1793	620,679	434,716	108,925	543,642
1794	707,249	420,162	190,398	610,560
1795	596,878	568,278	295,357	863,635
1796	375,054	626,968	146,884	773,852
1797	98,203	100,725	15,383	116,109
1798	145,440	184,075	38,093	222,169
1799	224,607	196,371	191,881	388,253
1800	411,765	449,618	136,940	586,559

THE STREIGHTS and GIBRALTAR *.

Value of Exports.

Years.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	37,235	188,733	15,341	204,075
1791	16,124	224,673	16,841	241,515
1792	13,154	179,694	17,429	197,124
1793	5,756	118,479	17,225	135,705
1794	11,440	83,164	37,125	120,290
1795	18,033	107,331	32,973	140,305
1796	28,593	97,262	39,273	136,536
1797	16,990	37,760	19,095	56,855
1798	36,217	144,722	57,767	202,489
1799	62,992	289,885	68,899	358,784
1800	35,665	228,620	65,937	294,558

TURKEY.

1790	249,187	70,526	42,653	113,179
1791	178,388	99,206	90,085	189,291
1792	290,599	98,961	174,824	273,785
1793	184,681	23,466	21,803	45,270
1794	324,906	55,690	62,009	117,700
1795	84,299	51,800	98,137	149,938
1796	150,182	59,410	96,100	155,510
1797	104,838	22,085	1,447	23,532
1798	42,285	42,860	19,308	62,168
1799	33,091	112,065	114,012	226,078
1800	199,773	111,096	55,708	166,804

Many persons entertain sanguine expectations that the brilliant achievements of the British army in Egypt will, notwithstanding our evacuation

* The exports in the four last years, in this table, were all exports to Gibraltar: the imports from the Streights in these four years were only

In 1797-	£.1,220
1798	3,091
1799	3,957
1800	2,940

of that country, secure to us great commercial advantages in that province of the Turkish empire; but, as the treaty of peace lately concluded between Bonaparte and the Porte places the French republic on the footing of the most favoured nation, it is not by means of exclusive privileges that we can hope to supplant our rivals in the markets of Turkey. We must found our pre-eminence on the lowness of our prices, the variety of our assortments, and the improved quality of our woollen manufactures. The period is peculiarly favourable for speculation in this branch of commerce. Twenty years ago, the French cloth trade to Turkey began to decline; the troubles produced by the revolution in the southern provinces, and the war that followed those troubles, have much injured the manufactures of Languedoc. Marseilles, sixty years ago, annually exported twelve thousand pieces of cloth (of forty yards each) to Aleppo and Constantinople*; but the French woollens are now in low estimation in the Levant. A French ex-consul in Greece admits that the cloths of Germany, called *Leipsics*, have supplanted the *Londrins* of Languedoc; and that we enjoy a considerable share in the export of stuffs, the lightness and texture of which his countrymen are utterly unable to imitate†. Our

* Hanway's Travels to Persia, vol. i. p. 39.

† Beaujour, Commerce de la Grèce, tome ii. p. 9.

other principal exports to Turkey are gunpowder, hardware, toys, jewellery, and watches. Of our trade in the last of these articles, the writer, whom I have just mentioned, gives a very flattering account. He says that of English watches, there are sold annually, at Salonichi, thirty dozen; as many in the Morea; three hundred dozen at Constantinople; four hundred dozen in Syria; and two hundred and fifty dozen in Egypt. He says each watch is worth from eighty to one hundred and twenty piasters*; and computes the aggregate of this branch of commerce at 266,400l. sterling. “The trade in clock-work in Europe, “has doubled within the last fifty years. It is “probable that it will increase with the progress “of society; for, wherever civilization exists, time “is a precious article, and its value renders the “instrument necessary that portions it out†.”

The advantageous situation of Marseilles, which lies almost in the direct route from the West Indies to the Levant, will enable the French, on the complete re-establishment of peace, to recover the export trade of coffee and cotton to Turkey. The export of naval stores, from the north of Europe to the Levant, was formerly in the hands of the Dutch: the Russians, in consequence of the privileges which they have acquired on the Black Sea,

* From 16l. to 20l.

† Commerce de la Grèce, tome ii. p. 18.

now possess this branch of commerce almost exclusively.

I cannot conceive that the possession of Malta (whatever may be its value as a military station) would have afforded us any new means of extending our trade with Turkey. The heavy charge of a garrison at La Valette might, in some degree, have been compensated by a clandestine trade with Italy and Sicily, (if such a trade could have been deemed a national object,) but the acquisition of this island would not have enabled our manufacturers to drive their competitors, the French, Italians, and Germans, from the markets of the Levant. It may, however, be fairly presumed that the government of Malta, renovated by the 10th article of the Definitive Treaty, and protected and guaranteed by the six principal powers of Europe, will afford greater encouragement to mercantile adventure than it could possibly do in its former feeble state; that the admission of Maltese into all employments, both civil and military, will promote the industry, and increase the consumption, of the island; and that the establishment of a Lazaretto, open to all nations, and the advantages of a neutral port, will enable British merchants to extend their commercial intercourse with the Italian States and the Levant. It may also be hoped that a commercial treaty with the Porte will afford our merchants an opportunity of improving the intercourse which

British valour has established with Egypt. Our trade with that country was very inconsiderable before the war.

Tonnage and Number of Vessels entered Inwards from Egypt, and cleared Outwards, from Great Britain to Egypt, in the Years 1790, 1791, and 1792.

Years.	Entered Inwards.		Cleared Outwards.	
	Ships.	Tons.	Ships.	Tons.
1790 - -	1	194	—	—
1791 - -	3	576	2	543
1792 - -	2	584	3	287

It may likewise be expected that our trade in the Mediterranean will receive some increase in consequence of the establishment of the republic of the Seven Islands. We have long dealt with them for an article, which, however unimportant it may appear, yields a considerable sum in revenue. The duty on currants, which, I believe, are chiefly imported from Zante, last year produced above 90,000l.

L E T T E R VII.

ON THE COASTING TRADE; AND THE TRADE OF IRELAND.

THE limits to which I propose to confine my inquiries do not permit me to enter into a minute investigation of the progress of our coasting trade; an investigation which would furnish the most satisfactory evidence of the prosperity of this branch of our commerce. The increase in the number of vessels belonging to the different ports of the British empire, which has already been noticed*, and which is much greater than the increase of our foreign trade required, is chiefly ascribable to the extension of the intercourse between the different ports of the British islands. It appears from a comparative view of the tonnage in the foreign trade, and in the coasting trade entered inwards at the port of London, that whilst the former, between 1792 and 1799, increased from 603,431 tons to 673,473 tons, the latter, during the same period, increased from 982,700 to 1,411,878 tons. The exports from the outports have also increased in a greater proportion than the exports from the port of London.

* See page 56.

Account of the Number of Ships, with their Tonnage, that entered Inwards in the Port of London, from the Foreign Trade, and the Coasting Trade, in the Years 1700, 1750, 1790, and the Nine following Years*.

Years.	Foreign Trade.		Coasting Trade.	
	Ships.	Tons.	Ships.	Tons.
1700	1,335	157,035	5,562	278,100
1750	1,682	234,359	6,396	511,680
1790	3,415	581,095	9,278	927,800
1791	3,420	568,427	9,398	939,800
1792	3,675	603,431	9,827	982,700
1793	3,541	655,124	9,641	964,100
1794	3,663	620,845	10,286	1,028,600
1795	2,832	578,453	11,964	1,196,400
1796	4,176	723,985	10,529	1,323,532
1797	3,269	557,248	10,781	1,360,823
1798	3,420	627,087	10,133	1,250,449
1799	3,414	673,473	11,163	1,411,878

The amount of foreign tonnage entered inwards at the port of London (included in the foreign trade) amounted in the year 1700 to 76,995 tons; in 1750 to 36,346 tons; in 1790 to 149,205 tons; in 1793 to 177,019 tons; and in 1798 to 232,005 tons. The trade at the outports has much increased since the year 1790 in the official value of their exports, but not in the amount of their tonnage.

* Second Report on the Port of London, 1799, Appendix, D. 2. D. 9.
Third Report on ditto, 1800, Appendix, A. 5. A. 7.

An Account of the Tonnage cleared Outwards, and of the Exports, from all the Outports; and of the Exports from the Port of London, in the following Years*.

Years.	Tonnage from the Outports. Tons.	Years.	Value of Exports from all the Out- ports. £.	Value of Exports from the Port of London. £.
1751	522,802	1758	4,283,862	8,415,218
1790	1,031,231	1760	3,968,245	10,726,709
1791	1,108,923	1770	5,000,945	9,267,709
1792	1,168,712	1780	5,714,094	6,837,960
1797	930,300	1790	8,168,167	10,716,548
1798	999,132	1793	6,704,965	12,660,463
1799	1,014,615	1798	13,920,316	18,002,204

It appears from these accounts that the export trade of London was in a flourishing state in 1760; that in 1780 it had decreased two-fifths; and that in 1798 it amounted to thrice the value of the exports in 1780. The exports of the out-ports appear to have been doubled in eighteen years. The following accounts of the tonnage of vessels cleared out to Ireland, and the islands of Alderney, Guernsey, Jersey, and Man, in 1789 and the eleven following years, and of the imports and exports to those parts of the empire in 1790 and the ten following years, comprize the principal countries in the Custom-house accounts which have not been noticed in the preceding pages. The disturbances in Ireland have no doubt prevented the increase of Irish commerce from being as rapid as it would otherwise have been; and various circumstances connected with the war have probably extended the trade of the British islands on the French coast much beyond the limits to which it will be confined in times of peace.

* Second Report on the Port of London, Appendix, D. 12, 13, 14. Third Report, Appendix, A. 8.

Account of the Tonnage of British and Foreign Vessels entered Inwards, and cleared Outwards, in the Ports of Great Britain and Wales, from or to Ireland, in 1789, and the Eleven following Years.

Vessels entered Inwards from Ireland.

Years.	ENGLAND AND WALES.		SCOTLAND.	
	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.	British Tons.	Foreign Tons.
1789	176,560	1,704	93,329	133
1790	180,192	2,326	103,307	187
1791	182,179	2,149	108,219	—
1792	199,764	2,026	94,934	—
1793	179,374	5,447	74,980	110
1794	420,943	7,021	62,237	154
1795	437,241	10,154	70,389	—
1796	453,772	6,828	102,792	228
1797	396,745	5,256	86,762	145
1798	394,126	3,157	67,509	—
1799	432,540	5,660	63,290	—
1800	442,667	7,746	65,954	—

Vessels cleared Outwards to Ireland.

	ENGLAND AND WALES.		SCOTLAND.	
1789	406,734	82	69,307	—
1790	408,839	—	71,108	—
1791	409,391	—	37,005	—
1792	436,843	—	71,529	—
1793	448,247	—	72,037	—
1794	441,103	—	61,567	—
1795	448,406	900	58,941	150
1796	463,356	—	75,154	—
1797	423,747	160	71,913	—
1798	413,686	—	77,153	—
1799	447,838	—	79,924	—
1800	498,398	157	87,024	68

Imports from, and Exports to, Ireland.

Value of Exports.

Years.	Value of Imports.	British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize.	Total Exports.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1790	2,573,747	1,528,388	937,380	2,265,769
1791	2,479,279	1,470,795	999,667	2,470,463
1792	2,622,733	1,512,844	860,022	2,372,866
1793	2,284,920	1,055,276	888,048	1,943,324
1794	2,749,900	1,281,316	1,199,159	2,480,476
1795	2,636,705	1,612,270	1,185,103	2,797,463
1796	2,764,879	1,781,789	1,015,280	2,797,070
1797	3,113,585	1,310,996	1,126,085	2,437,082
1798	2,735,686	1,657,954	1,316,408	2,974,363
1799	2,770,731	2,405,999	1,680,987	4,086,986
1800	2,312,824	1,787,966	1,953,533	3,741,400

An Account of the Value, according to the Prices current, of all Imports into, and Exports from, Ireland, for Five Years, ending 25th March, 1801, stated in British Currency*.

Year ending 25th March.	Value of Imports.	Value of Exports.		Total Exports.
		Irish Produce.	Foreign Articles.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1796	5,924,654	6,312,798	51,049	6,363,847
1797	5,741,324	5,702,632	99,598	5,802,230
1798	4,395,504	5,554,268	107,127	5,661,395
1799	5,688,361	5,695,664	193,989	5,889,653
1800	7,525,385	5,200,953	227,967	5,428,920

* Accounts respecting the Income, &c. of Ireland, (No. V.) ordered to be printed 29th June, 1801. It may be expected, that measures will be adopted, for ascertaining, with the greatest possible precision, not only the *real value* of the annual exports and imports of Great Britain and Ireland, but also the annual consumption of each country, in various taxable commodities, as by the 7th Article of the Union it is declared that “at the
“ expiration of twenty years, the future expenditure of the
“ United Kingdom, other than the interest and charges of the
“ debt to which either country shall be separately liable, shall
“ be defrayed in such proportion as the United Parliament shall
“ deem just and reasonable, upon a comparison of the real value
“ of the exports and imports of the respective countries, upon
“ an average of the three years next preceding the revision; or
“ on a comparison of the value of the quantities of the following
“ articles, consumed within the respective countries, on a similar
“ average, *viz.* Beer, Spirits, Sugar, Wine, Tea, Tobacco, and
“ Malt; or, according to the aggregate proportion resulting
“ from both these considerations combined; or on a comparison
“ of the amount of income in each country, estimated from
“ the produce for the same periods, of a general tax, if such
“ shall have been imposed on the same descriptions of income
“ in both countries.” Statements of this nature would be valuable additions to the financial and commercial accounts, which are annually laid before Parliament.

Account of Tonnage from and to Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, Sark, and Man.

Years.	Gu. Jersey, Ald. Sark. Tons.	Isle of Man. Tons.	Years.	Gu. Jersey, Ald. Sark. Tons.	Isle of Man. Tons.
1789	18,656	5,947	1795	31,123	10,339
1790	17,353	5,114	1796	38,316	12,362
1791	18,055	1,322	1797	29,997	14,383
1792	19,583	1,639	1798	35,961	11,257
1793	18,547	10,933	1799	41,549	10,537
1794	25,793	11,907	1800	39,717	10,859

Official Value of Imports from, and of Exports to, Alderney, Guernsey, Jersey, Sark, and Man.

Years.	Imports. £.	Value of Exports.		To. Exp. £.
		Brit. Man. £.	For. Merch. £.	
1790	69,194	90,078	30,572	121,550
1791	71,019	98,203	29,112	127,316
1792	86,196	104,201	25,457	189,658
1793	103,204	146,246	38,104	144,350
1794	106,466	132,627	56,464	189,092
1795	142,397	140,546	89,484	230,031
1796	260,190	148,622	73,645	222,267
1797	198,356	137,408	84,335	221,743
1798	206,835	176,209	61,495	237,705
1799	240,290	213,232	102,720	315,953
1800	275,117	195,931	68,398	264,330

We cannot reasonably apprehend that foreign nations, who, with all the advantages of neutrality during the war, have not stript us of our trade, or ruined our manufacturers, should be more successful in peace, when circumstances will be more favourable to us; but it is extremely improbable, that France, without a plentiful supply of fuel, without our improved mills and steam-engines*,

* The amount of capital vested in mills and machinery, in the woollen manufacture alone, is estimated, by a very intelligent manufacturer of Leeds, Benjamin Gott, esquire, at 5,083,560*l*.—Minutes of Evidence before the House of Commons, relating to Wool, 29th April, 1800. p. 31.

without that ingenuity which can only be acquired by long practice, without habits of industry, wanting capital to set her industry in motion, and unable to give that credit which those countries which deal with us have been accustomed to, should soon dispossess us of those markets which we now supply. If we could undersell the French in America before the year 1793, we may now hope to preserve our superiority. The taxes imposed during the war do not press heavily on our manufactures. The internal improvements, which during the last ten years have taken place in Great Britain, have facilitated the operations of labour, and rendered it more productive. New roads, canals, and machinery, while they reduce the price of manufactures, increase the remuneration of the workman.

In our export trade we now enjoy many peculiar advantages which we did not formerly possess; there is hardly an article in the manufacture of silks, woollens, cotton, leather, metals, and glass, (plate-glass excepted, in which, however, we have lately much improved,) which cannot be made in this country. Every species of colonial produce (except some kinds of spices* and the precious metals) will be brought directly to our ports. We

* Some of the spices, I believe, have been naturalized in our West India islands, and in India; the complete conquest of the Moluccas has afforded us the opportunity, which, it is to be hoped, will not be thrown away, of transplanting the clove and the nutmeg to the congenial soil of Ceylon.

shall thus be enabled to supply every part of the world with cargoes completely assorted; and, though it should be admitted that in some of the least valuable manufactures other nations may excel us, we may be assured that, whenever we furnish the principal commodities wanted by a foreign consumer, the convenience of making up an assortment will, if our prices are not extravagant, cause a preference to be given to us in more trifling articles.

The following statements exhibit the real value of the principal articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture of Great Britain or Ireland, exported to different parts of the world. It will be seen, from these interesting documents, that the principal articles of export from the two countries rank in the following order :

GREAT BRITAIN.			IRELAND.		
Exported on an Average of Three Years.			Exported on an Average of Three Years.		
£.			£.		
Manufactures.	Woollens	- 8,458,567	Manufac.	Linens	- 2,654,253
	Cottons	- 4,175,236		Yarn	- 147,114
	Iron and Steel	- 2,167,062		Candles	- 23,782
	Haberdashery	- 1,503,409	Provisions.	Butter	- 949,266
	Linens	- 1,278,734		Pork	- 474,143
	Brass & Copper	} 1,041,854		Corn & Meal	441,051
	manufactured			Beef	- 424,534
	Silk	- 610,552		Cows & Oxen	122,177
	Glass and	} 537,959		Bacon	- 117,755
Earthenware					
Leather	- 412,306				

An Account of the Value, according to the Prices Current of the Goods, Wares, and Merchandize, being Irish Growth, Produce, and Manufacture, exported from Ireland on an Average of the Three Years ending the 25th March, 1799, to Great Britain, and to all other Parts of the World*.

Exports of Irish Produce
and Manufactures.

		To Great Br. To all other Parts.		Total.
		£.	£.	£.
Beer and ale	6	662	668	
Books (bound and unbound)	94	177	271	
Brass & copper, (manufacture)	383	91	434	
Candles	220	23,562	23,782	
Copper, { Ore	9,552	—	9,552	
	2,118	—	2,118	
Cordage	—	2,990	2,990	
Corn and Meal	435,003	6,048	441,051	
Cows and Oxen	122,177	—	122,177	
Cotton, and cotton and linen } mixed (manufacture)	17	12,118	12,135	
Feathers	6,342	652	6,954	
Fish	161	6,960	7,121	
Flax (dressed and undressed)	179	6	185	
Glass	187	6,300	6,487	
Glue	2,359	146	2,505	
Gunpowder	1,786	207	1,993	
Hats	—	239	239	
Hogs	4,892	—	4,892	
Hogs lard	14,469	1,607	16,076	
Horses	7,282	18	7,300	
Hides untanned	69,513	173	69,686	
Iron (wrought)	110	3,330	3,440	
Kelp	6,633	—	6,633	
Leather (wrought)	131	5,291	5,422	
Linen {	Cambrick	140	2,184	2,324
	Plain, white	2,363,824	273,892	2,637,716
	Coloured	132	14,081	14,213
Provisions {	Bacon	117,224	531	117,755
	Beef	343,272	81,262	424,534
	Bread	786	4,781	5,567
	Butter	739,544	209,722	949,266
	Cheese	648	206	854
	Pork	410,107	64,036	474,143
	Tongues	1,590	1,868	3,458

* Accounts of the Commerce and Revenue of Great Britain and Ireland, ordered to be printed 2d April, 1800. (B, No. 1.)

	£.	£.	£.
Rape-seed	8,313	—	8,313
Sheep (alive)	645	—	645
Silk (manufacture)	—	133	133
Silk, and worsted mixed (man.)	—	219	219
Skins { Calf	30,285	2,663	32,948
{ Other skins	2,117	56	2,173
Soap	1,076	13,039	14,115
Spirits	499	5,053	5,552
Stationary	673	28	701
Tallow	32,090	1,303	33,393
Wool	92	—	92
Woollens, (manufacture)	13	10,374	10,387
Yarn { Linen	126,789	244	127,033
{ Woollen worsted & bay	20,081	—	20,081
All other articles	7,607	3,528	11,135
Total	£. 4,891,161	759,692	5,650,853

An Account of the Value, according to the Prices Current, or to the declared Value of the Merchants Exporters, of the Goods, Wares, and Merchandize, being British Produce and Manufactures, exported from Great Britain, on an Average of the Three Years ending 5th January, 1799, to Ireland, and to all other Parts of the World*.

Exports of British Produce
and Manufactures.

To Ireland. To all other Parts.

		£.	£.	Total. £.
Native Produce	Bark, (tanners)	90,517	268,621	359,138
	Coals	156,349	212,077	368,426
	Copper, (unwrought)	810	16,113	16,923
	Lead	7,235	223,091	230,326
	Salt	36,198	109,336	145,534
	Tin	5,315	289,794	295,109
Manufactures.	Beer	10,796	205,591	216,387
	Brass	14,017	459,161	473,178
	Cottons	66,619	4,108,617	4,175,236
	Cordage	1,131	130,498	131,629
	Chariots and coaches	18,734	24,166	42,900
	Copper	14,539	554,137	568,676
	Glass and earthen ware	75,075	462,884	537,959
	Gunpowder	1,465	135,744	137,209
	Haberdashery	33,544	1,470,005	1,503,409
	Iron and steel	119,160	2,047,902	2,167,062
	Leather	50,966	361,340	412,306
	Linens	22,534	1,256,200	1,278,734
	Pewter	390	141,394	141,784
	Silk	24,991	585,561	610,552
	Woollens	686,759	7,771,808	8,458,567
	Apothecary ware	17,532	107,425	124,957
	Books (printed)	2,840	88,568	91,408
	Fish	96,785	164,887	261,672
	Candles (tallow)	6	110,916	110,922
	All other articles	533,365	7,879,357	8,412,722
Total		£. 2,087,672	29,185,193	31,272,865

* Accounts of the Commerce, &c. (A, No. I.)

One measure, which, it was justly observed by Mr. Rose in the beginning of 1799*, was still wanting to secure the foreign commerce we have, and to afford the best chance of extending it considerably, has at length been happily accomplished. By the acts for making wet docks in the Isle of Dogs, and near Wapping, a plan has been sanctioned for establishing a warehouse system; and for enabling ships in the Port of London to take in their cargoes with facility and dispatch. Probably not less than two millions will be expended in these two docks; Parliament has been recently applied to for powers to enable the Directors to open one of the docks in the Isle of Dogs, which will be ready to receive the first West India Fleet that arrives in the ensuing summer; and new plans are under discussion for rebuilding London bridge, and improving the quays and avenues leading to the Thames. "Thus," as Mr. Burke observes, "our trade has grown too big for the ancient limits of art and nature. Our streets, our lanes, our shores, the river itself, which has so long been our pride, are impeded, and obstructed, and choaked up by our riches†."

It is not only by the foreign and coasting trade that the maritime power of Great Britain is sup-

* Brief Examination into the Increase of the Revenue, p. 78.

† Third Letter on Peace, p. 156.

ported. The inland commerce, carried on by means of rivers and canals, rears a hardy race of men, capable of managing small vessels, and qualified with less instruction than mere landsmen would require, to become good seamen. Of the number thus employed it is not easy to form an estimate. A Register, stating the tonnage of all boats of burden, on rivers and canals, and the number of men employed in navigating them, would furnish a very satisfactory account of this part of the population of Great Britain*. That it is not inconsiderable may be presumed from this circumstance, that near the metropolis alone, 3436 craft, and 5000 wherries, employ about 10,000 boatmen and boys; and that, exclusive of the business which they transact, there are 800,000 tons of different commodities carried up and down the river every year†.

* The 35th Geo. III. c. 58, only requires that vessels exceeding 13 tons, used on navigable rivers and inland navigations, shall be registered. This act, I conceive, should be extended to small craft of every description; and the returns under this register annexed to the accounts of shipping, required by Lord Liverpool's Act, which are annually laid before Parliament. A moderate licence-duty on vessels of every description would yield a very considerable revenue.

† Colquhoun's *Police of the River Thames*, pp. 16. & 498. In the Report from a Committee of the House of Commons in 1793, on the Thames navigation, it was stated (p. 55.) that the tonnage that passed upwards on the River, at, and above Boulter's lock, near Maidenhead, in the year ending on the 1st Dec. 1792, amounted to 68,000 tons.

A very

A very considerable increase in inland navigation will probably take place. During the last ten years 126 Canal Acts of Parliament were passed, and many millions thus invested in the internal improvement of the country. It will appear from the following account that, in the ten years immediately preceding, only 42 acts, or one third of 126, were passed*.

Years.	No. of Acts.	Years.	No. of Acts.
1782	1	1792	9
1783	5	1793	28
1784	3	1794	18
1785	4	1795	12
1786	2	1796	16
1787	3	1797	7
1788	3	1798	7
1789	3	1799	4
1790	8	1800	13
1791	10	1801	12
Total No. of Acts in the 1st ten years,	42	Total No. of Acts in the 2d ten years,	126

£. 6,793,800
were authorised
to be raised by
these Acts.

* The number of Navigation and Canal Acts is erroneously stated in the Lords' Committee of Secrecy Report on the Bank (No. 44) at 11 for 1795, and 12 for 1796.

I shall close this account of our commerce with exhibiting, at one view, our trade with different parts of the world during the year 1800.

An Account of the official Value of Imports into, and Exports from, Great Britain in the Year 1800, distinguishing the Countries, and also distinguishing British Manufactures from Foreign Merchandize.

Value of Exports.

			Value of Imports.	British Manufactures.	Foreign Merchandize, including Prize Goods.	Total Exports.
			£.	£.	£.	£.
Denmark	—	—	241,562	186,703	353,994	540,698
Russia	—	—	2,382,098	557,374	467,960	1,025,335
Sweden	—	—	309,280	29,761	49,079	78,840
Poland	—	—	393,041	17,802	30,099	47,902
Prussia	—	—	1,340,904	297,185	497,266	794,452
Germany	—	—	2,352,197	4,364,120	8,300,470	12,664,591
Holland	—	—	972,600	20,414	3,188,198	3,208,613
Flanders	—	—	34,656	40,415	768,410	808,826
France	—	—	110,415	130,685	1,194,734	1,325,419
Portugal	—	—	916,848	903,435	108,457	1,011,893
Madeira	—	—	10,410	171,082	16,048	187,131
Spain	—	—	655,652	—	3,382	3,382
Canaries	—	—	48,536	—	—	—
Streights	—	—	2,940	—	—	—
Gibraltar	—	—	32,725	228,620	65,937	294,558
Italy	—	—	357,737	440,017	128,743	568,760
Venice	—	—	54,028	9,601	8,196	17,798
Turkey	—	—	199,773	111,096	55,708	166,804
Minorca	—	—	13,500	7,776	4,470	12,246
Total Foreign Europe			10,428,913	7,516,123	15,241,131	22,757,254
Ireland	—	—	2,312,824	1,787,966	1,953,533	3,741,499
Alderney, Guernsey, Jersey & Man			275,117	195,931	68,398	261,330
Greenland	—	—	125,805	—	761	761
States of America	—	—	2,357,923	6,689,467	196,040	6,885,508
British Continent of America			558,037	1,196,365	240,081	1,436,446
British West Indies including Trinidad			5,820,223	2,827,113	339,866	3,166,980
Conquered Islands	—	—	2,543,534	704,918	142,314	847,232
Foreign West Indies	—	—	310,196	15,103	7,818	22,921
Honduras Bay	—	—	16,777	1,870	430	2,301
Florida	—	—	10,116	24,792	4,153	28,946
Southern Fishery	—	—	89,198	—	259	259
Nootka Sound	—	—	—	36,853	644	37,497
Asia	—	—	4,942,275	2,718,279	142,141	2,860,421
Africa	—	—	96,563	589,496	510,161	1,099,657
Total of all Parts			29,387,506	24,304,283	18,847,735	43,152,019

Prize Goods imported 682,098—prize Goods exported are included in the Amount of Exports to the different Countries to which sent.

The Shillings and Pence omitted in each separate Article are included in the Totals.

I have thus endeavoured to shew, that, though a great part of the colonial trade, acquired by us during the war, must revert to other countries, and our commerce with the neutral powers of the North must be reduced within much narrower bounds than it is at present, we may reasonably expect that the export of our manufactures to the United States will increase, that our settlements in America, the West Indies, and Asia, will be improving markets, and that returning amity and tranquillity will supply us with new customers in those belligerent states in Europe with whom our intercourse has been suspended or embarrassed during the contest. It is, however, material to recollect, that neither the tonnage nor the values of imports and exports furnish a fair comparison of the relative importance of the different branches of our foreign trade. The exportation of a piece of British broad cloth is more beneficial to us than the re-exportation of a quantity of Bengal muslin, or of West India coffee, of equal value. The exportation of a piece of broad cloth to a neighbouring country is more beneficial to us than the exportation of the same commodity to a distant country. The reasons are obvious. The vent of British manufactures gives more employment to British industry, and

and contributes more towards our internal improvements, than the vent of foreign manufactures or of colonial produce. The circuitous trade carried on with the East and West Indies, for the supply of other nations in Europe, is much too slow in its returns, to set so much labour in motion, and to afford employment and subsistence to so great a part of the nation, as a direct trade with our neighbours; a trade which, whilst it enables them to benefit by vicinage, and to procure what they want at the cheapest rate, enables us to purchase the linens of Holland with the woollens of Yorkshire, and the wines of France with the hardware of Birmingham. It is truly observed that, exclusive of British manufactures and produce exported, “ our
 “ export trade is, properly speaking, a trade of
 “ transit, of merchandize coming either from other
 “ parts of the British Empire, or from foreign
 “ countries, and passing through our ports: having
 “ been brought to them either in consequence of
 “ our colonial laws or otherwise, as a safe and convenient place of deposit, in the way to the
 “ nations by which it is consumed.—This branch
 “ of trade, though of great advantage in a political view, and in its collateral benefits, yet, as a
 “ *direct* source of *national* profit, when contrasted
 “ with the interior sources” of profit, “ will appear almost insignificant in the comparison,
 “ though of no inconsiderable value in itself.—It

“ will immediately occur to any one, who considers
 “ the subject with attention, that this portion
 “ of our export trade must, at all times, whether
 “ of war or peace, return far less national profit
 “ than an equal value of commodities of our own
 “ produce and manufactures *.”

There is no reason to apprehend that the most valuable part of our commerce, the export of British manufactures, will decrease in consequence of the peace : nor do I conceive that the following estimate of the peace export of these articles will appear extravagant.

* Beeke on the Income Tax, p. 51. and p. 77.

Official Value.

To Foreign Europe - - - £. 5,967,068

Ireland - - - - - 1,787,966

Alderney, Guernsey, Jersey, } 195,931
and Man - - - - - }

Asia - - - - - 2,718,279

Africa - - - - - 882,074

America £.

United States - 6,689,467

British Continent 1,196,365

British West Indies 2,827,113

Foreign West Indies 500,000

Other Parts of the World

11,212,945

100,000

£. 22,862,263

The amount of the exports of British Manufactures to Foreign Europe in 1792, the last year of peace. In 1800, the export was 7,516,123/. (See p. 168.)

The export in 1800. We may reasonably expect that the consumption of British Manufactures in Ireland will increase in a period of tranquillity. The export to that country in 1792 was 1,512,844/.; and in 1799 2,405,999/.

The export in 1800. The export in 1792 was 2,341,360/. The future export in consequence of the acquisition of the Mysore, and of Ceylon, will, probably, be much increased.

The export in 1792.

The export in 1800. The necessary consequence of the increasing wealth and population of the Continent of North America, must, for some years to come, be an increasing demand for European Manufactures. No average of past years could afford a fair idea of the future consumption of a very thriving state.

The export in 1800. The export of many articles will be diminished in consequence of the reduction of the Fleet and Army in the West Indies to the peace establishment. But this diminution will, probably, be more than compensated by the increased demand for British Manufactures in Trinidad, and in the British free ports.

If a liberal system of free ports is established, there can be little doubt that the export to the Foreign Islands & to Spanish America will exceed this sum. The export of British Manufactures to the island of St. Thomas in the year 1799 exceeded 200,000/. real value. (See p. 82.)

This

This total is within one twentieth of the amount of the export of British manufactures in the year 1800 ; and I am persuaded that, if we enjoy peace five years, the annual average export of British manufactures, in that period, will exceed this computation. The stagnation which many branches of business experienced during the interval between the Preliminary Articles and the Definitive Treaty was not occasioned by a general declension in our commerce ; but may be fairly ascribed to the protracted negotiation. The operations, however, of the mercantile classes are no longer perplexed by uncertainty. The treaty of peace assures them the trade of an enlarged and consolidated empire ; and their capital, skill, and spirit of enterprize will assure them an ample portion of the trade of the world.

The flourishing state of our commerce, which, during a long and arduous struggle, has been extended by British industry, and protected by British valour, affords a memorable example of what may be effected by the sense, the spirit, and the perseverance of the people.

*“ Quid virtus, et quid sapientia possit,
 “ Utile proposuit nobis exemplar.”—*

May the lesson not be thrown away ! May Britain, during peace, gratefully recollect that, whilst a great part of Europe, deficient either in wisdom or in courage, has sacrificed its independence with the
 vain

vain hope of preserving its property, a vigorous resistance has enabled her to maintain her independence, and by the sacrifice of a part to render the remainder of her wealth more valuable and more improveable ! May she gratefully recollect that the revolutionary system, which she has opposed, has not forced her to surrender her commerce to preserve her constitution, and that the cessation of hostilities does not call on her to surrender her constitution to preserve her commerce. They both may, they both will, flourish together ; and when, at some future period, the feverish ambition of mankind shall compel her to unsheath the sword, her constitution and her commerce will again supply her both with motives, and with means, to prosecute the contest until it can again be terminated with safety and with honour,

LETTER

LETTER VIII.

ON THE FINANCES;—DEFINITIVE TREATY.

I DO not enter into a very minute consideration of our financial resources, though they are confessedly great, because no satisfactory estimate of the probable amount of the future income and expenditure of the United Kingdom can be formed, until it is settled whether any of the taxes imposed, on the spur of the occasion, during the last nine years, shall be lessened, increased, or repealed, and until the peace establishment of the army and navy is determined on, and the expences of the war are wound up.

It must be admitted that the cost of the war has been great and unprecedented: but an account of the disbursements which it occasioned furnishes only barren truths that generate no useful conclusion. We all know that war is expensive, and that peace is desirable: but to lament that money should be spent, and lives consumed, in fleets and armies, is to lament that great objects cannot be accomplished without the application of great means. It is still more absurd to form any standard of the merit of public men from the comparison of two different periods, unless forces, exertions, and
other

other circumstances are in both the same. We should not be justified, from a comparison of the national debt, expenditure, and taxes, incurred, whilst Mr. Pitt was in office, with those created by his predecessors, to conclude that he had been criminally profuse and prodigal, and that they have been economical. In truth, as Mr. Burke very justly observes, “ War and economy are things not easily
 “ reconciled : the attempt of leaning towards parsimony in such a state may be the worst management, and in the end, the worst economy in the
 “ world, hazarding the total loss of all the charge incurred, and of every thing else along with it*.”

Common experience will inform us that the magnitude of expenditure forms no criterion of culpability; and that our establishments may cost more than those of our forefathers without being less economical. As the most trifling payment from the Treasury cannot be defended if it is unnecessary, the largest, if it is judiciously applied, furnishes no ground for censure. The proper consideration is not merely how many millions were expended in the last war, but whether the public purse was carefully and faithfully managed; whether the objects which excited, also deserved, our exertions; what proportion the force employed has borne to the means provided; and how far the strength and

* Observations on the late State of the Nation, p. 25.

resources of the country have been commensurate with its burthens. Financial merit, I apprehend, is something more than the mere art of drawing money from the pockets of the people. It is to comprehend the nature and extent of the different sources of national wealth, and to impose those taxes which the public service requires with the least possible injury to the reproductive powers of industry. Examined by this test, the late Minister might safely rest his pretensions to the gratitude of the public, on what has been urged as a proof of his demerit—"a comparison of the state in which he *found* the resources of the country, and that "in which he *left* them*".

To his administration we are indebted for the adoption of a system of finance, which has introduced three measures of infinite importance to public credit and the future security of the country:

1. The establishment, in 1786, of a sinking fund of 1,000,000*l* a year, which has been applied, together with an annual grant from Parliament of 200,000*l*. and the interest of the stock redeemed, to the liquidation of the debt incurred previously to that period:
2. The establishment, in 1792, of a new sinking fund by the act which provided that, in addition to the taxes which should be imposed for paying the interest of any future loan, a surplus of

* See Mr. Morgan's Comparative View of the Public Finances from the Beginning to the Close of the late Administration, p. 2.

1 *per cent. per annum*, on the capital created, should be raised for redeeming it* : and 3. The establishment of a plan, considered thirty years ago as impracticable†, to raise part of the war supply within the year.

Of the utility of these measures the present state of public credit is the most satisfactory proof. Although in consequence of a war, extensive and expensive beyond example, above 350,000,000*l.* of debt have been incurred, the marketable value of government securities is now greater than it was in 1786, when the whole debt did not exceed 40,000,000*l.* ; and greater than it was in 1783, immediately after the conclusion of a general peace.

Years.	Bank Stock.	India Stock.	Three per cent. Consols.
1783 February	126	145	66
1783 September	127	141	66
1786 February	139	156	69
1802 April 28th‡	195 $\frac{1}{8}$	225 $\frac{7}{8}$	76 $\frac{3}{4}$

The following statements exhibit a view of the national debt and sinking fund on the 1st February, 1802.

* See 32d Geo. III. c. 55.

† “ Suppose some Jacob Henriques had proposed, in the year 1762, to prevent a perpetual charge on the nation by raising ten millions within the year. He would be considered not as a harsh financier who laid an heavy hand on the public; but as a poor visionary who had run mad on supplies and taxes.” Observations on a late State of the Nation, (published in 1769,) p. 35.

‡ The day after the Proclamation of Peace appeared in the London Gazette.

PRINCIPAL DEBT *.

£. £. £.

Total principal of the old
debt created before the
5th of January 1793 238,231,248

Principal debt created
since January 1793, for
which a sinking fund of
1 *per cent. per annum*
has been created in pur-
suance of the 32d Geo.
III. c. 55. - - 241,981,355

Principal debt of Ireland,
payable in Great Britain 19,708,750

261,690,105

Principal debt (charged
on the Income tax) for
which no sinking fund
has yet been provided:
now made part of the
consolidated, permanent,
debt - - - 56,445,000

318,135,105

Total principal debt cre-
ated before the 1st of
April 1802 - - - 556,366,353

* See Report of the Committee on Finance, 1797, Appendix I; Ac-
count of Additions to the Annual Charge of the Public Debt; (ordered
to be printed 18th March, 1802;) and Accounts respecting the Public
Funded Debt, (ordered to be printed 1st April, 1802.)

ANNUAL CHARGE ON UNREDEEMED DEBT.

	Annual Interest.	Annuities for lives, or for terms of years.	Charges of management.	Total annual charge on un- redeemed debt.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
Old debt creat- ed before 1793 }	6,083,323	1,274,193	105,615	7,463,131
New debt, for which a sink- ing fund has been provided }	7,487,245	291,004	103,298	7,881,547
Debt of Ire- land, payable in Great Bri- tain - - }	570,670	9,792	8,625	589,087
Debt (charged on the income tax) now part of the perma- nent debt - }	1,693,350	19,666	25,621	1,738,637
	15,834,588	1,594,655	243,159	17,672,402

DEBT REDEEMED.

Principal debt redeemed.

£.

By the old sinking fund created in pursuance of the 26th Geo. III. c. 31. }	39,885,308
By the new sinking fund created in pursuance of the 32d Geo. III. c. 55. }	20,490,003
By stock transferred to the com- missioners for redeeming the national debt ;—on account of the land tax redeemed }	18,001,148
Total debt redeemed before the 1st of February, 1802 }	78,376,459

SINKING

SINKING FUND.

	£.	£.
Old sinking fund		
Annual charge	1,000,000	
Usual grant	200,000	
Unclaimed and ex-		
pired annuities	125,708	
Dividend on	} 1,208,479	
£.39,885,308 re-		
deemed		
	—————	2,534,187
New sinking fund		
1 per cent. per ann.	} 2,660,443	
on £.261,690,105,		
part of the debt of		
Great Britain and		
Ireland (See p.179)		
Dividend on	} 614,700	
£.20,490,003 re-		
deemed	—————	3,275,143
Total sinking fund		
on the 1st of Feb.		—————
1802		5,809,330

It appears from these accounts of the national debt that, exclusive of £56,445,000 which were originally charged on the income tax, the capital funded stock, on the 1st February 1802, including the capital redeemed, amounted to £499,921,353; and that deducting £78,376,459, the amount of the capital redeemed, there remained at that period £.421,544,894 principal debt unredeemed.

A comparison of the sinking fund with the principal and interest of the unredeemed debt at different periods, will shew that the means of lessening the public burthens have increased more rapidly than they have been augmented.

Proportion of the Sinking Fund to the Capital of the Unredeemed Debt.

Years.	Annual Sum applicable to the redemption of the debt then existing.				Unredeemed debt then existing.
	£.				£.
1786	1,000,000	} one {	} 238th {	} part of {	238,231,248
1793	1,427,143				227,989,148
1802	5,809,330				421,544,894

Proportion of the Sinking Fund to the Interest of the Unredeemed Debt.

Years.	Sinking Fund				Annual interest and management of the unredeemed debt.
	£.				£.
1786	1,000,000 less	} than a {	} 9th {	} part of {	9,297,000
1793	1,427,143 less				8,854,000
1802	5,809,330 more				15,933,000

I do not conceive it would be proper, in considering the proportion which the sinking fund bore to the debt in February last, or even in considering the proportion which it now bears, to notice either £.56,445,000, the debt originally charged on the income tax, but now made permanent, or the debt created by the act lately passed for raising £25,000,000*, towards the supplies of the current

* Raised at less than four per cent. interest.

year. Both these operations form part of a system, which has not been fully detailed : a view only of the burthen thus imposed, without reference to the means intended to be provided for lessening it, would lead us to form a very unsatisfactory estimate of the efficacy of the sinking fund.

The measure of raising part of the war supply within the year has, both directly and indirectly, contributed to lessen the amount of national debt which the funding system would otherwise have entailed on posterity. It directly lessened that amount by furnishing an immediate supply for the service of the years 1798, 1799, 1800, and 1801 : and it lessened it indirectly by its beneficial influence on public credit, which enabled the Minister to raise the loans for the last years of the war on better terms than he had done in 1798. Considering the measure with regard to this twofold effect, I have no doubt that it has saved the nation a perpetual charge of £.1,545,618 a year, or an annuity for 40 years of £.2,060,824*.

This result may be shewn in the following manner :

1st Operation.—After deducting that part of the aid and contribution, income and convoy duties

* A sinking fund of 1 *per cent. per annum*, issued by quarterly payments, will redeem a 3 *per cent.* capital, if the average price of stocks is 75, in 35 years, if 85, in 39 years and a half, and if at *par*, in 46 years and a half. See Rose's Brief Examination, (Appendix 3.)

which was applied to the payment of interest on loans in the years 1798, 1799, and 1800, the remainder of these duties, applied to the war supply of these years, when all arrears have been received, will, probably, amount to more than 15,000,000*l.*: a sum which, if it had been funded, at the price of stocks in 1798, would have created an additional debt of *£*.30,000,000, and have required a permanent interest of 900,000*l.* and if 300,000*l.* (1 *per cent. per annum* on the capital created,) had been added, upon the system introduced by Mr. Pitt in 1792, in order to reduce this debt to an annuity of 40 years, the interest payable during that period would have amounted to *£*.1,200,000.

2d Operation.

3 per cents.
£.

In 1798 the capital created on account of the sum of 17,000,000*l.* borrowed for the service of Great Britain and Ireland, was - - -

34,000,000

Exclusive of an annuity of *£*.22,125 for 61 $\frac{3}{4}$ years, worth -

422,432

34,422,432

The Money borrowed and the Capital created in the Three following Years were in

	Sums borrowed, <i>£</i> .	Capital created in the 3 per cents. <i>£</i> .
1799	18,500,000	32,749,250
1800	20,500,000	32,185,000
1801	28,000,000	49,210,000
	67,000,000	114,144,250

If 67,000,000*l.* the sum borrowed in these three years, had been funded upon no better terms than the £.17,000,000, borrowed in 1798, the capital created would have amounted to £.135,664,879, which exceeds the actual capital created in 1799, 1800, and 1801, by £.21,520,629. The permanent interest of this debt would have amounted to £.645,618 annually; and if £.215,206 (1 *per cent. per annum* on the capital created) had been added in order to reduce this debt to an annuity for 40 years, the interest payable during that period would have amounted to £.860,824.

Saving effected by the Plan of raising Part of the War Supply within the Year.

	3 per Cents. Principal Debt. £.	Permanent Interest. £.	Annuity for 40 Years. £.
By First Operation }	30,000,000	900,000	1,200,000
Second Operation }	21,520,629	645,618	860,824
	51,520,629	1,545,618	2,060,824

The sinking fund must have also materially assisted public credit, and have enabled the Minister to negotiate his loans on better terms than he would otherwise have done.

In addition to the savings which have been thus effected, it may be observed that loyalists debentures, and charges attending the issue of them, amounting to 2,946,269*l.* and other sums given to American loyalists, at various times, and
in

in different modes, forming, together with the debentures, a total of more than 4,000,000*l.* have been paid off since the establishment of the sinking fund. Mr. Rose justly remarks, that this may be strictly considered as a floating debt provided for, as the amount must have been funded, if it had not been discharged*.

The expences, also, of the Spanish armament in 1791, provided for by debentures, and amounting to 3,133,000*l.* have been paid off.

We are therefore indebted to the solid system of finance, adopted by the last Administration, for the following savings in the national debt :

	£.
Sums paid to American loyalists, above	4,000,000
Spanish armament expences paid } off, above - - - - - }	3,000,000
Savings effected by the plan for } raising part of the war sup- } ply within the year, above }	50,000,000
Debt redeemed by the sinking } fund and land tax, before the } 1st February, 1802, above }	78,000,000
	£. 135,000,000

If this nation is destined to enjoy a peace of ten or twelve years, (a term not exceeding the average period of peace, during the last century) we may reasonably expect that the sinking fund will not only discharge in that time a considerable part

* Brief Examination, p. 25.

(a fifth at least) of the debt existing at the commencement of the present year ; but that its annual amount, at the commencement of a future war, will exceed ten millions sterling. On such topics we can only indulge reasonable expectations. Fact may disappoint well-founded conjecture : “ The effects of all human contrivances are in the hands of Providence*.” Those, however, who were entrusted with the management of the finances of Great Britain, during the last fifteen years, have done their duty. They acted as became the guides of a mighty nation, placed in critical circumstances, which no wisdom could foresee. Great sacrifices were necessary : the national wealth, generosity, and spirit, have enabled us to submit to them ; and we are now placed in a situation, which countries that have adopted a conduct less energetic, would be proud to share ; in a situation which will enable us to maintain a firm and dignified independence ; and by a perseverance in a vigorous system of finance, to provide new means to meet new exigencies.

Our taxes, I admit, are heavy, but they are not insupportable. “ I can” (to use the language of the eminent statesman just quoted) “ perceive the bur-
 “ then, but I cannot avoid contemplating, also,
 “ the strength that supports it. From thence I
 “ draw the most comfortable assurances of the
 “ future vigour, and the ample resources, of this
 “ great, misrepresented, country†.”

* Burke.

† Observations on a late State of the Nation, p. 29.

I will conclude this letter with a few remarks on some parts of the Definitive Treaty. The chief objections which have been made to it, relate to the non-renewal of former treaties, to India, to our navigation in the Eastern seas, to the rights of the British Flag, to Honduras, to Louisiana, and to Guiana.

It is contended that the non-renewal of former Treaties of peace weakens the sovereignty of Great Britain to many of her colonial possessions, and that the claims of foreign nations with respect to trade or territory in those countries, being now unqualified by express stipulations, will be revived. On this head a French writer on the Law of Nations furnishes a sufficient answer. Vattel thus states the effect of treaties of peace: “as every
“ power at war pretends to have right on its side,
“ and this pretension is not liable to be judged by
“ others, the state of things at the instant of the
“ treaty is to be held legitimate, and any change to
“ be made in it requires an express specification in
“ the treaty; consequently all things, not mentioned
“ in the treaty, are to remain as they were at the
“ conclusion of it *.”

* Vattel, b. iv. § 21,

I cannot see how the non-renewal of the stipulations in the treaty of 1783 and the convention of 1787, respecting India, affects our sovereignty in that country. Those stipulations were concessions merely of a commercial nature ; directed to secure
 “ to the subjects of France a safe, free and independent trade, such as was carried on by the French
 “ East India company, whether they exercised it
 “ individually, or as a company, as well in the nabobship of Arcot, and the countries of Madura
 “ and Tanjore, as in the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orixá, the Northern circars, and in general in all the British possessions on the coasts of
 “ Orixá, Coromandel, and Malabar.” This is the first article of the convention concluded between Great Britain and France in 1787. The second article stipulates that the French shall not import annually more than 200,000 pounds of salt into Bengal, to be delivered at a fixed price, at a place of deposit appointed for the purpose. No such stipulation exists in the present treaty. The French may therefore smuggle as much salt as they can into Bengal, and they may do the same into Great Britain : but it will not be easy for them to carry on a trade of this description from the factories restored to them by the treaty, from mere houses of commerce circumscribed by our settlements, and watched by the civil and military powers of British India. France, too, has lost the privilege, which she

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acquired

acquired by the third article of the convention of 1787, of purchasing in Bengal 18,000 pounds of saltpetre, and 300 chests of opium, at the price established before the war of 1778. Whatever commercial advantages she may wish to obtain in our Eastern empire, must be the result of commercial convention. The rights of British sovereignty in Asia are indisputable. France, it is true, never directly recognized them: but they are not the less secure on that account. The Mysore, the fruit of conquest, whilst we have the means of defending it, will be held on as firm a tenure, as that which secures to the French Republic either Savoy, or Belgium.

Some objectors to the peace have complained that, by the omission of the article contained in former treaties with Holland, respecting a free navigation to the Eastern seas, our commerce with the Dutch spice islands is destroyed. I confess that on this point, the stipulation, which our negotiators obtained for us in 1784, does not appear to me to have been worth transcribing. It is (I quote the original treaty) as follows:—"Les Etats Généraux des
 " Provinces-Unies promettent et s'engagent à ne
 " point gêner la navigation des sujets Britanniques
 " dans les mers Orientales." This article gave us no power to trade with Amboyna or Banda: and I do not believe the Custom-house would furnish the

account of a single pound of cloves or nutmegs consigned directly in British ships from these islands to Great Britain. All it meant was to protect our vessels, navigating the Eastern seas, from being treated as piratical, which the Dutch, from their extreme jealousy, respecting this monopoly of the spice trade, had always considered them *; and, notwithstanding its omission in the present treaty, any molestation of British ships, not engaged in an illicit commerce, in the Eastern seas would be a contravention of the first article, which stipulates that "there shall be peace, friendship, and good understanding" between the contracting parties.

It is said that we have renounced the right of the British flag, by the omission of the article contained in all modern treaties with Holland, which required that their ships of war and other vessels, meeting any British men of war in the British seas, should strike their flags, and lower their topmasts †. To me it appears that our negotiators acted wisely in not insisting on the revival of this ancient punctilio. The establishment of such a custom, would have added nothing to the dignity, security, or import-

* See Forrest's Voyage.

† See the 19th article of the Treaty of Peace between Charles the Second and the States General, in July 1667, and the second article of the Treaty of Peace with the States General in May, 1784.

ance of Great Britain. To advance pretensions for priority of place in a congress, for pre-eminence in salutes at sea, or for precedence in titles, is, at best, to contend for what yields no solid power, and is calculated to inspire one of the contracting parties with animosity and revenge. In modern times, disputes of this nature have been suspended by mutual compromise, and by the tacit and gradual abolition of national etiquette. If a subject of this kind arises between two nations, neither of which acknowledges a superior, the wisest conduct to pursue is that recommended by the able Counsellors of our high-spirited queen Elizabeth, to get rid of the matter “*by some way of indifferency, without priority to either* *.” The negotiators of the peace of Amiens have acted on this principle, in omitting the clause of precedence contained in former Dutch treaties. Vattel well observes that “nations are naturally equal, and receive from nature the same obligations and rights. Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is as much a sovereign state as the most powerful kingdom †. None can pretend to prerogative. Their right to freedom and sovereignty renders them equals ‡.”

* See Winwood's Memorials.

† Vattel, Rel. § 18,

‡ Vattel, b. ii. § 36.

It has been asserted that all former stipulations, respecting the rights of Great Britain to the Bay of Honduras were abrogated by the war; and that, as we have not obtained a specific renewal of them, the right to cut logwood and mahogany in the Bay is annihilated. In answer to this, it may be observed that Great Britain has engaged by the third article of the treaty “to restore to the French “and their allies, all the possessions and colonies “which respectively belonged to them, and which “have been either occupied or conquered by the “British forces during the course of the war, excepting Trinidad and Ceylon.” No publicist, however ingenious, can reasonably maintain that the words “occupied during the course of the war” extend to Honduras, which we occupied before the war. Our right there is a right of possession, preserved throughout the war, and not annulled by the Peace. If the non-renewal of treaties has any effect, it must be disadvantageous to Spain; since, by retaining the possession of this settlement, unfettered by any stipulations, we should be freed from the engagement entered into by the 17th article of the Treaty of Paris, to demolish fortifications erected in the Bay of Honduras, and the further stipulations contained in the Treaty of peace of 1783, and the Convention of 1786. I apprehend, however, that, as Great Britain will allow other nations to avail

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them-

themselves of the non-renewal of treaties to set up ancient and exploded rights of sovereignty, she will not on her part convert the *jus publicum* of Europe into a system of endless litigation and dispute.

The acquisition of Louisiana by France furnishes no ground for serious alarm on the part of Great Britain. If the French are more successful, than they were in ancient times, in raising a colony on the continent of America to maturity, they may prove troublesome neighbours to the United States; disputes will arise between them respecting boundaries and navigation; and jealousies be created that will induce the Americans to court the friendship of this country. France, by obtaining Louisiana, comes into contact with a state, which has doubled her population since she withstood the fleets and armies of Great Britain. The Mississippi is not advantageously situated for supplying the French West Indies with lumber and provisions. A voyage from New Orleans to St. Domingo in the teeth of the trade wind could not, I apprehend, be effected in less time than a voyage from Brest.

It is said that Louisiana is particularly valuable, because it is capable of producing cotton in great abundance; and that, as we have surrendered by the peace Tobago and other colonies from whence the chief supply of cotton is derived, we must in future, de-
pend

pend almost entirely on foreign countries, for the supply of the raw materials of a very important manufacture. This is a mistake. I have already noticed our import of cotton from India. If the French or Dutch, contrary to their own interest, should refuse to supply us with West India cotton, any quantity of this article may be obtained from Surat and Bombay.

It has been said that the acquisition of a naval station, at the mouth of the river of the Amazons, will enable the French to send out cruisers, to molest our India trade. There is the same objection to this ingenious speculation, which a critic in *Gil Blas* introduces as the chief feature of the tragedy of *Iphigenia in Aulis*, "the wind." A trip from the river of the Amazons to Cape St. Augustine, which lies almost due East from it, and must be passed before an Indiaman can be intercepted in her track from Europe to Rio Janeiro, would, I am persuaded, take up as much time as a trip from Brest; or even from those embryos of naval stations, Cherbourg and Flushing.

The article respecting Malta is as strong a renunciation, on the part of the French, of any right to interfere in the internal concerns of the island, as the renunciation, contained in the treaty of Utrecht, of the king of Spain's interest in the crown of France. The independence of the island is guaranteed by all the contracting parties.

I will conclude with observing that the language of the Definitive Treaty, on the various subjects

subjects contained in it, is unambiguous; and a comparison of its provisions with various articles in former treaties, (particularly the treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, and that of Paris, in 1763,) would demonstrate, that, whilst many of the terms settled by former negotiators are loose, obscure, and capable of different interpretations, the stipulations of the present Peace are clear and unequivocal.

F. M. E.

Lincoln's Inn Fields,
8th May, 1802.

THE

The DEFINITIVE TREATY of PEACE, between
His Britannick Majesty, and the French Republick,
His Catholick Majesty, and the Batavian Republick.
Signed at Amiens, the 27th Day of March 1802.

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, and the First Consul of the French Republick, in the Name of the French People, being animated with an equal Desire to put an End to the Calamities of War, have laid the Foundation of Peace in the Preliminary Articles signed at London, the First of October One thousand eight hundred one (Ninth Vendémiaire, Year Ten).

And as by the Fifteenth Article of the said Preliminaries, it has been stipulated that Plenipotentiaries should be named on each Side, who should proceed to Amiens for the Purpose of concluding a Definitive Treaty, in Concert with the Allies of the contracting Powers;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has named for His Plenipotentiary the Marquis Cornwallis, Knight of the most Illustrious Order of the Garter, Privy Counsellor to His Majesty, General of His Armies, &c.; the First Consul of the French Republick, in the Name of the French People, the Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, Counsellor of State; His Majesty the King of Spain and of the Indies, and the Government of the Batavian Republick, have named for their Plenipotentiaries, *videlicet*, His Catholick Majesty Don Joseph Nicolas de Azara, His Coun-

SA Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Brétagne et d'Irlande, et le Premier Consul de la République Française, au Nom du Peuple Français, également animés du Desir de faire cesser les Calamités de la Guerre, ont posé les Fondemens de la Paix par les Articles Préliminaires signés à Londres, le Premier Octobre Mil huit cent un (Neuf Vendémiaire An Dix.)

Et comme par l'Article Quinze des dits Préliminaires, il a été convenu qu'il serait nommé de Part et d'autre des Plénipotentiaires qui se rendraient à Amiens pour y procéder à la Rédaction du Traité Définitif, de Concert avec les Alliés des Puissances contractantes;

Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Brétagne et d'Irlande a nommé le Marquis de Cornwallis, Chevalier de l'Ordre très Illustre de la Jarretiere, Conseiller Privé de Sa Majesté, General de Ses Armées, &c. le Premier Consul de la République Française, au Nom du Peuple Français, le Citoyen Joseph Bonaparte, Conseiller d'Etat; Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne et des Indes, et le Gouvernement d'Etat de la République Batave, ont nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir, Sa Majesté Catholique Don Joseph Nicolas de Azara, Son Conseiller d'Etat, Chevalier Grand

fellor of State, Knight, Great Cross of the Order of Charles III. His said Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary to the French Republick, &c. and the Government of the Batavian Republick Roger John Schimmelpenninck, their Ambassador Extraordinary to the French Republick; who, after having duly communicated to each other their full Powers, which are transcribed at the End of the present Treaty, have agreed upon the following Articles :

Article I.

There shall be Peace, Friendship, and good Understanding between His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Heirs and Successors, on the One Part; and the French Republick, His Majesty the King of Spain, His Heirs and Successors, and the Batavian Republick, on the other Part. The contracting Parties shall give the greatest Attention to maintain between themselves and their States a perfect Harmony, and without allowing, on either Side, any Kind of Hostilities, by Sea or by Land, to be committed for any Cause or under any Pretence whatsoever.

They shall carefully avoid every Thing which might hereafter affect the Union happily re-established, and they shall not afford any Assistance or Protection, directly or indirectly, to those who should cause Prejudice to any of them.

Article II.

All the Prisoners taken on either Side, as well by Land as by Sea, and the Hostages carried away or given during the War, and to this Day, shall be restored, without Ransom, in Six Weeks at latest, to be computed from the Day of the Exchange of the Ratifications of the present Treaty, and on paying the Debts which they have con-

Croix de l'Ordre de Charles III. Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de Sa dite Majesté près la République Française, &c. et le Gouvernement d'Etat de la République Batave, Roger John Schimmelpenninck, Son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire près la République Française; lesquels, après s'être dûment communiqués leurs pleins Pouvoirs, qui sont transcrits à la Suite du présent Traité, sont convenus des Articles suivans.

Article I.

Il y aura Paix, Amitié, et bonne Intelligence entre Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Brétagne et d'Irlande, Ses Héritiers et Successeurs, d'une Part; et la République Française, Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne, Ses Héritiers et Successeurs, et la République Batave, d'autre Part. Les Parties contractantes apporteront la plus grande Attention à maintenir une parfaite Harmonie entre elles et leurs Etats, sans permettre, que de Part ni d'autre, on commette aucune Sorte d'Hostilité, par Terre ou par Mer, pour quelque Cause ou sous quelque Prétexte que ce puisse être.

Elles éviteront soigneusement tout ce qui pourroit altérer à l'avenir l'Union heureusement rétablie, et ne donneront aucun Secours ni Protection, soit directement soit indirectement, à ceux qui voudraient porter Préjudice à aucune d'elles.

Article II.

Tous les Prisonniers faits de Part et d'autre, tant par Terre que par Mer, et les Otages enlevés ou donnés pendant la Guerre, et jusqu' à ce Jour, seront restitués sans Ranson, dans Six Semaines au plus tard, à compter du Jour de l'Echange des Ratifications du présent Traité, et en payant les Dettes qu'ils auraient contractées pendant leur

tracted during their Captivity. Each contracting Party shall respectively discharge the Advances which have been made by any of the contracting Parties for the Subsistence and Maintenance of the Prisoners in the Country where they have been detained. For this Purpose a Commission shall be appointed by Agreement, which shall be specially charged to ascertain and regulate the Compensation which may be due to either of the contracting Powers. The Time and Place where the Commissioners, who shall be charged with the Execution of this Article, shall assemble, shall also be fixed upon by Agreement; and the said Commissioners shall take into Account the Expences occasioned not only by the Prisoners of the respective Nations, but also by the Foreign Troops who, before they were made Prisoners, were in the Pay or at the Disposal of any of the contracting Parties.

Article III.

His Britannick Majesty restores to the French Republick and her Allies; namely, His Catholick Majesty and the Batavian Republick, all the Possessions and Colonies which belonged to them respectively, and which had been occupied or conquered by the British Forces in the Course of the War, with the Exception of the Island of Trinidad, and the Dutch Possessions in the Island of Ceylon.

Article IV.

His Catholick Majesty cedes and guarantees in full Right and Sovereignty to His Britannick Majesty the Island of Trinidad.

Article V.

The Batavian Republick cedes and guarantees in full Right and Sovereignty to His Britannick Majesty all

leur Captivité. Chaque Partie contractante soldera respectivement les Avances qui auraient été faites par aucune des Parties contractantes pour la Subsistance et l'Entretien des Prisonniers dans le País où ils ont été détenus. Il sera nommé de Concert pour cet Effet une Commission spécialement chargée de constater et de régler la Compensation qui pourra être due à l'une ou à l'autre des Puissances contractantes. On fixera également de Concert l'Epoque et le Lieu, où se rassembleront les Commissaires qui seront chargés de l'Exécution de cet Article, et qui porteront en Compte non seulement les Dépenses faites par les Prisonniers des Nations respectives, mais aussi par les Troupes Etrangères qui avant d'être prises étaient à la Solde et à la Disposition de l'Une des Parties contractantes.

Article III.

Sa Majesté Britannique restitue à la République Française et à ses Alliés; savoir, Sa Majesté Catholique et la République Batave, toutes les Possessions et Colonies qui leur appartenaient respectivement, et qui ont été occupées ou conquises par les Forces Britanniques dans le Cours de la Guerre, à l'Exception de l'Isle de la Trinité et des Possessions Hollandaises dans l'Isle de Ceylan.

Article IV.

Sa Majesté Catholique cède et garantit en toute Propriété et Souveraineté à Sa Majesté Britannique l'Isle de la Trinité.

Article V.

La République Batave cède et garantit en toute Propriété et Souveraineté à Sa Majesté Britannique toute

the Possessions and Establishments in the Island of Ceylon, which belonged, before the War, to the Republick of the United Provinces, or to their East India Company.

Article VI.

The Cape of Good Hope remains in full Sovereignty to the Batavian Republic, as it was before the War.

The Ships of every Description belonging to the other contracting Parties shall have the Right to put in there, and to purchase such Supplies as they may stand in Need of as heretofore, without paying any other Duties than those to which the Ships of the Batavian Republick are subjected.

Article VII.

The Territories and Possessions of Her most Faithful Majesty are maintained in their Integrity, such as they were previous to the Commencement of the War.

Nevertheless, the Limits of French and Portuguese Guiana shall be determined by the River Arawari, which falls into the Ocean below the North Cape, near the Isle Neuve, and the Island of Penitence, about a Degree and One Third of North Latitude. These Limits shall follow the Course of the River Arawari, from that of its Mouths which is at the greatest Distance from the North Cape to its Source, and thence in a direct Line from its Source to the River Branco, towards the West. The Northern Bank of the River Arawari, from its Mouth to its Source, and the Lands which are situated to the North of the Line of the Limits above fixed, shall consequently belong in full Sovereignty to the French Republick. The South-

les Possessions et Etablissmens dans l'Isle de Ceylan, qui appartenait avant la Guerre à la République des Provinces Unies, ou à sa Compagnie des Indes Orientales.

Article VI.

Le Cap de Bonne Esperance reste à la République Batave en toute Souveraineté, comme cela avait Lieu avant la Guerre.

Les Bâtimens de toute Espèce appartenant aux autres Parties contractantes auront la Faculté d'y relâcher, et d'y acheter les Approvisionnemens nécessaires comme auparavant, sans payer d'autres Droits que ceux auxquels la République Batave assujettit les Bâtimens de sa Nation.

Article VII.

Les Territoires et Possessions de Sa Majesté très Fidelle sont maintenus dans leur Intégrité tels qu'ils étaient avant la Guerre.

Cependant, les Limites des Guyanes Française et Portugaise sont fixées à la Rivière d'Arawari qui se jette dans l'Océan au dessous du Cap Nord, près de l'Isle Neuve et de l'Isle de la Penitence, environ à un Degré un Tiers de Latitude Septentrionale. Ces Limites suivront la Rivière d'Arawari depuis son Embouchure la plus éloignée du Cap Nord jusqu'à sa Source, et ensuite une Ligne droite tirée de cette Source jusqu'au Rio Branco vers l'Ouest. En conséquence la Rive Septentrionale de la Rivière d'Arawari depuis sa dernière Embouchure jusqu'à sa Source, et les Terres qui se trouvent au Nord de la Ligne des Limites fixées ci-dessus, appartiendront en toute Souveraineté à la République Française. La Rive Méridionale de la dite Rivière

ern Bank of the said River from its Source, and all the Lands to the Southward of the said Line of Demarcation, shall belong to Her most Faithful Majesty. The Navigation of the River Arawari shall be common to both Nations.

The Arrangements which have taken Place between the Courts of Madrid and of Lisbon, for the Settlement of their Frontiers in Europe, shall, however, be executed conformably to the Treaty of Badajoz.

Article VIII.

The Territories, Possessions, and Rights of the Ottoman Porte are hereby maintained in their Integrity, such as they were previous to the War.

Article IX.

The Republick of the Seven Islands is hereby acknowledged.

Article X.

The Islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino, shall be restored to the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, and shall be held by it upon the same Conditions on which the Order held them previous to the War, and under the following Stipulations:

1. The Knights of the Order, whose *Langues* shall continue to subsist after the Exchange of the Ratifications of the present Treaty, are invited to return to Malta as soon as that Exchange shall have taken place. They shall there form a general Chapter, and shall proceed to the Election of a Grand Master, to be chosen from amongst the Natives of those Nations which preserve *Langues*, if no such Election shall have been already made

vière à partir de la même Embouchure, et toutes les Terres au Sud de la dite Ligne des Limites, appartiendront à Sa Majesté très Fidelle. La Navigation de la Rivière d' Arawari dans tout son Cours sera commune aux deux Nations.

Les Arrangemens qui ont eu Lieu entre les Cours de Madrid et de Lisbonne, pour la Rectification de leurs Frontières en Europe, seront toutefois exécutés suivant les Stipulations du Traité de Badajoz.

Article VIII.

Les Territoires, Possessions, et Droits de la Porte Ottomane sont maintenus dans leur Intégrité, tels qu'ils étaient avant la Guerre.

Article IX.

La République des Sept Isles est reconnue.

Article X.

Les Isles de Malte, de Gozo, et de Comino, seront rendues à l'Ordre de St. Jean de Jerusalem, pour être par lui tenues aux mêmes Conditions auxquelles il les possédait avant la Guerre, et sous les Stipulations suivantes :

1. Les Chevaliers de l'Ordre, dont les *Langues* continueront à subsister après l'Echange des Ratifications du present Traité, sont invités à retourner à Malte aussitôt que l'Echange aura eu lieu. Ils y formeront un Chapitre général, et procéderont à l'Election d'un Grand Maître, choisi parmi les Natifs des Nations qui conservent des *Langues*, à moins qu'elle n'ait été déjà faite depuis l'Echange des Ratifications des Préliminaires. Il est en-

since the Exchange of the Ratifications of the Preliminary Articles of Peace. It is understood that an Election which shall have been made subsequent to that Period, shall alone be considered as valid, to the Exclusion of every other which shall have taken Place at any Time previous to the said Period.

2. The Governments of Great Britain and of the French Republick, being desirous of placing the Order of Saint John, and the Island of Malta, in a State of entire Independence on each of those Powers, do agree, that there shall be henceforth no English nor French Languages; and that no Individual belonging to either of the said Powers shall be admissible into the Order.

3. A Maltese Language shall be established, to be supported out of the Land Revenues and commercial Duties of the Island. There shall be Dignities, with Appointments, and an *Auberge* appropriated to this Language; no Proofs of Nobility shall be necessary for the Admission of Knights into the said Language; they shall be competent to hold every Office, and to enjoy every Privilege in the like Manner as the Knights of the other Languages. The Municipal, Revenue, Civil, Judicial, and other Offices under the Government of the Island, shall be filled, at least in the Proportion of One Half, by native Inhabitants of Malta, Gozo, and Comino.

4. The Forces of His Britannick Majesty shall evacuate the Island and its Dependencies within Three Months after the Exchange of the Ratifications, or sooner if it can be done: At that Period the Island shall be delivered up to the Order in the State

tendu, qu'une Election faite depuis cette Epoque sera seule considérée comme valable, à l'Exclusion de toute autre qui auroit eu lieu dans aucun Tems antérieur à la dite Epoque.

2. Les Gouvernemens de la Grande Brétagne et de la République Française, désirant mettre l'Ordre et l'Isle de Malte dans un Etat d'Indépendance entière à leur Egard, conviennent qu'il n'y aura désormais ni Langue Angloise ni Française, et que nul Individu appartenant à l'une ou à l'autre de ces Puissances ne pourra être admis dans l'Ordre.

3. Il sera établi une Langue Maltaise, qui sera entretenue par les Revenues Territoriaux et les Droits commerciaux de l'Isle. Cette Langue aura des Dignités qui lui seront propres, des Traitemens, et une Auberge; les Preuves de Noblesse ne seront pas nécessaires pour l'Admission des Chevaliers de la dite Langue; ils seront d'ailleurs admissibles à toutes les Charges, et jouiront de tous les Privileges comme les Chevaliers des autres Langues. Les Emplois Municipaux, Administratifs, Civils, Judiciaires, et autres dépendant du Gouvernement de l'Isle, seront occupés, au moins pour Moitié, par des Habitans des Isles de Malte, Gozo, et Comino.

4. Les Forces de Sa Majesté Britannique évacueront l'Isle et ses Dependances dans les Trois Mois qui suivront l'Echange des Ratifications, ou plutôt si faire se peut: A cette Epoque elle sera remise à l'Ordre dans l'Etat où elle se trouve—pourvu que
le

in which it now is—provided that the Grand Master, or Commissioners, fully empowered according to the Statutes of the Order, be upon the Island to receive Possession; and that the Force to be furnished by His Sicilian Majesty, as hereafter stipulated, be arrived there.

5. The Garrison of the Island shall, at all Times, consist at least One Half of Native Maltese; and the Order shall have the Liberty of recruiting for the Remainder of the Garrison from the Natives of those Countries only that shall continue to possess Langues. The Native Maltese Troops shall be officered by Maltese, and the supreme Command of the Garrison, as well as the Appointment of the Officers, shall be vested in the Grand Master of the Order; and he shall not be at Liberty to divest himself of it, even for a Time, except in Favour of a Knight of the Order, and in consequence of the Opinion of the Council of the Order.

6. The Independence of the Islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino, as well as the present Arrangement, shall be under the Protection and Guarantee of Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia.

7. The perpetual Neutrality of the Order and of the Island of Malta, and its Dependencies, is hereby declared.

8. The Ports of Malta shall be open to the Commerce and Navigation of all Nations, who shall pay equal and moderate Duties. These Duties shall be applied to the Support of the Maltese Langue, in the Manner specified in Paragraph 3, to that of the Civil and Military Establishments

le Grand Maître, ou des Commissaires, pleinement autorisés suivant les Statuts de l'Ordre, soient dans la dite Île pour en prendre Possession, et que la Force qui doit être fournie par Sa Majesté Sicilienne, comme il est après stipulé, y soit arrivée.

5. La Moitié de la Garnison pour le moins sera toujours composée de Maltais Natifs; pour le Restant l'Ordre aura la Faculté de recruter parmi les Natifs des Païs seuls qui continuent de posséder des Langues. Les Troupes Maltaises auront des Officiers Maltais; le Commandement en Chef de la Garnison, ainsi que la Nomination des Officiers appartiendront au Grand Maître; et il ne pourra s'en remettre, même temporairement, qu'en Faveur d'un Chevalier, d'après l'Avis du Conseil de l'Ordre.

6. L'Indépendance des Îles de Malte, de Gozo, et de Comino, ainsi que le présent Arrangement, sont mis sous la Protection et Garantie de la Grande Bretagne, de la France, de l'Autriche, de la Russie, de l'Espagne, et de la Prusse.

7. La Neutralité permanente de l'Ordre et de l'Île de Malte, avec ses Dépendances, est proclamée.

8. Les Ports de Malte seront ouverts au Commerce et à la Navigation de toutes les Nations, qui y payeront des Droits égaux et modérés. Ces Droits seront appliqués à l'Entretien de la Langue Maltaise, comme il est spécifié dans le Paragraph 3, à celui des Etablissements Civils et Militaires de
P 4 l'Île,

of the Island, and to that of a Lazaretto, open to all Flags.

9. The Barbary States are excepted from the Provisions of the Two preceding Paragraphs, until by means of an Arrangement to be made by the contracting Parties, the System of Hostility, which subsists between the said Barbary States, the Order of St. John, and the Powers possessing Langues, or taking Part in the Formation of them, shall be terminated.

10. The Order shall be governed, both in Spiritual and Temporal Matters, by the same Statutes that were in force at the Time when the Knights quitted the Island, so far as the same shall not be derogated from by the present Treaty.

11. The Stipulations contained in Paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10, shall be converted into Laws and perpetual Statutes of the Order, in the customary Manner. And the Grand Master (or, if he should not be in the Island at the Time of its Restitution to the Order, his Representative), as well as his Successors, shall be bound to make Oath to observe them punctually.

12. His Sicilian Majesty shall be invited to furnish Two thousand Men, Natives of His Dominions, to serve as a Garrison for the several Fortresses upon the Island. This Force shall remain there for One Year from the Period of the Restitution of the Island to the Knights; after the Expiration of which Term, if the Order of St. John shall not, in the Opinion of the guarantying Powers, have raised a sufficient Force to garrison the Island and its Dependencies, in the Manner proposed in Paragraph 5, the Neapolitan Troops shall remain, until

l'Isle, ainsi qu'à celui d'un Lazareth ouvert à tous les Pavillons.

9. Les Etats Barbaresques sont exceptés des Dispositions des Deux Paragraphes précédents, jusqu'à ce que par le Moyen d'un Arrangement que procureront les Parties contractantes, le Système d'Hostilité qui subsiste entre les dits Etats Barbaresques, l'Ordre de St. Jean, et les Puissances possédant des Langues, ou concourant à leur Composition, ait cessé.

10. L'Ordre fera régi, quant au Spirituel et au Temporel, par les mêmes Statuts qui étaient en Vigueur lorsque les Chevaliers sont sortis de l'Isle, autant qu'il n'y est pas dérogé par le présent Traité.

11. Les Dispositions contenues dans les Paragraphes 3, 5, 7, 8, et 10, seront converties en Loix et Statuts perpétuels de l'Ordre dans la Forme usitée. Et le Grand Maître (ou, s'il n'étoit pas dans l'Isle au Moment où elle sera remise à l'Ordre, son Représentant), ainsi que ses Successeurs, seront tenus de faire Serment de les observer ponctuellement.

12. Sa Majesté Sicilienne sera invitée à fournir Deux mille Hommes, Natifs de Ses Etats, pour servir de Garnison dans les différentes Fortereffes des dites Isles. Cette Force y restera Un An à dater de leur Restitution aux Chevaliers; et si à l'Expiration de ce Terme, l'Ordre n'avait pas encore levé la Force suffisante, au Jugement des Puissances garantes, pour servir de Garnison dans l'Isle et ses Dépendances, telle qu'elle est spécifiée dans le Paragraph 5, les Troupes Napolitaines y resteront jusqu'à ce qu'elles soient remplacées par une autre

they shall be relieved by another Force, judged to be sufficient by the said Powers.

13. The several Powers specified in Paragraph 6, videlicet, Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia, shall be invited to accede to the present Arrangement.

Article XI.

The French Forces shall evacuate the Kingdom of Naples and the Roman Territory; the English Forces shall in like Manner evacuate Porto Ferrajo, and generally all the Ports and Islands which they may occupy in the Mediterranean or in the Adriatick.

Article XII.

The Evacuations, Cessions, and Restitutions, stipulated for by the present Treaty, except where otherwise expressly provided for, shall take place in Europe within One Month; in the Continent and Seas of America, and of Africa, within Three Months; and in the Continent and Seas of Asia, within Six Months after the Ratification of the present Definitive Treaty.

Article XIII.

In all the Cases of Restitution agreed upon by the present Treaty, the Fortifications shall be delivered up in the State in which they may have been at the Time of the Signature of the Preliminary Treaty; and all the Works which shall have been constructed since the Occupation, shall remain untouched.

It is further agreed, that in all the Cases of Cession stipulated, there shall be allowed to the Inhabitants, of

autre Force jugée suffisante par les dites Puissances.

13. Les différentes Puissances désignées dans le Paragraph 6, savoir, la Grande Brétagne, la France, l'Autriche, la Russie, l'Espagne, et la Prusse, seront invitées à accéder aux présentes Stipulations.

Article XI.

Les Troupes Françaises évacueront le Royaume de Naples, et l'Etat Romain; les Forces Anglaises évacueront pareillement Porto Ferrajo, et généralement tous les Ports et Isles qu'elles occuperaient dans la Méditerranée ou dans l'Adriatique.

Article XII.

Les Evacuations, Cessions, et Restitutions, stipulées par le présent Traité, seront exécutées pour l'Europe dans le Mois; pour le Continent et les Mers d'Amérique et d'Afrique dans les Trois Mois; pour le Continent et les Mers d'Asie dans les Six Mois, qui suivront la Ratification du présent Traité Définitif, excepté dans le Cas où il y est spécialement dérogé.

Article XIII.

Dans tous les Cas de Restitution convenue par le présent Traité, les Fortifications seront rendues dans l'Etat où elles se trouvaient au Moment de la Signature des Préliminaires, et tous les Ouvrages qui auront été construits depuis l'Occupation resteront intacts.

Il est convenu en outre, que dans tous les Cas de Cession stipulés, il sera alloué aux Habitans de quelque Condition

whatever Condition or Nation they may be, a Term of Three Years, to be computed from the Notification of this present Treaty, for the Purpose of disposing of their Property acquired and possessed either before or during the War, in which Term of Three Years they may have the free Exercise of their Religion and Enjoyment of their Property.

The same Privilege is granted in the Countries restored to all those, whether Inhabitants or others, who shall have made therein any Establishments whatsoever during the Time when those Countries were in the Possession of Great Britain.

With respect to the Inhabitants of the Countries restored or ceded, it is agreed that none of them shall be prosecuted, disturbed, or molested in their Persons or Properties under any Pretext, on Account of their Conduct or political Opinions, or of their Attachment to any of the other contracting Powers, nor on any Account, except that of Debts contracted to Individuals, or on Account of Acts posterior to the present Treaty.

Article XIV.

All Sequestrations imposed by any of the Parties on the funded Property, Revenues, or Debts of whatever Description, belonging to any of the contracting Powers, or to their Subjects or Citizens, shall be taken off immediately after the Signature of this Definitive Treaty. The Decision of all Claims brought forward by Individuals, the Subjects or Citizens of any of the contracting Powers respectively, against Individuals, Subjects or Citizens of any of the others, for Rights, Debts, Property, or Effects whatsoever, which, according to received Usages

dition ou Nation qu'ils soient, un Terme de Trois Ans, à compter de la Notification du présent Traité, pour disposer de leurs Propriétés acquises et possédées soit avant soit pendant la Guerre, dans lequel Terme de Trois Ans ils pourront exercer librement leur Religion et jouir de leurs Propriétés.

La même Faculté est accordée dans les Pays restitués à tous ceux, soit Habitans ou autres, qui y auront fait des Etablissmens quelconques pendant le Tems où ces Pays étaient possédés par la Grande Brétagne.

Quant aux Habitans des Pays restitués ou cédés, il est convenu qu'aucun d'eux ne pourra être poursuivi, inquiété, ou troublé dans sa Personne ou dans sa Propriété sous aucun Prétexte, à Cause de sa Conduite ou Opinion politique, ou de son Attachement à aucune des Parties contractantes, ou pour toute autre Raison, si ce n'est pour les Dettes contractées envers des Individus, ou pour des Actes postérieurs au présent Traité.

Article XIV.

Tous les Séquestres mis de Part et d'autre sur les Fonds, Revenus, et Créances, de quelque Espèce qu'ils soient, appartenans à l'une des Puissances contractantes, ou à ses Sujets ou Citoyens, seront levés immédiatement après la Signature de ce Traité Définitif. La Décision de toutes Réclamations entre les Individus des Nations respectives pour Dettes, Propriétés, Effets ou Droits quelconques, qui conformément aux Usages reçus et au Droit des Gens, doivent être reproduites à l'Epoque de la Paix, sera renvoyée devant les Tribunaux compétens ;

and the Law of Nations, ought to revive at the Period of Peace; shall be heard and decided before competent Tribunals; and in all Cases prompt and ample Justice shall be administered in the Countries where the Claims are made.

Article XV.

The Fisheries on the Coast of Newfoundland, and of the adjacent Islands, and of the Gulph of St. Lawrence, are replaced on the same Footing on which they were previous to the War; the French Fishermen and the Inhabitants of Saint Pierre and Miquelon shall have the Privilege of cutting such Wood as they may stand in Need of in the Bays of Fortune and Despair, for the Space of One Year from the Date of the Notification of the present Treaty.

Article XVI.

In order to prevent all Causes of Complaint and Dispute which may arise on Account of Prizes which may have been made at Sea, after the Signature of the Preliminary Articles, it is reciprocally agreed, that the Vessels and Effects which may have been taken in the British Channel, and in the North Sea, after the Space of Twelve Days, to be computed from the Exchange of the Ratifications of the said Preliminary Articles, shall be restored on each Side; that the Term shall be One Month from the British Channel and the North Seas, as far as the Canary Islands inclusively, whether in the Ocean or in the Mediterranean; Two Months from the said Canary Islands as far as the Equator; and lastly, Five Months in all other Parts of the World, without any Exception, or any more particular Description of Time or Place.

pétens; et dans ces Cas il sera rendu une prompte et entière Justice dans le Pays où les Reclamations seront faites respectivement.

Article XV.

Les Pêcheries sur les Côtes de Terre-Neuve, et des Îles adjacentes, et dans le Golphe St. Laurent, sont remises sur le même Pied où elles étaient avant la Guerre; les Pêcheurs François de Terre-Neuve, et les Habitans des Îles de St. Pierre et Miquelon, pourront couper les Bois qui leur seront nécessaires dans les Bayes de Fortune et du Désespoir, pendant la première Année, à compter de la Notification du présent Traité.

Article XVI.

Pour prévenir tous les Sujets de Plainte et de Contestation qui pourraient naître à l'Occasion des Prises qui auraient été faites en Mer, après la Signature des Articles Préliminaires, il est réciproquement convenu, que les Vaisseaux et Effets qui pourraient avoir été pris dans la Manche, et dans les Mers du Nord, après l'Espace de Douze Jours, à compter de l'Echange des Ratifications des Articles Préliminaires, seront de part et d'autre restitués; que le Terme sera d'Un Mois depuis la Manche et les Mers du Nord jusqu'aux Îles Canaries inclusivement, soit dans l'Océan soit dans la Méditerranée; de Deux Mois depuis les Îles Canaries jusqu'à l'Equateur; et enfin, de Cinq Mois dans toutes les autres Parties du Monde, sans aucune Exception, ni autre Distinction plus particulière de Temps et de Lieu.

Article

Article XVII.

The Ambassadors, Ministers, and other Agents of the contracting Powers, shall enjoy respectively in the States of the said Powers, the same Rank, Privileges, Prerogatives, and Immunities, which publick Agents of the same Class enjoyed previous to the War.

Article XVIII.

The Branch of the House of Nassau, which was established in the Republick formerly called the Republick of the United Provinces, and now the Batavian Republick, having suffered Losses there, as well in private Property as in consequence of the Change of Constitution adopted in that Country, an adequate Compensation shall be procured for the said Branch of the House of Nassau for the said Losses.

Article XIX.

The present Definitive Treaty of Peace is declared common to the Sublime Ottoman Porte, the Ally to His Britannick Majesty; and the Sublime Porte shall be invited to transmit its Act of Accession thereto, in the shortest Delay possible.

Article XX.

It is agreed that the contracting Parties shall, on Requisitions made by them respectively, or by their Ministers or Officers duly authorized to make the same, deliver up to Justice, Persons accused of Crimes of Murder, Forgery, or fraudulent Bankruptcy, committed within the Jurisdiction of the requiring Party; provided that this shall be done only when the Evidences of the Criminality shall be so authenticated as that the Laws of the Country where the Person so accused shall be found, would justify his Apprehension and

Article XVII.

Les Ambassadeurs, Ministres, et autres Agents des Puissances contractantes jouiront respectivement dans les Etats des dites Puissances, des mêmes Rangs, Privilèges, Prérogatives, et Immunités, dont jouissaient avant la Guerre les Agents de la même Classe.

Article XVIII.

La Branche de la Maison de Nassau, qui était établie dans la ci-devant République des Provinces Unies, actuellement la République Batave, y ayant fait des Pertes tant en Propriété particulière que par le Changement de Constitution adopté dans ce Pays, il lui sera procuré une Compensation équivalente pour les dites Pertes.

Article XIX.

Le présent Traité Définitif de Paix est déclaré commun à la Sublime Porte Ottomane, Alliée de Sa Majesté Britannique; et la Sublime Porte sera invitée à transmettre son Acte d'Accession dans le plus court Délai possible.

Article XX.

Il est convenu que les Parties contractantes sur les Réquisitions faites par elles respectivement, ou par leurs Ministres ou Officiers dûement autorisés à cet Effet, seront tenus de livrer en Justice les Personnes accusées des Crimes de Meurtre, de Falsification, ou Banqueroute frauduleuse, commis dans la Jurisdiction de la Partie requerrante; pourvu que cela ne soit fait que lorsque l'Evidence du Crime sera si bien constatée que les Loix du Lieu où l'on decouvrira la Personne ainsi accusée, auraient autorisé sa Détention

et

Commitment for Trial, if the Offence had been there committed. The Expenses of such Apprehension and Delivery shall be borne and defrayed by those who make the Requisition. It is understood that this Article does not regard in any Manner Crimes of Murder, Forgery, or fraudulent Bankruptcy, committed antecedently to the Conclusion of this Definitive Treaty.

Article XXI.

The contracting Parties promise to observe sincerely and *bonâ Fide* all the Articles contained in the present Treaty; and they will not suffer the same to be infringed, directly or indirectly, by their respective Subjects or Citizens; and the said contracting Parties generally and reciprocally guaranty to each other all the Stipulations of the present Treaty.

Article XXII.

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the contracting Parties in Thirty Days, or sooner if possible, and the Ratifications shall be exchanged in due Form at Paris.

In Witness whereof, we, the underwritten Plenipotentiaries, have signed with our Hands, and in virtue of our respective Full Powers, the present Definitive Treaty, and have caused our respective Seals to be affixed thereto.

Done at Amiens, the Twenty-seventh Day of March One thousand eight hundred and two; the Sixth Germinal, Year Ten of the French Republick.

(L. S.) CORNWALLIS.
(L. S.) JOSEPH BONAPARTE.
(L. S.) J. NICOLAS DE AZARA.
(L. S.) R. J. SCHIMMELPENNINCK.

et sa Traduction devant la Justice au cas que le Crime y eut été commis. Les Fraix de la Prise de Corps et la Traduction en Justice seront à la Charge de ceux qui feront la Requisition. Bien entendu que cet Article ne régarde en aucune Manière les Crimes de Meurtre, de Falsification, ou de Banqueroute frauduleuse, commis antérieurement à la Conclusion de ce Traité Définitif.

Article XXI.

Les Parties contractantes promettent d'observer sincèrement et de bonne Foi tous les Articles contenus au présent Traité; et elles ne souffriront pas qu'il y soit fait de Contravention, directe ou indirecte, par leurs Sujets ou Citoyens respectifs; et les susdites Parties contractantes se garantissent généralement et réciproquement toutes les Stipulations du présent Traité.

Article XXII.

Le présent Traité sera ratifié par les Parties contractantes dans l'Espace de Trente Jours, ou plutôt si faire se peut, et les Ratifications en due Forme seront échangées à Paris.

En Foi de quoi, nous, soussignés Plénipotentiaires, avons signé de notre Main, et en vertu de nos Pleinpouvoirs respectifs, le présent Traité Définitif, et y avons fait apposer nos Cachets respectifs.

Fait à Amiens, le Vingt-sept Mars, Mil huit cent deux; le Six Germinal, An Dix de la République Française.

(L. S.) CORNWALLIS.
(L. S.) JOSEPH BONAPARTE.
(L. S.) J. NICOLAS DE AZARA.
(L. S.) R. J. SCHIMMELPENNINCK.

ARTICLE

SEPARATE ARTICLE.

It is agreed that the Omission of some Titles which may have taken Place in the present Treaty shall not be prejudicial to the Powers or to the Persons concerned.

It is further agreed that the English and French Languages made Use of in all the Copies of the present Treaty shall not form an Example, which may be alleged or quoted as a Precedent, or in any Manner prejudice the contracting Powers whose Languages have not been used; and that for the future what has been observed, and ought to be observed, with Regard to, and on the Part of, Powers who are in the Practice and Possession of giving and receiving Copies of like Treaties in any other Language, shall be conformed with; the present Treaty having nevertheless the same Force and Virtue as if the aforesaid Practice had been therein observed.

In Witness whereof, we, the underwritten Plenipotentiaries of his Britannick Majesty, of the French Republick, of his Catholick Majesty, and of the Batavian Republick, have signed the present separate Article, and have caused our respective Seals to be affixed thereto.

Done at Amiens, the Twenty-seventh Day of March One thousand eight hundred and two; the Sixth Germinal, Year Ten of the French Republick.

(L. S.) CORNWALLIS.

(L. S.) JOSEPH BONAPARTE.

(L. S.) J. NICOLAS DE AZARA.

(L. S.) R. J. SCHIMMELPENNINCK.

ARTICLE SÉPARÉ.

Il est convenu que l'Omission qui pourroit avoir eu lieu de quelques Titres dans le présent Traité ne sera pas préjudiciable aux Puissances ou aux Personnes intéressées.

Il est également convenu que les Langues Anglaise et Française employées dans tous les Exemplaires du présent Traité, ne fourniront point un Exemple qui puisse être allégué, ni tirer à Conséquence, ni porter Préjudice en aucune Manière aux Puissances contractantes dont les Langues n'ont pas été employées; et que l'on se conformera à l'avenir à ce qui a été observé, et doit être observé, à l'Egard et de la Part des Puissances qui sont en Usage et Possession de donner et de recevoir des Exemplaires des semblables Traités en une autre Langue; le présent Traité ne laissant pas d'avoir la même Force et Vertu que si le susdit Usage y avait été observé.

En Foi de quoi, nous, soussignés Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté Britannique, de la République Française, de Sa Majesté Catholique, et de la République Batave, avons signé le présent Article séparé, et y avons fait apposer nos Cachets respectifs.

Fait à Amiens, le Vingt-sept Mars Mil huit cent deux; le Six Germinal, An Dix de la République Française.


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(L. S.) JOSEPH BONAPARTE.


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(L. S.) R. J. SCHIMMELPENNINCK.





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